



**ALBERTA
MILITARY
INSTITUTE**

**JOURNAL
1945**

Published Annually by
THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE
Incorporated
Calgary, Alberta

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
mac

...and all I said was, "Here's your CALGARY Ginger Ale ma'am!"





Published Annually by
THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE
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Calgary, Alberta



FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

A PERSONAL MESSAGE

from

**LT.-GEN. H. D. G. CRERAR, C.B., D.S.O.,
GOC-in-C, FIRST CDN ARMY**

It is not possible for me to speak to each one of you, but by means of this personal message, I want all ranks of the Canadian Army to know what is in my mind, as the hour approaches when we go forward into battle.

I have complete confidence in our ability to meet the tests which lie ahead. We are excellently trained and equipped. The quality of both senior and junior leadership is of the highest. As Canadians, we inherit military characteristics which were feared by the enemy in the last Great War. They will be still more feared before this war terminates.

The Canadian formations in the assault landing will have a vital part to play. The plans, the preparations, the methods and the technique, which will be employed, are based on knowledge and experience bought and paid for by 2 Canadian Division at DIEPPE. The contribution of that hazardous operation cannot be over-estimated. It will prove to have been the essential prelude to our forthcoming and final success.

We enter into this decisive phase of the war with full faith in our cause, with calm confidence in our abilities and with grim determination to finish quickly and unmistakably this job we came overseas to do.

As in 1918, the Canadians, in Italy, and in North West Europe, will hit the enemy again and again, until at some not distant time, the converging Allied Armies link together and we will be rejoined, in Victory, with our comrades of 1 Canadian Corps.

To be read to all troops.

(H. D. G. Crerar) Lt.-Gen.

GENERAL CRERAR'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO CANADIAN
TROOPS BEFORE THE LAUNCHING OF OPERATION "OVERLORD".



(From an oil painting by Lieut. T. R. Macdonald, June 1944)

GENERAL H. G. D. CRERAR, C.H., C.B., D.S.O.,
G.O.C.-in-C., FIRST CANADIAN ARMY.

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.



D-DAY—A "RHINO FERRY" APPROACHING THE BEACH.

(From an oil painting by Captain N. Fisher)


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(From a watercolor portrait by Major C. F. Comfort)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL G. G. SIMONDS, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.
G.O.C. 2nd CANADIAN CORPS.

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.



"THE OLD TOWN THAT HAD COST SO MUCH GOOD BLOOD WAS ITSELF A SHAMBLES."
A military policeman directs traffic in blazing Falaise.

(From "Canada's Battle in Normandy")

REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

In Memoriam



MAJOR F. A. BAGLEY

CAPTAIN F. J. FENDALL

LIEUT. R. H. GOODCHILD

LIEUT. D. F. HARVEY

CAPTAIN R. V. VALENTINE

MAJOR A. G. WILLSON

LIEUT.-COMMANDER C. E. YOUNG

1945 ANNUAL JOURNAL

of

THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE (Incorporated)

LIEUT. W. NORMAN SMITH, Editor.

LIEUT. M. H. ROBINSON, Advertising Manager.

MAJOR A. J. DAVIS, E.D., Business Manager.

Twenty-sixth Year.

December, 1945

The Alberta Military Institute does not hold itself responsible for the opinions expressed by speakers and reported herein, and no official opinions are given

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PALACE

CALGARY'S FAMILY THEATRE

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Manager

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Col. Snow Succeeds Brig. Harvey



COL. T. E. SNOW, O.B.E.



BRIG. F. M. W. HARVEY, V.C., M.C.

AT a meeting of the Alberta Military Institute on 7th December, 1945, good wishes were extended to Brigadier F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C., on his retirement as District Officer Commanding M.D. 13. Colonel T. E. Snow was welcomed upon his appointment as Brigadier Harvey's successor.

Brigadier Harvey was appointed D.O.C. at Calgary in November, 1940. Born in Ireland, he enlisted in the Canadian Mounted Rifles at Macleod in 1915. After passing through non-commissioned ranks, he was appointed lieutenant in 1916, and went overseas with the C.M.R.'s, later transferring to the Lord Strathcona's Horse, in which he served to the end of the war. He won the Victoria Cross in March, 1917, at Peronne, north of the Somme. Following World War I, he transferred to the permanent force, and rose to command the L.S.H. (R.C.) in which he served prior to being appointed to command Currie Barracks Infantry (Rifle) Training Centre early in 1940.

Immediately prior to taking his present command, Colonel Snow was commanding officer of the Canadian School of Infantry at Vernon, B.C. He is a native of St. John, N.B. First commissioned in the Saint John Fusiliers, he was physical training instructor at Royal Military College, Kingston, before the war. He went overseas with the Royal Canadian Regiment in 1939, and was in command from 1941 to 1943. He had temporary command of a brigade in Italy, and in 1944 he returned to Canada to command the school at Vernon. In the King's Birthday Honours List for 1946, Colonel Snow was made an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Military Division). He is Honorary President of the Alberta Military Institute.

The Alberta Military Institute

(Incorporated 1920)
CALGARY.

PATRONS

HIS Excellency Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis, G.C.B., C.C.M.G., C.S.I.,
D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., Governor-General of Canada.
The Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, C.M.G., P.C., M.A., LL.B., LL.D., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada.
Hon. Col. Viscount Bennett, E.D., P.C., K.C., LL.B., LL.D.,
Lt.-General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., Chief of the General Staff in Canada.
Major-General A. H. Bell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Major-General C. R. Pearkes, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., M.P.
Colonel G. E. Sanders, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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Colonel T. E. Snow, O.B.E.
District Officer Commanding M.D. No. 13

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Lt.-Col. J. W. Littleton, M.C.	Major N. A. Campbell
Capt. D. C. Sinclair	Capt. R. C. Carlile

OFFICERS FOR 1946

PRESIDENT

Lt.-Col. H. E. Wright, E.D.

IMMEDIATE PAST PRESIDENT

Capt. R. C. Carlile

VICE-PRESIDENT

Lt.-Col. J. Begg, D.S.O., E.D.

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
President's Annual Address, 1945

(By. Captain R. C. CARLILE)

THE policy of your directors during the last year has been based on the realization that this Institute can provide a central meeting point for officers of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Consequently they took steps to acquaint officers on discharge, of our facilities. The response has been excellent and our Institute now is a mixture of the older men of the first War and the younger men of this war.

As the incoming directors will probably be composed half of officers of this war, a certain number who were in both, and a minority who were in the First War only, the same policy will probably be continued. This policy has had the complete endorsement of the old members, who have all shown a keen desire to welcome the younger men.

The Royal Canadian Navy officers have formed a naval organization. We told Lt./Comm. Elliott, the officer commanding H.M.C.S. Tecumseh, that our Institute would be glad to have all naval officers possible as our members, and in any way to work with and be of assistance to the Calgary Branch of the Navy Association.



CAPTAIN R. C. CARLILE

It is regrettable that the R.C.A.F. have no central headquarters in Calgary any longer; but it is our privilege to make their officers feel that this Institute is as much theirs as the Army's and Navy's.

Capt. Ralph Wilson edited the Journal last year. He was promoted afterwards to edit the Maple Leaf in Germany. The new directors may be able to get Norman Smith to edit it for us this year. It will include speeches made during the year. The outstanding feature last year in our addresses was the general coverage of war activity in its different phases by different services.

Addresses Of Year Outstanding

From Lt./Col Don G MacLauchlan, D.S.O., we received a very precise picture of the internal organization of the Canadian Army before and during the invasion. Capt. Arthur Maw, M.C., gave us a friendly talk about action under fire. Without meaning to do so, he made me feel very pleased not to be lying on my stomach ahead of Units, waiting for the German guns to drop shells on me outside of Falaise.

Lt.-Col. F. D. Adams, D.S.O., led the Recce Unit of the Canadian Corps in going up the East Coast of Italy. The speed with which they moved forward, crossed broken bridges, and even behind enemy lines, was extraordinary.

Major L. G. Alexander, M.B.E., M.C., was in the thick of everything, both in Italy and in Normandy. He talked to us about the Medical Organization practically in the front line, but gave very little indication of the danger he lived in. We had a picture presented to us in two addresses about the forward march from England, across the sea through Normandy, across the old battlefields, the surrender of Le Havre, Dieppe, Bologne, Calais, of the hard battle for the port of Antwerp, ending with the final advance from Nymegen, through the Reichswald and the Hochwald, across the Rhine, back through Holland at the end of the War. Part of this picture was given by Major H S Patterson as he moved through it with the Signals. The other part was given by Brig. C Churchill Mann, C.B.E., D.S.O., who was Chief-of-Staff under General Crerar.

Lt. Davies, Superintendent of the Experimental Station at Suffield, told us about many of the war secrets, but could not tell us what we all wanted to know, namely, about the Atom Bomb. Lt./Col. H. N. Watson, in command of the prisoner of war camp at Seebe, illustrated his address with some of the prisoners' work. I shall never forget the excellent picture of the very handsome Nazi officer with the most cruel eyes I have ever seen. We heard about Ceylon and the early stages of the Japanese War as it affected the defence of India, from Major M. G. Dover; and about life in the Argentine from F/O. Rev. V. S. Lord

Two Dinners During Year

We had two dinners during the year. For Vimy Day, L. W. Brockington, K.C., came all the way from Ottawa especially to address us. He was at the top of his form. A special dinner was held January 21, 1946, for General Crerar, to which we invited all officers who were not members as well as, of course, members and their friends. To be noted at this dinner were the large number of officers back from this war. After the dinner, the

General talked with officers he knew personally. His wide acquaintance was a pleasant surprise. This is a good place to thank Major A. J. Davis for his good work as Secretary, as the General complimented us on our staff work for the dinner.

A.M.I. Cadets Have Successful Year

The A.M.I. Cadets were under the care of Major H. Chapman, and have never been more successful. They won the E. M. Adams shield for efficiency. We had three cadets who won Master Badges. We have to find new premises for the Corps, as Willingdon Hall will no longer be available after May 31st. The boys provided a Guard of Honor to General Crerar. They were well turned out and gave a smart performance, just as they had done on Vimy night when inspected by Brig. F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C. Due to the kindness of R. W. Wright of Irricana, our boys had an excellent camp in the summer.

Many thanks to Major A. H. Norrington for the work he did in organizing a Christmas concert. Unfortunately we could not get the Mess Room, and the concert will probably be put on in February.

The New Year's reception was better attended than ever before.

Our finances were improved by the Alberta Government's decision to make good on its bonds.

For years Brig. F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C., has been connected with the Institute. Many of our speakers recently, as well as in years gone by, have come to us through his help. He is now retired and has gone for a trip to New Zealand. He will be back again to live in Calgary.

After demobilization is completed it is our policy to make the Garrison Officers' Mess as much as possible a club for our members where they can obtain refreshment and meet old friends. It will probably be six months before we can get the full advantages.

Owing to the death of my predecessor, Lt. Tommy Collinge, my term in the chair has been longer than that of any other president. This has had no effect on the progress and usefulness of the Institute, as the policy is always laid down by the Board of Directors. To them as a body, I pay tribute for their wisdom. As individuals, they all undertook various jobs and did them well.

As only two nominations were made by members to the offices of the Institute, for 1946, the nomination committee has brought in a slate of officers to include these. Under Lt./Col. Harold E. Wright as President, the Institute should have a most successful year in 1946.



THE PRESIDENT

Lieut.-Col. H. E. Wright, E.D., President of the Alberta Military Institute for 1946, was commissioned in the N.P.A.M. in 1930. In 1939 he mobilized the 91st Field Battery, R.C.A., which he took overseas in 1940. In Britain he became successively 2 i/c and, in 1941, acting C.O. of the 6th Field Regiment. In January, 1942, he was placed in command of the 11th Army Field Regiment, which he took to Sicily with the First Canadian Army Group, Royal Artillery. In the succeeding Italian campaign,

under his command, this Regiment served with the 8th and 5th Armies, supporting the Indian Division in the big show at Cassino and in various operations, the New Zealand and other divisions. Lt.-Col. Wright left Italy for Canada when the Canadian Corps was at rest in the fall of 1944, resuming his connection with the Reserve forces in Command of the 19th Medium Regiment. He is District Manager of Canadian Bakeries, Ltd., for Saskatchewan and Alberta.

Lt.-Col. John Begg, D.S.O., E.D., Vice-President for 1946, saw active service in both First and Second World Wars. From 1915 to 1919 he served in the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and he was wounded in action at Cambrai in 1918. He was an officer in the Calgary Regiment, N.P.A.M., from 1919 to 1941, when he went overseas with the 14th Canadian Army Tank Regiment, of which he became 2 i/c. He fought with that Regiment in the Dieppe raid of August 19th, 1942, taking command when the C.O., Lt.-Col. John G. Andrews, was killed in action, and winning the D.S.O. He continued in command of the "Calgary Tanks" until April, 1943. From then until July, 1944, he commanded No. 1 Canadian Armoured Training Regiment, Camp Borden, and after filling various military appointments he returned to civil life in November, 1944. Lt.-Col. Begg is Credit Manager for the Motor Car Supply Company of Canada, Ltd., Calgary.



THE VICE-PRESIDENT

Report of the Auditor

By LIEUT. F. J. BUTLER

Sir:

I HAVE completed the Audit of the Books and Records of the Alberta Military Institute for the year ended 31st December, 1945, and report as follows:

Bank Balance—Current Account \$3.28 has been confirmed by Certificate received from the Bank of Montreal. Cash on hand of \$5.00 was counted and confirmed by me.

Investments—Bonds and Savings Certificates having a market value as at 31st December, 1945, of \$8,574.50 were inspected by me and found in order. The Securities are kept in a Safe Deposit Box at the Bank of Montreal.

Library—No change from last Balance Sheet.

Office Equipment, etc.—No change from last Balance Sheet

Surplus Account—The Balance of this account, which stood at \$8,116.33, has increased to \$8,780.86 owing to appreciation values of Stocks, etc., less loss on the year of \$242.66.

All receipts of Cash and Disbursements made were properly vouched by me.

The Books and Records have been well kept and reflect great credit on Major McCarthy, your treasurer.

Subject to the foregoing remarks, I certify in my opinion the attached Balance Sheet and Revenue Statement dated 31st December, 1945, are correct and in accordance with the explanations given to me and to the Books of the Institute.



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The Treasurer's Report

By CAPT. L. G. McCARTHY

Mr. President and Gentlemen:

Copies of the Financial Statement of the Alberta Military Institute for the fiscal period ended December 31st, 1945, were mailed to members along with notice of this meeting.

Government Grants

The Department of National Defence, General Services, made a grant of \$250.00 to the Institute in 1945; also a grant of \$44.00 to the Bugle Band of the Institute Cadet Corps.

The Alberta Military Institute Cadet Corps

A grant of \$250.00 was made by the Institute for use of the Cadet Corps, and a further grant of \$322.70 was made for the purpose of covering the expense of a camp at Sylvan Lake for the younger Cadets whose age would not permit them attending the regular camp for Cadets held at Sarcee Camp. In all, a total of \$496.08 was expended on the Cadet Corps.

Accounts Receivable and Payable

The \$5.00 item in Accounts Receivable is for advertising in the A.M.I. Journal, and is collectable. There are no Accounts Payable on the books.

Membership Dues

Membership dues collected for the year amounted to \$1,361.50, an increase of \$214.00 over the \$1,147.50 collected in the year 1944. Prepaid dues were collected in the amount of \$66.00. These figures do not represent total dues for actual membership, as officers who were returned from overseas in the year 1945 were accepted as members without the payment of dues for that year.

Investment Securities

The Investment Securities of the Institute as at December 31st, 1945, were as follows:

	Par Value	Cost	Market Value Dec. 31st, 1945
Dominion of Canada War Savings Certificates	\$ 600.00	\$ 480.00	No Market
Dominion of Canada Bonds	3,900.00	3,900.00	\$4,040.50
Province of Alberta Bonds	3,400.00	2,978.50	4,534.00
	<u>\$7,900.00</u>	<u>\$7,358.50</u>	<u>\$8,574.50</u>

The market value of the bonds increased during the fiscal period by \$907.19. This amount has been added to Surplus Account.

THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE ANNUAL JOURNAL

During the year three Alberta Bonds were redeemed by the Province for \$700.00, and Dominion of Canada Bonds were purchased in the amount of \$800.00.

Profit and Loss and Surplus

The Revenue Statement shows an expenditure of \$242.66 in excess of receipts, accounted for by a drop in advertising receipts for the A.M.I. Journal; increased costs for the Vimy Dinner, and lectures during the year; and a drop in the amounts received from the Government on account of the Cadet Corps

There is an increase in Surplus Account of \$664.50 over the fiscal period ending 31st December, 1944, accounted for by the purchase of another \$100.00 bond, and an increase in the market value of bonds held.

Membership

The membership as at December 31st, 1945, was as follows

Honorary Members	6
Resident Members—Paid	212
Resident Members—Unpaid	44
Privileged Members—paid	100
Privileged Members—Unpaid	22
Members back from Overseas (No dues collected 1945)	
(Resident)	111
(Privileged)	12
TOTAL	507

For the fiscal period ending December 31st, 1939, at the commencement of hostilities, membership was 482, and Surplus Account \$6,560.09.

For the fiscal period ending December 31st, 1945, membership was 507, and Surplus Account \$8,780 86.



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THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE

BALANCE SHEET—DECEMBER 31st, 1945

ASSETS		LIABILITIES	
Cash—			
Cash on Hand	\$ 5.00	Outstanding Cheques	\$ 89.60
Bank Balance—Current Account	3.28	Prepaid Dues	66.00
Accounts Receivable	5.00	Suspense Account	1.00
		Surplus Account as at Jan 1, 1945	\$8,116.33
Investments—		Add. Adjustment of Investments to	
Bonds and Savings Certificates	8,574.50	Market Value as at	
(at Market Value, Dec. 31, 1945)		December 31st, 1945	907.19
Par Value \$7,900.00. Cost \$7,358.50			9,023.52
Library	306.18		
Office Equipment, Pictures, etc.	43.50	Less. Loss for Year as per	
		Revenue Statement	242.66
	<u>\$8,937.46</u>		<u>8,780.86</u>
			<u>\$8,937.46</u>

Audited and found correct:

F. J. BUTLER, Auditor Lieut
Calgary, Alberta, January 16th, 1946.

Certified Correct

L. G. MCCARTHY, Major, Treasurer

THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE ANNUAL JOURNAL

REVENUE STATEMENT
For Year Ended 31st December, 1945

RECEIPTS

Membership Dues		\$1,361.50
Grant—General Services, Ottawa		250 00
Interest		302.10
A M I. Journal—Receipts for Advertising	\$ 513 05	
Less: Cost of Publishing	476.09	36 96
		<u>1,950 56</u>

DISBURSEMENTS

Garrison Officers' Mess C.A —			
Proportion of Current Membership Dues	\$ 469 00		
Lectures, etc.—			
Refreshments for Meetings	\$ 140.00		
Expenses	47 50	187.50	
Vimy Dinner Expense	1,061.62		
Less: Receipts	710 00	351 62	
New Year's Reception, 1945		42 78	
A M I. Cadet Corps—			
1945 Camp Expense	322 70		
Accident Policy	10 00		
Bugle Band	132 14		
Receiver-General of Canada (Boots)	67.50		
Miscellaneous	87.74		
	<u>620 08</u>		
Less. Gov't Grant—Band	\$44.00		
Reimbursement—Boots	80 00	124 00	496.08
General Expense—			
Honorariums.			
Secretary—Clerical Help	150 00		
Treasurer—Clerical Help	150.00	300.00	
Exchange		.45	
Multigraphing		154.20	
Postage and Excise		47.26	
Printing, Stationery and Office Supplies		61.47	
Fire Insurance Premium		5 80	
Safety Deposit Box		5.00	
Wreaths		17.50	
Audit		30.00	
Miscellaneous		24 56	
TOTAL EXPENSE FOR YEAR 1945		<u>2,193.22</u>	
BALANCE, Being Loss for Year to Surplus Account		<u>242.66</u>	
		<u>\$1,950.56</u>	<u>\$1,950.56</u>

INVESTMENTS AS AT DECEMBER 31st, 1945

No.	Date of Purchase	Due Date	Int. Rate	Half Int.	Amount Par Value	Cost	Market Value Dec. 31, '45	Coupons Due	Cashed to	Amount of each Coupon	Half Amount
PROVINCE OF ALBERTA BONDS:											
2463	Mar., 1932	Apr. 1, 1961	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	\$1,000.00	\$ 790.00	\$1,360.00	Apr. & Oct.	Apr., 1945	\$22.50	\$11.25
2968	July, 1932	Apr. 1, 1961	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	500.00	400.00	680.00	Jan. & July	Jan., 1945	11.25	5.62 1/2
2577	Mar., 1926	Jan. 15, 1946	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	500.00	475.00	640.00			11.25	5.62 1/2
2578	Mar., 1926	Jan. 15, 1946	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	500.00	475.00	640.00			11.25	5.62 1/2
1499	Sept., 1929	Jan. 15, 1946	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	100.00	94.50	128.00			2.25	1.12 1/2
1500	"	Jan. 15, 1946	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	100.00	94.50	128.00			2.25	1.12 1/2
1501	"	Jan. 15, 1946	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	100.00	94.50	128.00			2.25	1.12 1/2
4338	Nov., 1930	Oct. 1, 1959	5%	2 1/2%	500.00	500.00	695.00	Apr. & Oct.	April, 1945	12.50	6.25
3355	Feb., 1938	May 1, 1961	4 1/2%	2 1/4%	100.00	55.00	135.00	May & Nov.	May, 1945	2.25	1.12 1/2
					\$3,400.00	\$2,978.50	\$4,534.00			\$77.75	\$38.87 1/2
DOMINION OF CANADA BONDS:											
A010910	Sept., 1931	Nov. 1, 1959	4 1/2%		\$ 100.00	\$ 100.00	\$ 109.00	May & Nov.		2.25	4.50
A010911	"	Nov. 1, 1959	4 1/2%		100.00	100.00	109.00			11.25	22.50
Z2487	"	Nov. 1, 1957	4 1/2%		500.00	500.00	525.00			11.25	22.50
Z12446	"	Nov. 1, 1959	4 1/2%		500.00	500.00	545.00			1.50	3.00
Z802861	Nov., 1943	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		100.00	100.00	102.50			1.50	3.00
A802859	"	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		100.00	100.00	102.50			1.50	3.00
A802858	"	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		100.00	100.00	102.50			1.50	3.00
A802857	"	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		100.00	100.00	102.50			1.50	3.00
B0103499	"	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		100.00	100.00	102.50			1.50	3.00
B0103500	"	Nov. 1, 1957	3%		500.00	500.00	512.50			7.50	15.00
A112252	May, 1944	June 1, 1960	3%		500.00	500.00	512.50			1.50	3.00
A112253	"	June 1, 1960	3%		100.00	100.00	101.75			1.50	3.00
A112254	"	June 1, 1960	3%		100.00	100.00	101.75			1.50	3.00
A112255	"	June 1, 1960	3%		100.00	100.00	101.75			1.50	3.00
B1124397	Nov., 1945	Nov. 1, 1966	3%		500.00	500.00	505.00	Mar. & Sept.		7.50	15.00
A533984	"	Nov. 1, 1966	3%		100.00	100.00	101.00			1.50	3.00
A533985	"	Nov. 1, 1966	3%		100.00	100.00	101.00			1.50	3.00
A533986	"	Nov. 1, 1966	3%		100.00	100.00	101.00			1.50	3.00
					\$3,900.00	\$3,900.00	\$4,040.50				\$135.00

A. M. I. Library

(By Lieut. M. H. ROBINSON)

Mr. President and Gentlemen.

IN presenting this report, I am pleased to state that the Library is being fairly well patronized once again, and no doubt with more of our members returning from overseas, together with the addition of new members, it will be used still more extensively.

Several of the long overdue books are back in the bookcase, and it is hoped that eventually all will be returned.

As I intimated in my last report, we had a new book on order, namely, "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild. This has since arrived and been read by several of the members and has proven an interesting addition. One other book, "The History of the 16th Scottish", has also been bought and placed in the Library.

I recommend that a sum of \$25.00 be authorized for use of the Library during 1946.

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Alberta Military Institute Cadets

(By MAJOR L. H. CHAPMAN, E.D.)

IT is nearly twenty years since this Institute decided to sponsor a Cadet Company, and in spite of all the starvation years of the N.P.A.M., with its ups and downs, it is still maintaining its high standard of recruits, many of them finding their way into the N.P.A.M. and later helping in forming the nucleus of the Army which is now being demobilised. We are now faced with losing our splendid drill hall on May 31st, and I hope all members interested will see that in time efforts be made to have the Cadet movement, this Corps of ours in particular, housed in a Permanent Home.

We have 225 uniforms and have provided 100 pairs of boots.

Following a winter of real training under the Cadet Syllabus, the first social event of the last season (1945) was—

April 4th—Colonel LeBlanc, of the Inter-Cadet Committee, Navy, Army and Air Force, visited and reported favourably on work of the Company.

April 9th—Guard of Honour for Vimy Dinner. Complimented for its smart turnout and steadiness by Brigadier Harvey, V.C., D.O.C. 13. Received a special letter of commendation from D.O.C. This was placed in the Archives of the Cadets. The four senior Cadet Officers were guests of the Institute at the dinner, a privilege much appreciated by these young lads. The members of the Guard were the guests of Mr. Pete Egan of the Palace Theatre.

April 13th—Colonel Holloway, Chief Cadet Officer, spent evening on every phase of work. Guard of Honour put on at his request. Was delighted to see Company functioning without instructors.

April 15th—Final examination of three Master Cadets.

April 22nd—St. George's Day. Church Parade to St. Barnabas Church—92 Cadets and 4 Officers present, including Band of 24. Nice day. Very smart turnout. Lt.-Col. J. Begg, D.S.O., took the salute. Band had white drum aprons for first time.

April 23rd—Eighth Victory Loan Parade—28 boys took part, 4 as Standard Bearers, 24 lined streets. Good show.

May 8th—Inter-Cadet Demonstration at the Armouries. Announcing over loud-speaker system by Cadet Officers of their



The first three Master Cadets of Canada taken with Brig. Harvey, V.C., D.S.O., D.O.C., M.D. 13, following Presentation of the Awards.
Left to Right—Cadet Lt. J. Kadlec, Cadet Capt. F. W. Chapman, the Brigadier, and Cadet Major R. Oldaker.

Unveiling the Honour Roll by Col. E. R. Knight, V.D., Chaplain Major W. H. Morgan. Thirty-six Cadets are shown on the Roll, five of whom made the Supreme Sacrifice.

own demonstration; i.e., Bren Gun, 2-inch Mortar and Rifle Coaching. 130 on Parade including Band of 24.

May 18th—Three Cadet Officers qualified for Master Cadets. First three in Canada following Colonel Holloway's visit.

May 22nd—Full parade outdoors. Band of 24 and 125 Cadets on Parade. President of A.M.I., Mr. R. Carlyle, and five Directors present at presentation of Master Cadet's Star by Brigadier F. W. Harvey, V.C., D O C, to

Cadet Major R. Oldaker,
Cadet Captain F. W. Chapman,
Cadet Lieut. J. Kadlec, and
5th Chevron to Cadet Sgt. C. Dingle.

May 23rd—Inter-Cadet Dance at Western Canada College—35 present.

June 8th—Inter-Cadet Sports at Mewata—30 attended Had no practice whatever, just a get-together

June 22nd—Annual Inspection by Capt. Ritson-Bennett—135 on parade. After the March Past, parade broke off into classes, and demonstrations were given by the Officers in map reading, Bren gun, revolver, 2-inch mortar and rifle handling, each class being visited by the parents present. Capt. Bennett addressed the boys and presented St. John Ambulance Certificates to 20 of the Junior Cadets.

June 29th—Unveiling and consecrating of Roll of Honour with 36 Cadets named, who had enlisted in the Active Army, 5 of whom made the Supreme Sacrifice. Colonel E. R. Knight, V.D., did the unveiling following a splendid address on Service and Citizenship advising the Cadets to read the lives of Lord Strathcona and Premier Smuts of South Africa. Major Canon W. H. Morgan consecrated the Honour Roll. A Guard of 12 was present in charge of Cadet Lt. F. McCall. Ninety-six on Parade in charge of Cadet Major R. Oldaker.

July 6th to 20th—Camp at Sarcee for Senior Cadets. Sixty-six including Band attended and in spite of considerable wet weather the Camp proved very instructive and enjoyable. A great change was noted due to the attendance of Capt. Steckle and Lt. French to watch the interests of this particular Cadet Company.

July 9th—Stampede. Two composite platoons were in the Parade. A.M.I. had 34 and 2 officers, band of 22, making a total of 58.

July 15th—The writer spent one day at Camp and attended Tabloid sports on Sunday, the 15th. The latter were well organized and

it was interesting to see the keenness of the competition among so many fine lads.

July 22nd—Sunday. Sylvan Lake Junior Camp. Arrangements had been made for a bus to leave Calgary Armouries at 7.00 a.m. Forty-five boys chosen for their age and length of service were able to attend under the command of Cadet Lt. F. McCall. Of this number 30 were to be a charge to the A.M.I. Mr. Wright wished ten of the band to attend at his expense, and later said if we had five boys who wished to go he would take them. The Committee agreed to allow five extra boys, making a total charge of 35 to the Institute, which is very generous of Mr Wright, who furnishes Camp and Rations; the A.M.I. paying for maintenance.

August 4th—Saturday. All boys returned by bus from Sylvan Lake O.K. at 2.30 p.m

August 5th—Sunday, 9.35 a.m. Cadet Major R. Oldaker and Cadet Captain F. Chapman proceeded to No. 133 I.T.C., Wetaskiwin, for one month's training as Cadet Instructors. Returned September 1st with "A" Certificate and Dominion Marksmanship Badge

October 1st—Capt W. A. Steckle resigned and two senior Cadet Officers retired—age limit of 18—one resigned to go to Crescent.

Lieut. A. Cawsey, a former officer of this Company, taken on strength. Lieut. M. Manion also taken on strength, making a total of three instructors with Lieut. French.

October 19th—The Adams E. M. Shield for all-year round efficiency, competing against all Cadet Corps in Calgary, was presented by the new D.C.O., Capt. J. W. Fenny, to Major F. McCall, who gave a very interesting talk to the boys on Cadet work generally, and citizenship. Was given a rousing reception by the Company.

October 20th and 21st—Saturday and Sunday were all-day shoots on the Sarcee Ranges, firing with Rifle, Sten and Bren Buns. Altogether 105 present during the two days.

October 25th—Thursday in a real snowstorm was Theatre night at Palace Theatre—110 present.

October 28th—Sunday Church Parade of all Cadets of Calgary to Pro-Cathedral. A.M.I. had 115 on parade out of a total of 160.



Presentation of the E. D. Adams Shield for all-round efficiency to Cadet Major F. McCall by Capt. W. J. Fenny, District Cadet Officer.



"It's training that counts". Bren Gun demonstration. Inspecting Officer Col. W. H. Holloway, Chief Cadet Officer, looking on.

THE ALBERTA MILITARY INSTITUTE ANNUAL JOURNAL

November 11th—Forty Cadets from A.M.I. were used by Canadian Legion as a Guard at the Memorial Hall, the weather being too bitter for march to Cenotaph

December 7th—Annual Cadet Dance of Army, Navy and Air Force Cadets. Donation of \$10.00 towards prizes made by A.M.I. All directors of A.M.I. were invited.

Capt W. Miller returned to take over the Band as far as his time permitted, and was welcomed by the Band, he being the former Bandmaster. The activity of the new D.C.O. has provided two tenor drums and a number of trumpets. This combined effort will soon bring the Band into good shape

December 21st was the Annual Party for the boys, which took the form of games, films, community singing, pop and milk. For the latter we were again indebted to the Union Milk Company for eight dozen half-pints donated. The account for pop will appear in the treasurer's report. Due to sugar rationing the Cadets brought their own cakes and sandwiches, and with the temperature 15 degrees below there were 98 present.

December 27th, 28th and 29th—A new effort was made to have Ski training as part of the year's activity—30 boys, 2 officers and 2 instructors took part each day. Through D.C.O. and the kindness of Lieut.-Colonel Jacobs, all equipment was provided and lunch twice at Currie Barracks and once at No. 2 Wireless grounds. This was really enjoyed by all and there were no accidents. We will now have several instructors in the Company for this type of training, which will continue over week-ends through the winter.

To December 31st this has completed the most successful year in many, and I would like to thank the Instructors for their splendid work since taking over, also my Committee for their co-operation during the year.

Strength at present is 172 with an average attendance of 125, in spite of the severe winter for boys under 15. One hundred and ten attended Camps, which would appear to be a record

Would recommend, as we will have more junior than senior Cadets in 1946, the grant be increased to \$300.00, and statement of petty cash fund permitted your Chairman is attached. (Balance as at January 1st, 1946, \$20.15). I would request that \$40.00 be again allotted to this Fund to pay for many small items which occur during the year.

I would also request that Insurance of Band instruments again be renewed.

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The Canadian Legion Is on Guard

(By J. W. RUSSELL, Esq

, Manager of the Calgary Branch of the Canadian Legion)

AS we enter the hoped for Peace period, it might be well if those who served in the 1914-1918 conflict would recall the problems of veterans and what steps were taken to rectify same

In 1919 the largest organization was the Great War Veterans' Association, which later was absorbed into the Canadian Legion.

The writer does not propose to record details of every action, but would suggest that the work of these bodies has been worthwhile.

Previous to the Great War, the discharged veteran often was found in the most humble, and at times, the most humiliating positions. In the early 20's, even in this country, notices were posted, "No Veterans Need Apply", on some jobs. When there's a war, men are wanted, but when the danger is over those who served were a nuisance. All this had to be lived down, and the main problem today is for the ex-service men and women to see to it that this state of affairs will not occur again.

In 1915 the total disability pension was \$264.00. Today, it is \$900 per year. This was obtained after many representations that entailed considerable expense.

Medical treatment and hospitalization regulations are improved almost beyond recognition.

The War Veterans' Allowance was not contemplated at the end of the Great War, and now we consider this our most valuable legislation on the Statute Books. True, there's the Means Test and the amounts paid do not provide luxury, but recent increases give the recipient a modest security that keeps him off the bread-line.

For years we had to witness the humiliating spectacle of our comrades' widows going on relief. Now there's a little provision that keeps the "wolf" from the door.

On our discharge in 1919 the maximum gratuity for a single man was \$420.00 with no re-establishment credit. Today, those discharged receive on the average three times this amount. Clothing allowances are increased. Education and Vocational Training have expanded to a degree we thought impossible.

The young soldier at school gets \$60.00 per month for living expenses. The old soldier on War Veterans' Allowance has to live on \$30.00 per month. I mention this so that we will know one another's problems.

The best we can hope for on our journey through life is to make things better for those who come after us. Taking it all in all, the men who served in this war benefitted by the experiences of those who served previously. The pay was higher, dependents were treated better, conditions of service were improved, and post-discharge arrangements are on a scale that one can hope for a brighter future for a large number of discharged men.

It is pleasing to know that veterans had a part in framing these and other changes which were due the young men and women who responded to the call for service.

The Canadian Legion has on many occasions directed the attention of the Government to the various problems of the service personnel, and will continue to work for the welfare of those who served, and their dependents.

Of course we have the Housing and Unemployment difficulties at present, but having won the war we should be able to solve these problems in the not far distant future.

At the close of the Great War our Government had little or no experience in handling Post-War Problems. While we have to agree that there is evidence of a change today, yet who can say what will happen in the years to come.

The Canadian Legion is on guard, and success will be determined by our strength in membership. When we organized, our greatest asset was a big hope. Down through the years our accomplishments led us to believe that our organization is a continuance of service, and we invite all to join with us in the protection of the ex-service man's rights.

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History Day by Day

(By MAJOR A. C. BALLANTINE, E.D., R.C.A.)

OF all the "revolutionary changes" which have taken place in the method of conducting war, not the least revolutionary was the technique of compiling the history of World War II.

Histories have been written probably of every major campaign ever fought, and many a minor one that seemed of world-shattering import to the powers contemporarily involved. Most of these have come from the pens of competent authors commissioned for the task and ultimately published "by direction of His Majesty's Government." Histories less official have appeared in personal memoirs, and not a few excellent histories have been written by such laymen as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.

But the incorporation of the historian's work into the Staff of an Army is a comparatively recent growth, and it was not until 1917 that the Historical Section of the General Staff at National Defence Headquarters was created. This was reorganized in 1921 under the present Director, Colonel A. Fortescue Duguid, D.S.O. In 1918, the War Narrative Section published the Report of the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada. This

section was under the chairmanship of Brigadier-General Raymond Brutinelle, and, having discharged its function, was absorbed into the Historical Section.

Colonel Duguid, who served in the last war from the beginning, besides being an experienced officer, is a writer of repute on military history. His latest and so far his largest work is the History of the Great War of 1914-19, of which Volume One appeared not long before the Great War of 1939-45. Though thus interrupted, writing the history of the former campaign has not been stopped. As Dean Swift said of one of his works, it is all done but the writing. Colonel Duguid is also



MAJOR A. C. BALLANTYNE, E.D.,
R.C.A.

author of the article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica on the First Gas Attack; on the narrative of Vimy Ridge, written for the 1936 pilgrimage; the narrative of battles for the Canadian Battlefields Memorials; the story of Canadian achievements in the Memorial Chamber at Ottawa, and other literally monumental works.

Experience Learned from History

It might be asked why the compilation of military history is the care of a section of the General Staff, which is the fighting part of the Staff. The answer is that the fighting of the "next war" is based on experience gained in every previous war, and that experience is learned from history. It is fashionable for young soldiers to be a bit patronizing toward veterans of the "last" war, yet it is a commonplace that the principles of war never change, only the method of applying them. Every commander, therefore, is consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously under the influence of Roberts in South Africa, Wellington in the Peninsula, Napoleon at Waterloo, Marlborough at Blenheim, or Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. There is a recorded instance of a regimental officer in Palestine in 1817 basing his plan on Joshua's tactics as set out in the Old Testament.

But until the present war military history has been compiled almost exclusively from such documentary evidence as operation orders, situation maps, war diaries and the like, plus the not always accurate recollections of individuals. Such a laborious process was long and at best only as trustworthy as was humanly possible under the circumstances.

Today the Historical Section, while perhaps seeming to be of less immediate importance than Operations or Intelligence, enjoys very much the same status as those inseparables. The story of this war will be written not solely from documents pored over by historians for a decade or two before they put pen to paper, but from day to day by Staff Officers belonging to the Historical Section and holding appointments integrally provided for in War Establishments.

Germ of System in Official "Eye Witness"

This is a tremendous growth from the system which had its germ in the appointment by the War Office in 1914 of an official "eye witness", not even press correspondents being then allowed in the field. Later Sir Max Aitken, afterwards Lord Beaverbrook, was appointed by the Canadian Government in a corresponding capacity. In 1915 the public clamor for news was taken seriously enough that it was made the duty of an

Intelligence Officer from April to August of that year. Then the War Office relented sufficiently to admit accredited press representatives to operational areas, and in 1917 Colonel F. Manley Sims became Canadian representative at the front.

In the recent war the Historical Section, besides having its Canadian headquarters at Ottawa, maintained a complete counterpart at Canadian Military Headquarters (C.M.H.Q.) in England, with Officers and sub-staffs detailed to Canadian troops in that country. With Canadian troops in Italy in 1944, there were four officers of the Historical Section at each divisional headquarters, two narrators and two official artists. This establishment was designed so that they could "spell off" with each other, one narrator and one artist being with the division in action or on the move while one narrator and one artist were "in rest", the one writing his "copy" and the other finishing his paintings.

Must Be Highly Trained Fighting Soldier

It goes without saying that the narrator must himself be a highly trained fighting soldier, with a wealth of experience and qualifications not inferior to those of any other well-equipped Staff Officer. Junior War Staff Course qualifications were therefore required, though one officer, the "least" qualified, had been an adjutant. The artist may paint what he sees without necessarily appreciating the sum of its military meaning. But if posterity is to profit by the lessons of history, the historian must not only see, but comprehend, as thoroughly as any divisional commander, the significance of every step and its influence on the outcome of every factor, actual or potential.

This new technique, however, does not lessen the importance of documentary evidence; for these day by day recordings will not in themselves be the written history of the war—they will be far too voluminous, for one thing—but only one of the more important sources from which that history will be deduced. Accumulating at the Historical Section is the usual collection of war diaries, personal diaries, private letters, sketches, operation orders, administrative instructions, situation maps, orders-in-council, Hansard debates—every clue, in short, from which any relevant fact may be learned. None of this material is discarded as long as there is a possibility of its linking up with something not yet at hand, or until its value has been disproved. Even the dry-as-dust establishment tables and the drier mobilization stores tables, with all their frequent amendments, are of value together with their counterparts of 1914-9 for purposes of comparison.

Task of Collecting Evidence

But not until after the war can the writing of the histories be begun. Not until then, indeed, can the events of the campaign be seen in clear perspective. Then begins the task of collecting the documentary evidence, including the day to day narratives, files of units and formations, and other material which has been carefully filed away while the war was still in progress, checking it, discarding much of it, referring it for corroboration or verification where required to individuals or other Empire historical sections and those of other Allied armed forces. When volume one appears on "the market", therefore, it may be depended upon as being as faithful a narrative and as detailed as human fallibility permits. As successive volumes appear they are distributed to district and regimental libraries, military institutes, senior officers of National Defence Headquarters, garrison libraries, public libraries and the trade for public sale.

Although the Historical Section's most immediate task, for which all else had to be laid aside, was compiling the history of the recent war; and although the Section's first specific assignment was to prepare the history of the war of 1914-9, its function neither began with the one nor ended with the other. The South African campaign of 1899-1902, Anglo-French wars, the American War of Independence, Upper and Lower Canada Rebellion of 1837-9, Fenian Raids of 1886 and 1870, the Red River Rebellion of 1870, North-West Rebellion of 1885—the military histories of all these campaigns have been prepared by the Historical Section at Ottawa, and one (Arnold's March on Quebec) has been published.

Section Allots Battle Honors

Yet neither is the recording of history the end of the day's work, for the allotment of "battle honors"—those magical place names inscribed in gold thread on a regiment's colors—falls to the Historical Section. And it is not only a delicate task but a laborious one involving, up to the end of the last war, examination of the records of more than three hundred units in fifty-one engagements extending back from 1919 to 1914, through the South African campaign to 1899, and back from there to operations in West Canada, 1885.

The 602 vellum pages of the famous Book of Remembrance in the Parliament Building, containing the names of every officer and man who gave his life in the Great War of 1914-9, were compiled by the Historical Section; so was the brief but complete story of Canadian achievements on the Western front that is graven in marble panels in the Memorial

Chamber at Ottawa. Investigation of claims for pension also comes within the ambit of the Section's functions as well as research connected with regimental perpetuations, alliances and amalgamations.

Then there are such items as answering questions which come from every point of the compass—the authoress who wants “verisimilitude” for her new novel, the Hollywood studio producer with the very praiseworthy wish to be sure he’s right, the taproom debaters with a bet to be won or lost, the scion of a proud Canadian family who thinks he might have had an ancestor with Wellington at Waterloo.

Close Liaison with Opposite Numbers

But even Canadian military history is not completed in Canada. The Historical Section must keep close liaison with its opposite number in the British Army, in other Dominions, India, the colonies and the United States. Draft chapters are exchanged, checked with records, particularly with regard to flanking or otherwise co-operating formations and units, and submitted to surviving participants in the various engagements for their criticism. Liaison is vital also with co-ordinating naval and air forces if the lessons are to be learned from combined operations, carried out in the recent war on an unprecedented scale.

There is liaison also, in peacetime, with foreign armies’ equivalents of historical sections and volumes of military history exchanged as they are completed. In this way, volumes of Canadian military history reach the German, French and other army libraries, while French, German and other accounts of the war find their way to Canadian shelves. Thus all belligerents exchange experience after every war, confessing the mistakes they made and telling the former antagonist of opportunities he lost, like the “post-mortem” period after a bridge game.

If the late Sir Andrew Macphail correctly described the historian’s function, the Historical Section of the General Staff is rendering an excellent account of itself. In his “Official History of the Medical Services” he wrote “History demands . . . judging events as if they were already far in the past and men as if they were already dead. History is the master to which all men must go — history, with its pensive and melancholy face.”

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In Canada's Mountain Parks

On Wednesday, January 10th—the Alberta Military Institute “Ladies’ Night”—members and their ladies had the pleasure of hearing a lecture by Sydney Vallance, Esq., of Calgary, on the Canadian Rockies. Mr. Vallance is a Vice-President of the Alpine Club of Canada and also of the National Parks Association, and a Past President of the Sky-line Trail Hikers. His lecture was illustrated with slides from his own photographs in natural colour. He carried his audience in imagination over the mountain trails, across snowfield and glacier and scree and up steep rocks to mountain peaks. The felicity of his diction in describing the scenes from the heights, and the flower-bedded uplands and valleys, matched the beauty depicted on the screen. Mr. Vallance has addressed the Institute on a number of occasions, and on each of them he has opened up new vistas of scenic grandeur to those who have had the privilege of attending.



SYDNEY VALLANCE



Bombing Operations With the Maquis in France

(Address delivered by FLT.-LT. A. R. SMITH, D.F.C., to members of the Alberta Military Institute at a Meeting in the Garrison Officers' Mess, at the Calgary Armouries, Jan. 25, 1945)

AS the Air Ministry has given me permission to speak on various other operations which undoubtedly led to the success of the dropping of supplies to the French Maquis, I shall take these in order.

Importance of Training Command

The first and most important thing is Training Command. I think anybody like myself, who went Overseas in 1941 and was put in a position where I was expected to carry out training operations at a time when I thought "Thank God, I am finally going to the front", is entitled to some commiseration. Training Overseas at that time was chiefly turning out Pilots and more Pilots and actually it was a much more serious operation than the majority realized.

I was apportioned the training of pilots by day, training them by night and the time in between was spent training to defend the East Coast of Britain from suspected invasion, with no idea as to when or whether it would come, or not. We were sent at the time to a station in the South, to F.I.S., with very little experience, and we were told that our job was to turn out personnel capable of being fighter interceptors. I shortly found out the reason for this. The majority of Canadians who went Overseas in '40 and '41 were very capable on Hurricanes and Wellingtons, and so they were given the job of instructing other people. They really handled a lot of other jobs, as well—by night they would be searching for enemy aircraft; enemy flotillas, different types of surface vessels and espionage. From the East coast of Scotland it is not very far across to Norway and constant watching was necessary, the whole time.



FLT./LT. A. R. SMITH, D.F.C.

I won't add much to this, but I have often thought that of all the unfortunate people, these personnel who are connected with this type of training are the most unfortunate, and you will agree that "blood and guts", so far as these personnel were concerned, do not exist. The greatest percentage of our success today is because Training Command's hopes were realized, as well as in the fact that bomb aimers were well trained in operations, combined with the fact that we have superior navigational aids and armament. This experience has led to the creation of Bomber Command. So much for Training Command.

I said that I was going to mention each phase which was necessary, and right here I would like to mention Fighter Command. Fighter Command was not extremely active in the later period, prior to "D" day, in general, the reason for this being primarily because they could not penetrate very far, and return, with the types then in use—Hurricanes, Beaufighters and such types, and of course, there were absolutely no landing fields on the South Coast of England. There was the odd fighter patrol and patrols covering the Bomber stream or a security job if there was something important, but in '40 and '41, this was definitely a rarity. I happened to have the good fortune of a choice of the type I would fly, and I chose the "Mustang", chiefly because I liked the fact that they could fire seven bullets to one on every other fighter built, as well as other features. This was really a very fine position, as far as the individual went, but to me it was not worth a damn. They gave us a choice of some other command and I immediately thought of Bomber Command. After getting through my tour of operations, I immediately chose Bomber Command.

Bomber Command H.Q. Fluid and Mobile

Bomber Command is a form of Artillery and its most important job is the matter of carrying the maximum amount of bomb load far to the rear (whether an air force that is more varied is more effective is a debatable point). I would like to cover for you Bomber Command H.Q. H.Q. is very fluid and mobile, in case it decides to move on short notice, but it represents the topmost portion of the organization and it is divided into various groups. One group—one; two; three; five and six were Canadians, while nine and one hundred were the Tactical Group. Groups are divided into squadrons. There are about four and occasionally, four, five or six squadrons to eight or nine groups. Sometimes there are more groups, and the number of squadrons will vary upon the work they have to do. These squadrons are divided again, into flights. The number of flights varies greatly, also. One night there may be three or four flights and another more, or less. No. 149 Squadron had three flights in one location; two in another and two more flights on the South Coast. This system has been found to be a most neces-

sary means of carrying out air warfare, because it was found that if any are lost, they can immediately bring a sufficient number of the others into action to maintain strength at one hundred per cent of what is asked for.

The aircraft of Bomber Command are Avro-Lancaster, Halifax and Short-Stirling. Of these the Lancaster and Halifax are by far the most popular, the Halifax because it is substantially in the neighborhood of 40,000 pounds and the Lancaster somewhere within a thousand pounds of it. The Short-Stirling weigh about 60,000 pounds. These two aircraft have carried the brunt of the bomber offensive and they took it over from the Stirling, the most famous bomber command aircraft up to that time, and from the Wellington. Mr. Callaghan can tell you much more of that than I can.

Bomber Command is divided into bomber offensive and bomber escort, but the latter is not used a great deal, for two reasons, namely, the enemy opposition is not what it was, one, two or three years ago, and secondly, because we can carry out in daylight more raids with our own fighters escorting us, and it appears that it has been decided by senior officers that we are not losing as many aircraft.

Night bombing, known as a saturation raid, otherwise, meant that blacked out aircraft would assemble, set their course, fly to the coast of France, rendezvous at a river and from there to three or four other pinpoints in the road of the invasion in France and Holland, and eventually it was pretty much of a hit or miss proposition—in fact, it happened that at times they found themselves over Essen instead of Wilhelmshaven and nobody knows what happened. The organization is more definite now than in the educational days. They have made it more of a practical proposition, with absolute dead certainty.

From Uncertain Methods To Finer Accuracy

I can remember that when we were first instructed in various methods there was always a great deal of uncertainty and general reconnaissance of various positions, because such and such a town threw out more "flak" (being anti-aircraft fire). I always thought that that certainly was a very good means of identifying a town to keep out of the way of. As I say, later days did certainly bring bombing up to much finer accuracy. The greatest percentage of losses in night bombing have been due to undue fatigue, the same as in driving. You had "flak" towers and also enemy searchlight batteries, a certain amount of opposition, but the "pompom" guns never really proved any great asset to the enemy's artillery, though he was using Radar; but, to go out on a trip, take off at night, fly through bad weather, reach your target and come back, the mental

strain was considerably greater than in daytime. Eventually we heard we would fly daylight raids.

I was in the first Short-Stirling daylight raids. Each squadron commander said that this being the first daylight raid, he was going to send out a mass of aircraft in bombing formation. Stirlings and Lancasters, many bombers in all; it was a complete force in tight formation of heavy aircraft. You have seen Americans. Their training begins at elementary school and their aircraft are adapted to this type of bombing. Lancasters are not so well adapted, and it was very definitely an experience. It proved to be a very great success. Our losses were not as great in running into one another, the difference in day and night, and with aircraft formation, bombing was still more accurate, because they could see their target. Pathfinding aircraft went out and saw the target bombed, coming home they were protected by fighters

Pathfinding Highly Specialized

I mention Pathfinders. There are two types of path-finding. The first is a method whereby certain squadrons go out and mark a target with certain incendiary flares. Where the majority of bomber command squadrons have pathfinders, they mark their target by what they see of these flares. Pathfinding is a highly specialized work, involving a great deal of training and it is probable the most efficient method used

These various Pathfinder squadrons have navigational equipment which is beyond the present age. Very few aircraft were supplied with them and they went out two or three minutes before the main force came along. They dropped TI indicators and the main force dropped bombs on the TI indicators, instead of the actual target. These indicators are divided into two classes and the use of the two types depends on the clouds and on the target. If lower cloud obscures the target, the magnesium flares dissolve, ex-

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plode in the air and burn very slowly above the cloud base and the main force drop on the flares through clouds, on the target, very successfully.

I think I should like to clear up one fallacy which I have heard a number of people mention and I have talked it over and that is the accuracy of night bombing. Naturally, being a member of a squadron, I got down to the facts. A lot of people told me that when you bombed, of course, you picked out individual targets. There was a little story some time ago. There was a terrific fanfare in British newspapers, following one of the biggest raids on Cologne, where two or three thousand large aircraft completely plastered the city and there, standing alone, was the Cathedral. This was good propaganda for Canadian, British and American fliers, as to their accuracy. I won't go back on anything. I can remember dropping bombs on Cologne. The Cathedral stood beside the railway yard, next door to it, in fact. We were told to put the railway yard out of action. Afterwards they congratulated us, saying "You did not touch the Church of God," and I would like at this time to remark that we looked through the sight and there was the Cathedral the bombs went, and so on—well, that was the whole story, though it seems to be believed that results were altogether due to the efficiency of the R.A.F.

Another part of night operations was mine laying, and the chief reason I will mention it is that it was one I was connected with. Mine laying is considered to be what we call a "stooge". However, to sit in the aircraft from six to nine hours and fly very low over the sea; come back and report the work you have done to the interrogators and go to bed, it might be that you would wish you were doing something else

Mine-Laying To Protect D-Day Beachheads

Mine laying was heavy months before D-Day but the most important of the war, as you know, was just at D-Day, to protect the beachheads of Normandy, and against the enemy submarines which were in their formidable pens at Brest. Well, I can tell you it was a great thrill to drop a mine and see the hulk of an enemy ship, the result of ours or someone else's work, and drop more mines, intended to do the same. On D-Day, Jerry tried to get subs from Brest to Holland, to attack our shipping.

One of the most interesting jobs of mine laying was at St. Malo (where Jacques Cartier was supposed to have sailed from and discovered Canada). We were told that ships coming from Britain expected to dock at St. Malo and they were beginning to organize defence of the beachhead—it was comparatively early, about 4 o'clock. Nine Stirlings went in and we went around the island with very little opposition. The beachhead was light and

there were absolutely no opposition fighters. We dropped the mines and started to return. Intelligence must have slipped, for we ran into numerous flak ships. We did a lot of flying on the home trip, for they certainly had got an idea of where we were and there was not one that did not report some damage. I was later informed by squadron commander that they had not expected any opposition at all. I always did think that enemy intelligence is pretty smart.

Fighter Command Does Magnificent Job

From night bombing we went on to daylight bombing. It was temporary, because we were losing a lot of aircraft, and H.Q. decided there was no real reason for it. Fighter command was great, and I wish to pay the greatest respects to these comrades. I can never do too much in support of fighter command. They did a magnificent job. We were never trained to carry out daylight operations. All our flying, from early service flying and even elementary, was done with one end in view—bombing at night. Look at the Americans. Training in formation is essential if you expect to produce expert bombers. And American group is a group well assembled, instead of spread out. Fighter command dug in and battered them for sixty miles while we would be only a few miles. With sixty or seventy aircraft, had we been trained earlier to fly in formation in daylight, undoubtedly we would not have had such losses in the early days of daylight raids.

One per cent of losses in daylight bombing are due to absolute sheer carelessness, in that the aircraft manages to get over another and the result is, of course, that a bomb falls through another boat. There are also those that collide, of course, and the percentage of aircraft colliding and aircraft lost through bombs falling is not appreciably greater in night bombing, which is a strange feature. I think that is all I have got to say about Bomber Command.

Dropping Supplies To French Maquis

I shall now tell you of special duty of dropping supplies to French Maquis. I started out to become a night bombing pilot and eventually was told that I could have my choice of squadron leader in Canada (which I had no idea of taking) or of this special duty.

We were taken to operational training at a bombing operational training unit and there given difficult types of training. We all became suspicious, because we were told that we would not be flying Lancasters but would have Short-Stirlings. The Stirling is an aircraft made by Short Bros. It is a four-engine aircraft which was eventually put on the retired list—twelve to fourteen thousand is pretty high for a Stirling. The Stirling had two things—easier manoeuvrability and it could carry a much larger bomb load than the Lancaster. Special duty was decided upon by the

senior authorities in the group and originally decided upon in 1941, when military authorities came to the conclusion that we were not going to be able to invade the French occupied coast successfully without paying a heavy price, unless we had the assistance of the French themselves, which is still true.

Therefore, they decided that there must be some means of organizing the Maquis and supplying medical aid. Thus special duty squadrons were organized. Then groups of Bomber Command, various types of it, were taken off night bombing and tests were given them for this work. The idea was to cross the English coast excessively low—say five hundred feet, carry on to France, when quite dark; proceed to an area predetermined by Intelligence, meet reception and prepare to drop our supplies. The first thing is the fact that any aircraft which take off in England can be identified or could immediately be registered, at a height of a thousand feet.

Reason for Low Flying

The reason then that we had to stay so low was that if we had been at a considerable height the Germans would have been able to detect us by Radar. But at five hundred feet, continually, we were never within his signals, owing to the curvature of the earth and he could not identify us until the French coast or later. Another good reason was that at this low height we avoided certain defences and we were not subject to attack from their air patrols, at several thousand feet. We carried on, then, after the French coast, established certain obvious pin points, and then timed our distance run.

In Bomber Command, you endeavoured to find a place where you would not run into AA at five hundred feet; if there is any AA it is just a chance you have got to take—the same at two thousand feet or at five thousand feet, where there was considerable air support or "flak." We carried on, pinpointing for the DR point—provided we found this, everything was well and good—if we didn't we at once left. The first DR was never more than two miles from reception point and our reception point was nothing more than three flashlights, all in line. As you can imagine, as the Maquis were defying the Gestapo and the German army, it followed there could be no carelessness—if we saw them, we had to keep our eye on them. In flying to dropping DR points we had to fly at an absolute speed, on a direct course, in case they made an error.

We endeavored to look for these three flashlights, and down at the end there was an Aldis lamp, which is a power lamp. If we did not get a flash from the Aldis, we would deliver later—we always expected to find the Aldis at this point, as a means of recognition. When we were flashed this later, we would carry on, not making a very wide circuit, but come around, dropping our supplies,

which consisted of various small arms; medical supplies, food and equipment, and in some cases, squadrons dropped men and guns. In some cases, these men were Frenchmen who were expected to carry out different types of sabotage and help the underground movement. We would circle when dropping our supplies, circle once more and then carry on, past the DR point, back to the coast and home.

As it looks there, it is a very simple operation. The first one I was fortunate enough to go on, we got DR points just close to the Paris Museum. The greatest part of Paris was blacked out. I couldn't find it at first—we might just as well go back as have the Germans find out we were taking this type of action. So finally we turned the ship towards another town, only to find out that the German army was carrying out some large special movement. This, mind you, within a distance of only four miles from where the members of the French underground movement were expecting to receive these supplies from us—probably not three miles from the centre of a large German camp. It shows the guts and fortitude they had.

When The Enemy Got There First

(Often we found that the Germans had come along before hand, found the three men with the lights; put them over the jumps and endeavoured to flash the same signal which we expected and they flashed the wrong signal. When we came in at all close, they opened up on us with machine guns. We never saw them again, but they were pretty smart about it—it was all a matter of catching the mouse before he got out of the trap. Special duty briefing was hazardous. Whether or not particularly great losses were involved, I believe that night bombing paid, but I believe that special duty was one of the least fixed and most interesting operations of the whole thing, for that matter. The crew had to carry out very specific duties and the air gunner could make no defence in our aircraft—he was not expected to fire any bullets but instead, we took evasive action, so that enemy fighters could not get a sight on us. The pilot had to be in constant watch over the area; keeping control, watching for the bomber stream; had to do the pin-pointing and map-reading and as at times we were almost directly over the houses, it was a fairly difficult situation.)

This proved to be quite a successful operation, and General DeGaulle came around, when I happened to be on leave, and he brought with him a lot of French Engineers personnel. He had received the whole story. On the whole, it was an extraordinarily fine show and good work was done, but he mentioned that in one or two cases supplies had not come down where expected and that

the Maquis had burned down whole woods—the Gestapo could not be allowed to get hold of any of these supplies.

Intelligence was so fine that a certain small area outside, say, Versailles, would be selected on which ordnance or transport or bombs were to be dropped. This would be selected in the afternoon and the operation carried out that night. It was probably one of the most efficient organization in Bomber Command. One of the main things to understand is the consequences to the Maquis. If any of them were caught forming part of these receptions, they would invariably be shot, because if you are sitting in the back yard, where somebody is expecting you to receive supplies from the enemy, there are no two ways about it, if you are caught, you are shot. I have always, therefore, had nothing but the greatest admiration for the people of this movement. I have always kept my tongue well in my mouth about these things, because I was able to place myself very clearly in their position and realize that it was quite possible that through a bit of careless talk someone might be shot. Well, that is probably all there is to "Special Duty."

During The Attack Outside Falaise

I see the greatest percentage of you are Army men and, no doubt, hearing the odd word here and there, it is going to come to your minds, "Did the Air Force bomb the Canadian troops?" This is a question which I would not take on to answer myself, but I could suggest two possible reasons why it happened. On the day or so after we had attacked Falaise, after the first push north from the beachhead had begun, we were ordered to carry out an attack just outside of Falaise. The Americans had been out and there was trouble because there were certain Canadian and British troops who had suffered some losses of material and transport due to inaccurate bombing. I cannot speak for American efficiency—on our raids, we have always maintained the greatest accuracy on daylight raids.

Any time our Air Force has been told to go out and bomb an objective, such as at Heimberg, it has been done; and there has been the occasional chance error where General Staff has not made certain that advice was given to all, before zero hour. All I can say is that there must have been some complete mixup between H.Q.'s, but that it certainly was not any sloppy bombing on the part of the Air Force. I agree that whether at twenty-five thousand feet or ten or twelve thousand, bombing accuracy is of supreme importance. I read recently where there is still considerable importance attached to the question as to whether or not some troops were bombed and I have also heard statements made in London, after they had supposedly bombed troops. I would merely put forward this question: If you are given an order to bomb an objective and

it must be done successfully, and if through error this sort of thing happens, can any blame be attached to you as crews? I hope we can agree, then, that if you cannot, that somebody else made the mistake.

Bombing Buzz-Bomb Sites

Tactical bombing was against the "Buzz-Bomb" sites. These, as you no doubt are aware, are a peculiar weapon sent over against England and shot over from France, Holland and Belgium—even from Norwegian installations. These sites were small brick houses, not much larger than this room and they became quite a nuisance, and Command attached great importance to them. They sent us over after them as individual aircraft; groups of twenty and by the hundreds. They tried visual bombing; by marking with flares and by low level attacks and once, only once, fortunately, lost nine aircraft to machine gun fire. Buzz-bomb sites were wiped out one by one, and then they had to carry on with rockets. We did not know where they came from and much observation was

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necessary. Finally one or two were obtained and it was found out how they were made. Intelligence did some good work on this and then certain groups were assigned to go after the rocket sites and a great many of them were cleared away too.

I think that in the matter of bombing generally that is about all I have got to say. There is one point in connection with mining, which is without doubt the most tiresome operation of all, where you sit in an aircraft for up to nine or ten hours, these are lonely hours, and you are ready to quit at the end of two. St Malo, the Riviere Girond; Bordeaux and, in fact, all Bay of Biscay points, were fairly well done. The only note I have to make on it is that in any mining operation, even though minesweeping is carried on against it, its value is by no means always lost and there is almost always damage to some of the enemy's boats. It has one big advantage over the sea mine, which does most of its damage to the side of a boat—an air mine sinks all or part way to the bottom, as arranged, and, whether of magnetic or other type, it does most of the damage to the bottom of the ship and, in the majority of cases, breaks its back. I think that probably the greatest losses at Brest were due to the fact that there was extreme accuracy in all mining done.

We had a comparatively interesting operation on D-Day. The idea behind the whole operation was to endeavor to surprise the enemy. How accurately it was done, I cannot say, but our object was to distract the enemy. Therefore, we were sent out on a tour to fake an invasion at a point which would draw the enemy divisions or troops away from the beachhead in an attempt to let our lads land with as little opposition as possible. We therefore flew over an area about fourteen miles from the beachhead, covering this area fairly well and dropped various types of flares which would make a big display. We also shot off all possible types of Very lights.

We were told later that the enemy withdrew many troops from the beachhead area and even some from the Paris area. I do not know whether it was good or bad stage management, but that is what happened. The only unfortunate thing was that we had very little cover and there was a great deal of activity and, of those flying at low altitudes, the greater percentage were lost. Fortunately, I did not see a damn thing, but we got there. I shall never forget the squadron commander saying: "This is it", and I knew that it was "D-Day." I believe that it was a satisfactory operation. I have pretty well talked myself out and I would be pleased to show you these photographs and of course, if anybody should care to ask any questions, I should be delighted to answer them.

"The Pipers Played On"

(From THE CALGARY HERALD, February 10th, 1945)

THE Calgary Highlanders received their baptism of fire in the Normandy campaign in a manner which reflected credit to a unit perpetuating a famous battalion of the First Great War, Lt.-Col. Donald MacLauchlan, D.S.O., of Calgary, told the Alberta Military Institute last night.

Col. MacLauchlan returned to Calgary last month after having commanded the Highlanders in Normandy up through France and Belgium to Antwerp and the Schelde Estuary. He will assume the command shortly of the No. 122 Canadian Infantry Basic Training Centre at Maple Creek, Saskatchewan.

The first actual battle of the Calgary Highlanders in France, he said, took place at Fleury, near Caen, in Normandy.

"There was only a slight hesitation when they faced Hun machine gun fire for the first time as they advanced in extended order," the colonel said. "But the pipers played on and they went through to their objectives."

During the German counter-attack which followed, Lt. Vernon Kilpatrick of Calgary located three German tanks concealed in a hollow. With three hand-grenades he put the tanks out of action and was killed by a sniper on the way back to the unit.

Col. MacLauchlan said it all depended upon the type of German soldiers the Calgary Highlanders ran up against whether or not there would be stiff fighting and heavy losses or easy victories and the capture of many enemy prisoners.



LIEUT. COL. DONALD MacLAUCHLAN,
D.S.O.

Worst of all were the S.S. troops, superb physically with animal mentalities, excellent soldiers, well trained, well equipped and ready to fight to the death.

German paratroops used as infantry were in the "medium" class. Reasonably well trained, good fighting men, on the whole, they could be relied upon to put up fairly stiff opposition.

Least worrisome were the soldiers of the third class, comprising low-grade Germans, Poles, Mongols, French and other nationalities. They were poorly equipped, poorly uniformed and ready to surrender upon the slightest excuse.

Col. MacLauchlan revealed that the Calgary Highlanders pushed the Germans back to a mile and a half from the centre of Dunkirk.

"When we were relieved we were told there were 25,000 men in the garrison," he said. "I think we could have tidied up that situation if we had been left there for a few days longer."

It was a weird experience for the Highlanders to find street cars running, luxurious shops open, and all the comforts of life in Ghent and Antwerp close to the fighting lines, but they quickly pushed on to canal fighting and bloody battles of the Schelde Estuary.

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The 6th Field Regiment R.C.A. in Action

(Address of MAJOR ARTHUR MAW, M.C. to members of The Alberta Military Institute at The Calgary Armouries, on March 19th, 1945.)

I AM afraid that I am really here under false pretences, because I do not think that there is anybody who knows less about the invasion of Europe and the subsequent campaign than I do. I spent the greater part of my time in the bottom of a slit trench and did not stick my head out any more than I had to. I can tell you very little that you have not already heard, and I am fortunate tonight in having here another officer of my regiment who went to France with us and who saw more and did more than I did. If I am unable to answer your questions, I shall call on Major Bob Lucy to help me out.

However, I am here tonight to tell you about the 6th Field Regiment, R.C.A., because it was to the 6th Field Regiment that I was lucky enough to be posted when I left the 1st Division in '42, and went to the 2nd Division, and as you know, the 91st Battery of Calgary was a part of the 6th Field Regiment and was, incidentally, the battery in which I served before the war, and with which I went to France.

The second Division had been trained as an assault division, and had sent two brigades to Dieppe as assault troops. After that, the Third Division became an assault division and we were assigned the job of being "break-out" troops, and as such we trained from the fall of '42 until the summer of '44 and did a lot of things, including a certain amount of digging.



MAJOR ARTHUR MAW, M.C.

Concentration Area At Waldershare Park

Before the invasion we went to a concentration area on about the 15th or 20th of April, and were told that the normal time to be spent there was between five and eight weeks—never

more than eight weeks. We were there until the 1st of July, or about eleven weeks in all. We were quite lucky in the spot chosen for us—Waldershare Park, near Dover. The whole division was there, or nearby, and there was lots of opportunity for baseball games together with other sports, and we made good use of that time and had a lot of good, competitive inter-unit sports. We had as neighbors the 59th Division, who went to France as part of the Second Army, and were later broken up in Belgium to provide reinforcements

Waldershare Park, compared with some of our previous camps, was pretty good, but the time passed very slowly there because, first of all, we were waiting every day to hear of D-Day, and after it did arrive, our time there was further lengthened because of the gales in the Channel which delayed the landing of the supplies and ammunition which we as a "break-out" division needed in large quantities, prior to our landing

There was one rather interesting point about Waldershare Park. Up until that time we had practiced camouflage very carefully, not only as a preparation for war, but also on occasions with an operational purpose. During our long stay at Waldershare nobody ever checked us upon camouflage, and we gradually became sloppier to the extent of leaving washing on the fences, and that sort of thing. A week or so before we left Waldershare, an officer came over from Corps headquarters and gave us a lecture on camouflage. He was a fellow who knew quite a lot about camouflage, but he had been out on a party that afternoon, and was in rather poor shape, which was evidenced by his only use of the blackboard on which he spelt "camouflage" with two "m's" two "t's" and two "l's"

Glad To See Inadequate Camouflage

However, he told us that Corps were quite aware of our inadequate camouflage and that they were, as a matter of fact, very glad to see it, because we were advertising to the Boche that the Second Canadian Division was there, and as a consequence, they were holding three or four times as many of their troops on the other side of the Channel from us, who might otherwise have been engaged in opposing our troops in the beachhead

We eventually got away in the middle of the night—this time we didn't want the Boche to see what we were doing, and before daylight our vehicles standings had been filled up again by British troops replacing us in the same spot. We stayed two days in our embarkation area and were then loaded on ships—LST's—which was another sore point. We had been training for a year or two in the very complicated drill necessary to load a field regiment on LCT's, and had spent an enormous amount of time on

it, including the waterproofing of all our vehicles. The guns also were waterproofed to go through three feet of water, and much of the equipment was a hundred per cent waterproofed up to 4'6" of depth. By using LST's, and transferring the equipment to smaller craft off the beach, we finally had to go through eight or ten inches of water about three feet from the shore. All the waterproofing effort was wasted, and our only consolation was that the large tarpaulins provided for enclosing loads of technical equipment later proved invaluable as extra tenting material.

From England To France

It took longer than we had expected from England to France. We had two whole nights and two and a half days on the LST's—down the Thames Estuary, across the Straits of Dover at midnight with enemy shelling ineffective only, another night in the Channel, and finally the coast of Normandy off Courcelles, at 4 30 or 5 in the afternoon.

It was a very good afternoon to arrive, because the first thing we saw was one of the R A F's big bombing raids. At that time we had not taken Caen. The Third Division was sitting outside Caen threatening to take it, and had been given R A F. support, and we were just in time to see this big raid in which we counted six or seven hundred Lancasters. Their target was some eight or ten miles away, and we watched them go in, one after another, drop their bombs, circle around and go home, followed all the time by curving lines of ack-ack. Not more than two or three were shot down, and we saw their crews bale out over the beaches while the planes flew on and then crashed in the sea behind us.

Watch Bombardment By Rodney and Belfast

The following morning we had another good show. At that time the city of Caen and the front line were well within range of our warships off France and we watched the Rodney and Belfast giving support. The Rodney had sixteen-inch guns and the Belfast eight-inch guns. The Belfast fired its in salvos of six or sometimes twelve at a time, and the Rodney usually three at a time. We were about a mile away from Rodney and perhaps four hundred yards from Belfast, and we felt a tremendous blast from them.

I remember one point in particular that impressed me quite a lot—after several hours of bombardment, the Belfast backed away from the coast on a weaving course, not in a straight line, firing salvos very quickly—probably four in a minute, and moving all the time. Some months afterwards I asked a naval officer about this and he assured me that they were almost certainly firing on a specific target and that in spite of the continual movement of the

ship, every shell would land in approximately the same place. That brings up problems of gunnery which we, fortunately, never had to worry about.

That afternoon we unloaded, concentrated about two miles inland, and about midnight moved off to the neighborhood of Bayeux. There was a little erratic bombing of our column by the Luftwaffe that night, but we arrived in our new concentration area without casualties, and spent the next two days removing the sticky waterproofing compound from our vehicles, and making a final check-up of all our equipment. Nobody ever went to war anywhere better equipped than the Second Canadian Division, all our vehicles were brand new and our guns had had just the right number of rounds fired from them that they would all fire perfectly together. All technical equipment was perfect and there was not a single casualty either in men or equipment between England and France.

Two Months' Continuous Action

We left this final concentration area about midnight of the second night and proceeded to Marcelet, just southwest of Carpiquet airdrome, and there Second Division artillery went into action for the first time. From this point on, for over two months, we literally carried out the gunner's slogan that "there are only two places for the guns to be, in action or on the move," and for twenty-four hours a day the guns of Second Division artillery were in fact continuously in action or moving up to follow the retreating enemy.

Our move to Marcelet was just like any night-move and night-occupation that we had practiced so often in England, but after digging-in was completed and breakfast eaten, dawn came and the boys found that they were not only in action for the first time against the enemy, but they were also under direct ground observa-

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tion from the Boche. We were on the near slope of the ground going down to the river Orne, and they were on the corresponding slope on the far side of the river. They opened fire on our gun positions in the morning and continued to shell us steadily for the next two or three days to such an extent that one day we had to move two of our batteries who seemed to be sitting in a favorite target area. We had very few casualties and the boys really enjoyed themselves throwing their ammunition at last against the enemy instead of on to the long-suffering artillery ranges of England and Wales.

Nearly A Week's OP Free-Lancing

After spending the first morning with my guns at Marcelet, I was sent over to Caen to establish an OP and I had quite a happy time there for nearly a week. I had no direct infantry support job at all—the infantry of our division were not as yet in action, and I was there as a free-lance OP with permission to shoot at anything which I thought was a good target, or anything which the Third Division infantry asked me to shoot up for them, and practically unlimited ammunition to do it with.

My first OP was on the third floor of a house, but the Boche got on to it with 155's and knocked the house down. The next house was rather an old wreck, but I spent a very happy four days in it keeping decent hours, usually from ten 'till five, at which time we retired to a big monastery about a mile back in the town, which had a nice deep basement and a good wine cellar in which we spent our evenings. That was really a most pleasant, comfortable place, shooting in the daytime and sleeping in security at night. The last night that I was there was the night of the second mass bombing of Caen by the R.A.F. and they really plastered it. I do not know how many tons of bombs they did drop, but they completely wiped out all of the city along the river Orne, and when the infantry went in they took over what was left of the city with very little opposition.

For the next month or so it was pretty steady fighting. It was hard for us to know just what the High Command had in mind when we were fighting south and south-east of Caen. All we knew was that we were a "break-out" division. We had had lots of exercises on "break-out" tactics, and the main idea was to break out of the beachhead and go right on through.

Did Not Follow Expected Pattern

The fighting during that month did not follow that pattern as closely as we hoped it would. We knew that we were up against a fairly strong enemy position. We found out that they were dug in to a depth of about seven to ten miles, and they had pretty well-

prepared positions held by S.S. Panzer divisions with lots of dug-in tanks.

Time and time again infantry units of the division were given objectives of a thousand or two thousand yards to take and they would go in and do it. They might just as well not have done it, because they lost probably fifty per cent getting it and at times from twenty to thirty per cent holding it, and the real enemy line was not broken. It needed a ten-mile advance to get back in behind them and really break the line.

Heavy Losses Of Second Division

In the meantime Second Division, which had gone to France as admittedly the best trained division in 21 army group, had lost within one month about 100 per cent casualties in the fighting troops of the infantry battalions. Finally, a large operation was planned which was to take us right through the last of the German defences. Second Division attacked on a three-battalion front with Sixth Brigade leading on the initial assault. We had three objectives: on the right the F.M.R.'s were to take May-sur-Orne, which was a very tough job. In the centre was Fontenay le Marmion, which was the task for the Camerons, and on the left, Roquancourt, which was designated for the S.S.R.'s. Further on our left we had the 51st Highland Division, moving down the main road to Paris and there were two or three additional lines down which the armour was to move.

The R.A.F. were to do a very heavy bombing of May-sur-Orne in preparation, and also on Fontenay le Marmion, and there was to be a very heavy barrage in front of the 51st Division, which was also to assist the S.S.R.'s in the taking of Roquancourt. The main attack was to start between eleven and twelve at night, but there were considerable preliminaries which involved the withdrawal of some of our battalions which would otherwise be dangerously close to the R.A.F. targets, and in the course of this I was left behind in my OP at Verrieres for half an hour before and after the S.S.R.'s pulled out in order to compel the Boche in and around Roquancourt to keep their heads down and not see our infantry withdrawing. We had the best end of the stick in supporting the S.S.R.'s and our barrage was a much more satisfactory preparation than the bombing by the R.A.F. One or two batteries were detailed to fire colored flares into the target area, which they did all right, but for some reason the effectiveness of the bombing by the R.A.F. was not nearly what it was expected to be, our intensive barrage being much better.

Not Entirely According To Plan

This attack was presumably a well-thought-out operation, but it did not work out any too well in practice. It began on a very dark night, which caused a bit of confusion; there was rather more enemy action than usual, which was saying quite a lot; many of the tanks were unable, on account of mine fields and smoke and dust and darkness, to find their way to their objectives on time, and generally speaking, the attack did not go entirely according to plan. It was helped quite a bit by 40 mm Bofors shooting tracer down the axis of advance all night, and in addition, a certain amount of artificial moonlight was put on by searchlight batteries. Without these, the confusion in the darkness would have been considerably worse.

The S.S.R.'s made their objective of Roquancourt by first light, according to plan, and had it completely clear of Germans by about breakfast time. There we remained until noon, while a big tank battle was going on in front of our left flank.

In the meantime, on our right the rest of the brigade had not been so fortunate. The Camerons had succeeded by noon in getting into Fontenay le Marmion, but by that time they were down to about 120 men, and the Boche had advanced around them and had succeeded in isolating them from the rest of the brigade. The S.S.R.'s were given the job of helping them out, and Colonel Clift took two companies and the part squadron of tanks which he had, and we set off with some misgivings because our companies were only about 40 per cent strength, and we were not a very large force. However, by the time we contacted the Boche, who were between us and the Camerons, they must have figured that they had done enough for one day. The sight of our tanks did not improve their morale, and by the time we got through to the Camerons we had sent back some 200 or more prisoners, and on our way back to Roquancourt by another route, after being assured by the Camerons that they were now quite okay, we picked up about another two hundred.

Broke Boche Line Outside Caen

The same afternoon the F.M.R.'s got into May-sur-Orne and the job of the previous night was completed. That night's operations really broke the Boche line outside of Caen; it was the backbone of their defensive position. Until we got on to it, it was hard to realize what a commanding feature it was, but once we got on the crest we could see for miles and miles, and it was clear that they had had a very strong position. For some days after that, the fighting was rather scattered; we only really knew where the Boche were when we found them, and we did not have any really intensive fighting again until we got to Falaise.

I believe that at this point I should say a word or two about some interesting situations, several of which concerned Sam McWhirter. He did most of the more important jobs of deployment, and while with our regiment he had acquired the name of "Mad Sam," mainly because while on recce, it was his greatest joy to go right on through beyond the leading infantry until he contacted the Boche, when he would come back and deploy the artillery where it would do most good according to what he had found out on his recce.

An Evening With Sam McWhirter

One evening Sam had to deploy the divisional artillery. He had been given three map squares by the C.R.A. as possible locations, but he was to use his own judgment and find the most suitable positions. He said, "We are possibly going to have to go a long way tonight, and I am going to have a carrier with me as an armoured escort." I was elected as the escort. We went on through the first two map squares and found nothing, so we went on a bit further with Mad Sam leading in his jeep, and my carrier a few yards behind, the rest of the divisional artillery recce parties following along in jeeps. We were just rounding a small curve at the end of a village when Sam's jeep stopped suddenly and immediately two hand grenades landed a few feet in front of it. I saw Sam jump out and go to the front wheel of his jeep which had got tied up in some barbed wire in the roadblock. However, before I could reach him to give a hand he got disentangled, turned his jeep around and started back, followed by several rifle shots, one of which went through his petrol tank which, as you know, in a jeep, is pretty close to one's rump. He signalled everyone to turn around and we all started back, this time with my carrier at the rear.

We had got nicely out of the village and into the middle of a large open wheatfield, still only about 400 yards from where we had met up with the enemy, when Sam's jeep stopped. I pulled up alongside and said, "This is a hell of a spot to stop in!" Sam said, "I'm out of gas." I replied, "Forget the jeep and hop in here," but he said, "To hell with that; have you got a hankie?" So he took my hankie, plugged the bullet hole in his gas tank with it, and filled up his tank again with a jerry can from my carrier. That was the last time I went on a recce with Sam as his escort. I felt a lot safer in an OP than I did out with Sam that evening.

Co-operation Between Artillery and Typhoons

At that time and afterwards, we were getting pretty close support from the R.A.F. I do not know how much you have been told of the co-operation between artillery and the rocket firing Typhoons of the R.A.F., but we worked with them quite a lot with

excellent results. Although the Typhoon rockets are not very big, they have a tremendous thump to them, and I have seen Tiger and Panther tanks with the turrets blown completely off the tank as a result of a direct hit from one of these rockets, which I believe weigh about 45 pounds

When the infantry requested air-support, the R.A.F. would send Typhoons and it was our job to range on the target with a 25-pounder and at the appointed time use red smoke shells as target indicators for the Typhoons. They were a very impressive sight as they swooped down, one after another, releasing their rockets just before they swooped up again and zoomed away at high speed, twisting and turning as they went. If it would appear from their briefing that the target was a suitable one, they would usually swing in again after they had got rid of all their rockets and use up any cannon ammunition which they happened to have with them. The noise of the rockets was quite unnerving, even for us at whom they were not directed, and must have been very terrifying to anyone in the target area.

It was while we were advancing between Caen and Falaise that we had our first experience of using the Boche's own weapons against him. We had acquired some Minnenwerfer, and Sam McWhirter was chiefly responsible for collecting the ammunition and getting them into action. They were set up in the area of our wagon lines, and I was not there at the time, being up at the OP. The Boche was extremely mad at having his own weapon used against him, and as soon as his sound-ranging parties had located them, he retaliated with everything he had and plastered the whole area to such an extent that our regiment suffered 28 casualties in a very few minutes. That was the last time that we used the Moaning Minnies against the Boche, but we had much more success with his 155's.

Pushing The Boche Into Dunkirk

While the Third Division was coming up the coast and taking care of Calais and Bologne, we had the job of pushing the Boche, who were around Dunkirk, into Dunkirk and leaving them there. It was not our job to take Dunkirk, but we had to undertake to push them far enough inside that a comparatively small force of special service troops could contain them in there. In the course of this operation we had our guns at Adinkerke and while there, our regiment was augmented by a fourth battery consisting of three German 155 guns which we manned with No. 1's and layers from our own batteries and the remainder of the gun numbers from the light ack-ack. These guns had a very much longer range than our 25-pounders and were admirable for use on headquarters, forts and other targets around Dunkirk. We kept on

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using them steadily until all the ammunition was gone. Most of the firing was directed from our air OP, as it was hard to get ground observation of distant targets in the flat country around the coast.

One snag was that their ammunition was not very constant and as there were variations of as much as 2,000 yards between rounds fired at the same target, we decided with some considerable influence from our own infantry, that we could only use them on very distant targets. On the average, all through France and Belgium and into Holland at least 50 per cent of all 155 rounds were duds, which looked like sabotage in the German war factories. I myself saw a 155 shell which had broken open and appeared to contain sawdust.

A "Very Secret" Move To Antwerp

From Dunkirk we went to Antwerp; a very very secret move, nobody being allowed to know where we were going. However, when we got to the start point the provost had provided a large white sign "TO ANTWERP" so then we, and any enemy agents who happened to be around, knew where we were going. It was a long move for one afternoon, but very successful, and we received lots of fruit and flowers from the enthusiastic Belgians in all the towns and villages. Antwerp had only been liberated about a week when we got there, and it gave very much the impression of a peacetime town. The people were cheerful, the girls were good-looking and well-dressed, the sidewalk cafes were selling drinks, and the stores were well-stocked. For the first few days prices were very good, but later they soared fairly fast, particularly after the first American troops got there. However, we certainly got the impression, especially at first, that the city had suffered very little under German occupation.

From then on we went steadily north. We had to cross the Leopold Canal and after that, the Antwerp-Turnhout Canal where we had quite a time. The Sixth Brigade tried to cross at a place called Lochtenburg, the F.M.R.'s and the S.S.R.'s both took a crack at it. They had very little luck. The S.S.R.'s got practically everyone back, but the F.M.R.'s lost quite a few prisoners on the far side of the canal. We finally went some miles down the canal to a bridgehead established by the 49th Division, back up the other side again, and Lochtenburg was finally taken by coming in from the east on the north side of the canal.

Depleted Brigade Holds Fifteen Mile Front

We continued further north and at one point 6th Brigade got into rather an unusual situation. On the left, on the main road up to Bergen-op-Zoom there was considerable enemy strength,

and 4th and 5th Brigades were both in that area. Between them and 49th Division on our right was a distance of about 15 miles which was held by our brigade, and it was a very depleted brigade, not more than 40 to 50 per cent strength, and 15 miles is a lot of front particularly when the disposition of the enemy is not very well known and their strength varies from time to time and from one point to another. One anti-tank battery parked their guns and came into the line as an infantry company. The brigade was reinforced by the South Alberta Regiment from the 4th Division, and also a company of Algonquins. We also had several detachments of Free Belgians who fought well, but were not too reliable, as they were inclined to take the week-end off to go to Antwerp without providing other friends to take their place in the line. At the start, all we had to cover the 15 miles of front was our own regiment, which gave us considerable problems in providing support on all parts of the front. Later, however, they gave us two regiments of heavy ack-ack, one of which, a Royal Marines regiment, had never fired a round in anger before, and consequently were very enthusiastic, and fortunately also had lots of ammunition which at that time was a problem with us. We were in fact, rationed to about 70 rounds per gun per day. The heavy ack-ack regiments couldn't produce FOO's and so we used ours, and when an FOO called for fire through regimental control at Brigade headquarters, he might get twenty-five pounders or he might get 4.5 airbursts. In addition of course, we had our own light ack-ack, who were employed at that time on harassing fire tasks and fired infinitely more ammunition in a ground role than they had ever fired in their legitimate light ack-ack job.

Falaise was really the only battle of which I saw most of the show. If there was more time, I would like to tell you about Falaise. The South Saskatchewan Regiment deserved most of the credit for it. It was a town that had caused considerable competition; the Second and Third Divisions had both previously sent brigades to get Falaise, but when it came right down to it, the S.S.R.'s went in as just one battalion and took the town. However, time being up, I will leave that story of Falaise for some other time.

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With the Recces. in Sicily and Italy

(Address delivered by LT.-COL. F. D. ADAMS, D.S.O., before The Alberta Military Institute, in the Garrison Officers' Mess at The Calgary Armouries, on April 2nd, 1945.)

YOU have been told that I was Officer Commanding a Recce Regiment—1st Canadian 4th Division, Princess Louise Dragoon Guards. When I was asked to speak, it was either a question of one operation, in detail, or of giving you the broad outline of what the Regiment did during the time I was in Sicily and Italy. I decided to put the outline before you, after I had been told that there had been very few speakers on the Italian campaign, for I thought it would be of more interest to speak of the operation as a whole, from the time I started until I left.

I will run over it broadly, touch on any interesting points in detail, and then if there are any questions, I would be pleased to answer them.

One thing I wish to say is that if there is anyone here who has been to Italy throughout the operation and can help me out or correct me, I will be very glad. I am speaking entirely from memory, as I have made no notes at all and will therefore be only too glad if anybody can correct mistakes that I may make. One apology I wish to make before I start is for the use of the words "I" and "We"—I will endeavour to eliminate them as much as possible.

When the operation for Sicily was planned, it was planned to take the Recce. Regiment as a whole. About two weeks before we left Scotland, it was established that we would not all be sent and later I was detailed to proceed with No. 1 Squadron. No. 1 Squadron landed in Sicily on D plus 3. Up to that time, as you probably know from the papers, operations went quickly and my No. 1 Squadron did not get a great deal of opportunity to work. There were one or two little shows, but not to any great extent, following our arrival off the foot of Sicily.



LT.-COL. F. D. ADAMS, D.S.O.

We joined up with HQ and the operation for Italy was planned for September 3. No. 1 Squadron had to take part, but vehicles for the regiment did not arrive. At D plus 1, we landed with No 1 Squadron.

Landing In Toe of Italy

We landed in Italy just across from Messina, in Reggio, in the very toe. At first the division went straight up into the hills and it was planned to go up into Mount Salerno. The landing there occurred later on—on 8th/9th September. The weather was very hot and as we started up into the hills, all the bridges were blown—even the sides of the mountains were blown away. The Engineers did a grand job—they started in with "Bailey" bridges, putting them across gorges in the road that would surely make you nervous and we did get everywhere we wanted to, with a few exceptions. However, as we progressed on the 2nd and 3rd day into the hills, it was literally impossible, for in the act of overcoming one difficulty, it was found that there was some other obstacle that rendered passage impossible.

In General Simonds' First Canadian Division Medium Tank Force there were Calgary Regiment (Tanks), one squadron of my own regiment and one company of infantry and the sappers.

We started on this special mission straight down the coast. It was found that all our vehicles were a bit of an embarrassment, but they decided to send us off, on the chance that we would get through. Fortunately, we were well deployed along this main road, which was the coast road. All the bridges were gone, but in that particular place it was easier to make detours, although there were always the mines to be considered. The rear parties of German engineers left behind to blow the bridges would often appear—then there would be an exchange of fire—sweeping for mines and on we would go. During this later period, the whole division pulled out of the hills and we started going straight on through and went into Catanzaro.

Not Slowed By Enemy Opposition

At that time, there were very few airfields available—just a few in the very "toe" of Italy. The air forces wanted some others, where they could put bombers down, near the port of Catanzaro. We had to go on checking the airfields and also checking the road, also looking for other possible airfields. We moved along about forty or fifty miles. We were not slowed down at all by any enemy opposition. They were waiting for us at the port and I walked into the naval barracks, where a gentleman stepped up and said, "I will show you the port," and that was all there was to that!

Catanzaro was not knocked around a great deal—most of the installations were in fairly good shape, although the railway yards were completely demolished, otherwise things were fairly well all right.

From there it was decided that division would follow up and by-pass Catanzaro and go up, along the coast, to Castro Valleri, while at the same time there was a lunge forward at Taranto and, eventually, we hoped to join up with them. In the meantime, the force had landed at Salerno—the fighting was very stiff and bitter and they were not able to get forward. When they landed at Salerno they originally were planning to go straight up for Naples.

We were going to go up the centre and the other forces were to go up on either coast. We hoped to get to Castro Valleri and we did not meet a great deal of opposition—again just rear guards, blown bridges and things like that. It was then decided we would have to strike inland, because the people at Taranto were getting ahead. The division started for Potenza. They left one brigade on the flank and this included one squadron of my regiment. During this time, we were waiting for the regiment's vehicles—the vehicles had arrived at Reggio and they were trying to catch up. We waited for fifteen days before they did catch up. We were ordered out on the flank to do some recce, work and, carrying on with this, we eventually ended up at a place called Malfi, which was some 80 miles north of Potenza. About this time, it was considered that enough had been done on that flank, so we swung around, kept on going and eventually landed at Potenza. The only interesting part of this was that we eventually went on brigade duties and for five or six days we were out of touch with both brigade and division and had no supplies whatever. Fortunately, we did not run into very heavy opposition.

By the time we reached Malfi, the force from Taranto had gone up to Foggia, and it was decided that we would head up to Campo Basso, which is just beyond Foggia. I was ordered to "O" group. I went 82 miles to our divisional headquarters and met the 2 i/c, who had just reached the regiment as a vanguard of division group, which was starting for Campo Basso on 31st October; this was 29th September.

I drove back and packed up. No. 1 Squadron joined us on 30th September and we started at 5 o'clock on 1st October. We did not get started any too well. This was the first time the regiment was in action as a whole, and I finally had three squadrons on a front stretching for 50 miles; but we did have the enemy pinpointed along that front. However, thereafter it did become an infantry battle—definitely so for two squadrons—one on either

flank. Ten days after that we captured Campo Basso. Infantry at the centre of the line kept it. When the division reached Campo Basso, it was more or less decided that they would be held there until the rest caught up. The going was far from fast, the railroads were completely demolished, and it was difficult to bring up anything, so we were told that we would have quite a stay.

Stopped by Terrain

We had a chance to feel out to the north and west and we went some ten, fifteen to twenty miles all around to the north and west of Campo Basso. It was very interesting work, as at that time there appeared to be a real need of a reconnaissance regiment, although the roads were difficult, mines were thick and the weather was bad. We were able to get out and manoeuvre, however, but finally the terrain stopped us completely. We would come to a blown bridge and it was literally impossible to get across, and by the time the assault troops got across, with vehicles, we would go only two or three miles and meet another one.

A funny thing happened at that time. I was talking to the divisional commander one morning, discussing the difficult country which seemed so impossible unless we had horses. Two days later, he said he now had eighty horses but that nobody could ride them, so we started to form horse squadrons. We never used them in that operation.

Shortly after division was moved over to the Adriatic side and went into the line before the Sangro River towards Morro and the battle of Ortona. We moved from Campo Basso. We thought we would have to stop before crossing to the coast. I was then called to divisional HQ and told that there was no use in us staying around all winter—that we had to form an infantry battalion and get into the line for as long as the necessity for it existed. We formed an infantry battalion of from 500 to 600—there were 300 vehicles and the horses. It was impossible to train the horse squadron and that was why it was never used. Many parts of the

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front were such that use of the horses would have been valuable, but training with horses was out as there was not enough space to even exercise them.

During the winter months the whole front became static—very static. This was before Cassino. The 5th Army had taken Naples, but the whole line was held up. The Anzio beachhead ran into a very sticky time, for they had thought they were going to be able to get straight through. The first day or so they were running around anywhere they liked, but it did not take the Germans long to push down from north of Rome, and to get down to Anzio. Then the whole front became static. My unit went into forward positions with No. 1 Brigade and we operated as a straight infantry battalion for two months of that winter.

It was rather interesting to find out whether we could adapt ourselves to infantry work. Fortunately we did not have to operate with tanks. There was no fighting of an involved tactical nature in difficult operations; it was just a straight case of patrolling and staying in slit trenches all day. We were able to do that as well as any infantry, as the assault troops of my regiment excelled in patrolling, having been well trained to do that. The casualties were fairly heavy, which was wearing to some extent. It would have been different if the men could have got into the vehicles and gone to another task, but staying there, day after day, having three or four killed and five or six wounded, proved a very steady drain and got the chaps down.

We were able to give the infantry battalions a rest, sending them back into reserve. They had done a splendid job. My chaps were only too glad to help them out.

Attack on Hitler Line

In April, 1944, we knew that something was stirring. The rumor was that we were going to England and going to be teed up for the Second Front. We were moved to Caserta, just near Naples and after training there for a short time, we were told that we would be going forward to strike at the "Hitler" line. The policy on the Hitler line attack was that 13th Corps would be on our front; 5th Army was on our left and were going to conform; 13th Corps were going to breach the first line near Cassino, and Cassino was to be outflanked from the rear.

Action started on 11th May at 1100 hrs. Starting in that initial attack was the 4th British Division, 8th Indian Division and 13th Corps. We were told that it was possible that it would be two weeks before we got into the battle. The 4th British Division got along fairly well; but the others did not get along at all and Cassino still held out. Fourth British Division and 8th Indian Division went in and outflanked Cassino from the south. The 8th

Indian Division was badly mauled and 1st Canadian Corps was brought up. The plan was for the 1st Canadian Division to face up to the Hitler line; breach the line, and the 5th Armoured Division would then go through and strike on towards Rome.

We moved up to the Hitler line all right, but we found that it was not as easy to go through as we thought. It was felt that if we could exert enough force, quickly enough, we might get through and breach it. However, it did not work out that way and we were held up by very strong resistance on the part of the enemy. The Hitler line ran right up the Liri alley from Cassino, towards Rome, cutting across at Cassino, and that line was a very formidable system of fortifications and pillboxes. The enemy had been busy all through the winter organizing this. Some of these pillboxes were built with a large steel door, and inside was quite a large room capable of holding twelve men, with plenty of machine gun slits and all precautions taken. In some cases they had built the pillboxes inside a house and demolished the house on top of it, and, as you can imagine, these pillboxes were very interesting things to attack. It took three or four days to get through that line and I am afraid that casualties were heavy.

On 23rd of May 2nd Brigade were able to get through and led the 5th Division through. My regiment was leading when the division headed towards Ponta Corbo, at the extreme left side of the 8th Army front, facing that line.

Moroccan Troops On Our Right

A very interesting thing happened at that time. The 5th Army had French Moroccan troops on its extreme right. My unit was on the extreme left of the 8th Army, and if there is anything more difficult than liaison with French Moroccan troops, I hope never to run into it again. We found the Germans were in an area which had been fairly well breached. Nothing serious had happened to my unit, and I was making my evening rounds. We had had quite a good day, picking up eighty odd prisoners, and we were the first unit to get into the line and take any prisoners. I was feeling particularly happy—everything was fairly quiet and it looked as if we were all set for the night.

I drove back, down the road and in a few minutes was talking to "C" Squadron commander who said "We are being surrounded." He said this was a most annoying time for this to happen, and he did not know just what to do—whether to shove in his reserve troop until the situation clarified or not. I knew that there was a whole brigade of infantry down the road, and that if anything serious happened, we would be able to call on that brigade. I just got back to HQ and there was a message that "B" Squadron was sur-

rounded and were pulling out, yet "B" Squadron were not the ones who were supposed to be surrounded at all. Definitely, I had quite a time getting "B" Squadron settled.

It turned out that the French units I referred to had got into the habit of shooting. But at anything in boots that moved. One funny thing happened about this time, to one of my officers who was running towards the river when they began shooting steadily at him. He dropped down on his belly and did not know how to get up again, because every time he moved they fired and he finally crawled to the edge of the river. Just when he hit the river he put his hands up in the air, got over to them and finally made them understand that he was their friend. After that we thought, "Well, that's fine, everything is O.K." Five minutes afterwards they started to fire again. All in all, we had quite a night, trying to fight off the French. I sent one of my officers to stay with their forward troops and that did help to some extent.

An Interesting Operation

When the 2nd Brigade got through the line the 5th Division were able to move on to the Malfa River. This was rather difficult. When they reached the Malfa River they had quite a sticky time. There was a very strong German position there and it was there that the Strathcona Regiment had quite a bad time. The New Westminster Regiment got across and it was in that neighborhood that Mahoney won his V.C. My regiment got to Malfa River with the 5th Division and straightened out the line. It took two days to form a beach head in sufficient strength to get the engineers to build sufficient bridges to get across. When we got across that river, it was a straight case of the 1st Division going for Rome on highway No. 6. We got within twenty-five miles of Rome. That operation was a striking one, yet very interesting. We ran into hundreds of mines. I thought that the mines were the worst opposition that we had. We would go forward a certain distance, then run into the minefield with very heavy fire—machine gun fire, 75's and 88's behind it. Fortunately, in a reconnaissance regiment we have vehicles in front. A few of them kept getting in bad with the mines. Our artillery fire would push the enemy back a few more miles and then the same thing would go on, over again. As I said, we finally did get to within twenty-five miles of Rome. The French and the 5th Army came straight up on our flank. The Anzio beach-head broke out and went on and Rome fell. At that time, our division was pulled out into reserve area.

After the fall of Rome, the Canadian Corps was in reserve and then moved up along the Adriatic, straight towards Rimini. They have gone on from there, but I left just before they reached Rimini.

Vimy Anniversary Dinner

(From THE CALGARY HERALD, April 10th, 1946.)

I was never prouder in my life than I was of Canadians overseas wherever they were," was the message of an old Calgarian, L. W. Brockington, K.C., when he addressed the Alberta Military Institute and its guests at the Vimy dinner in the Palliser hotel Monday evening.

He warned his audience that he wasn't going to make a speech, because "the only thing more futile than making a speech is to take another plebiscite on conscription." In Canada and Australia, he added, there were "more speeches to the square meal than any place on earth."

"One-Mayor Town"

In his home town he was "what I am and always wish to be, a Calgarian home for a while," he told them. Spotting Mayor Andrew Davison in the audience, he admitted he was playing "an indifferent Amos to the Mayor's Andy." Calgary, he declared, was not "a one-horse town but a one-mayor town."

On every battlefield he visited he had asked, "Is there anybody here from Calgary or Alberta?" The answer had nearly always been "Yes".

He described his visits to the Calgary Highlanders and the Calgary Tanks overseas. Recalling that he saw the latter regiment in Italy in support of Punjabi and Sikh regiments, he commented that for once "Cawnpore and Midnapore met in the Apennine hills." He spoke of the Loyal Edmontons, "the timid Tenth" (10th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers), the South Albertas and the Strathconas, the latter who fought "in the bitterest tank engagement of the Italian campaign."

Canadians overseas formed "the proud procession and noble succession of the men who began the attack 28 years ago today."



L. W. BROCKINGTON,
C.M.G., K.C.

There were two memorials to the Battle of Vimy Ridge, said Mr. Brockington. One stood on the site of the battle. The other was "in the heart of eternal Canada." It symbolized "that grand unity forged in the last war and reformed in this war."

He recalled the dark days of the Battle of Britain and, more recently great fleets of bombers leaving British soil with "thunderbolts of revenge for Germany."

Dunkirk and its "little ships" led to 4,000 ships on D-Day. No greater work had been done in France than the clearing of the Channel ports by Canadians, he declared. The Germans were now meeting "the nemesis that overtakes insolence" because of a Divine Providence "that would not let evil triumph."

Sense of Unity

"The ancient land of Britain, the first to fight and the last to quit—it moulded the pattern," said Mr. Brockington. Thanks to Britain's defiance of a tremendous foe, the world "still walked in the light of London and of Coventry."

He praised the United States—"resilient and dynamic in action" and "the men and women of the little lands that would not let freedom die."

With all respect to the men for Vimy, young Canadians overseas "had the brightest eyes and deftest hands." They had learned a sense of unity among common perils "on hills that once were hopeless to all but the men who stormed them."

The toast to Vimy's heroes, proposed by Capt. R. C. Carlile, chairman, was observed in silence.

Toast to Forces

"Never did a great Empire owe so much to one man," said Maj. P. J. Jennings, O.B.E., in proposing the toast to His Majesty's forces. The Empire's forces provided a jealous guardianship and, in turn, "its guardianship has not been disputed."

Replying, Brig. F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C., recalled that Canadian forces were patterned on the traditions of British forces and that Britain's "most famous victories were won by outnumbered handfuls."

Everyone, civilian as well as soldier, was involved in modern warfare, said Lt. Cmdr. D. R. Dattels, R.C.N.V.R., in proposing the toast to the guests. The home front had the same significance as the fighting front. It took "the shock of Dunkirk" to awaken the Empire to the significance of total war.

Inspects Guard

No other day meant quite so much as Vimy Day, said Very Rev. Dean F. H. Smye, in reply. On that day "at last Canada had a chance to show herself as a producer of fine manhood."

Before the dinner, Brig. Harvey inspected a guard of honor from the Alberta Military Institute cadets. He declared them "as good if not better than anything I have seen."

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Japan's Abortive Attack on Ceylon

(Address delivered by MAJOR M. G. DOVER, V.D., before The Alberta Military Institute in the Garrison Officers' Mess, at The Calgary Armouries, April 25th, 1945)

MUCH water has gone under the bridge since those days of five years ago when I knew and was able to speak to members of the Institute. I am indeed happy to be here again, because I always feel that I am definitely among friends. You have no idea of how delightful it is, after a sojourn in a foreign land for five years and particularly in the Far East, to see civilians again.

I landed in New York on 17th March and was amazed to see the numbers of civilians and the type of civilization that I refer to; to see the huge numbers of members of the Forces; to see shops well filled with food and all the things that we had missed so much.

When I crossed the border into Canada, the first indication that I had arrived in Canada was to see a robin. The robin was sitting on a snowbank, but it was a very beautiful sight. In general, throughout Canada, you have it all here. Particularly here in Alberta—everything—good food, and so on.

On my last visit to Calgary, five years ago, I addressed members of the Institute, and I believe that I spoke particularly of Ceylon from the viewpoint of the customs of the people; history of the country and so on—information available to everybody, provided they had purchased Thos. Cook & Sons' Far Eastern guidebook.

Today, that position is different. We too have undergone the trials and tribulations of war. Ceylon, in its particular position in respect to those early days of the Jap advance, has been and still is a very vital position in our Empire. Little has been said of our position in Ceylon; this is not meant as a criticism of the lack of publicity. It has always been understood



MAJOR M. G. DOVER, V.D.

that when the war in Europe was over, due attention would be given to the opposition in the Pacific. On these lines, then, I will endeavour to put you into the picture in the early grave days.

Left Canada During Grim War Days

I left Canada, from Vancouver, on May 18th, 1940, on the "Empress of Russia," bound eastward and I never shall forget the grim faces of the few passengers that we had as news was received of the dismal tidings of happenings in the war. During the interval of the passage to Hong Kong, Italy had gone into the war. My own passage to Colombo had been booked on the "Count Verdi," an Italian liner, but that of course, was quickly cancelled and I had to make my own arrangements.

I obtained passage to Singapore on one of the American "President" liners and arrived there on the 10th of June. There has been the suggestion of neglect at Singapore, but I did not see anything of it. It is true that the hotels were open; that tea and supper dances were in order, but that was general all throughout the East and in Ceylon, too—no person realized that the situation was as serious as it was.

On my arrival in Singapore, I looked for passage to Colombo. I was told that it might be available in three weeks' time. Fortunately, I knew some good service friends and managed to find a small ship the following day. I bunked in with the captain. We pushed off for Ceylon, and while at sea detected various signals that came through, such as the signal ordering all French ships into the nearest British port. A few days later, by radio, we learned of the collapse of France, the conquest of Belgium, and finally, worst of all, Dunkirk. On my arrival on 21st June, 1940, the whole situation was felt to be indeed grave.

That was the position when I arrived in Ceylon. The military situation in Ceylon was more or less on a peacetime footing. That is, all local units were being mobilized, but this only included the permanent militia in Ceylon, at that time. The units I refer to had been organized for years, were under the direction of the Ceylon Defence Force, and at its head was a commandant, a permanent officer in the militia. The units were: Ceylon Planters' Rifle Corps, an organization of considerable strength in the islands—they were drawn from planters' sons, exclusively; The Ceylon Garrison Artillery, a very, very old unit, and their organization dealt with the manning of such guns as we had (very few), and the organization had lately been increased by two A/A batteries, which were identified with them. Then there were also Ceylon Light Infantry; Ceylon Army Service Corps; Ceylon R.A.M.C. and the Ceylon Home Guard. The Royal Navy at that time had a fleet, of sorts, but the local defence

was left to Royal Ceylon Naval Volunteer Reserve. There was no regularly organized unit of Airforce, but we had a few old planes.

Mobilizing of Ceylon's Forces

On arrival, I was immediately mobilized. The difficulty confronting all units was recruiting to war strength. I wish to impress on you that, at that time, in 1940, we had no equipment at all, except the rifles, and they were sparse, but with recruitment at full strength, you will appreciate the position. We had one searchlight, complete with generator, but nothing to drive it with. Every member of all units used his imagination and we all got busy. An old truck chassis was found and this provided the means of power to our one and only searchlight. The needs of the moment were such, considering the position of Ceylon, that we were endeavouring to place our training programme along the lines of invasion. That meant knowledge of the country in general and deciding what was best to do in the case of invasion. In Ceylon, however, it was found true that 95 per cent of the recruits needed physical training, for they were of only medium stature and their physique was weak. I believe that more attention was given to building up of the manpower than to infantry drill. This policy worked out very successfully. These men, after a few months of service, with good food, discipline, exercise and proper hours were, and still are, a credit to their units.

Meanwhile, with the Ceylon Defence Force, it was necessary to provide protection for oil installations; rail and road bridges; power plants; light plants and water supplies. These were under the care of various organizations set up by the military. I am speaking entirely of the grim days of 1940. It must be remembered that in these days there was a very limited European population which could be trusted. The civilian European women worked faithfully, long hours, giving their whole and undivided attention to whatever job had been assigned to them.

During this time other organizations sprung up—A.R.P. for instance, and the Fire Fighters' service. When you think of it, this was a very vital task, because we had such a conglomeration of houses, shacks, and frame places of that kind that in the event of an air raid, damages from fire would be colossal. Water banks were built and food distribution organized — this was particularly necessary. I would like to point out here that Ceylon does not grow sufficient staple food, that is rice, to feed her own people. For the past fifty years, Ceylon has depended upon rice shipments to come from India and Burma. I remember well Admiral Sir James Somerville warning the people of Ceylon to prepare to grow more rice, to make themselves self supporting,

because with or without Burma, shipping would not be available

It was not until 1941, a year later, that any equipment in any worthwhile amount came in for the units in Ceylon. A few ack-ack guns started to roll in. Transport, in very meagre amounts started to arrive; and I wish you to remember that, because, during late 1940 we were in the unhappy position that a hostile thrust might be made against us at any time

Removal of Japanese Nationals

In late 1941, a constant removal of Japanese nationals was carried out. We knew it well, because we had to provide guards for harbour installations. All the Jap women and children were removed by the Japanese in 1941. That was also very important, because what happened in Ceylon was the same story as elsewhere—Japan got everything away from all British ports long before they declared war on Great Britain. You can imagine that with all this preparation for what was to come, without any worthwhile military aid; considering the movement of troops around the Island which was necessary in view of the liability to invasion, there was a great need for transport. We had little or none from the services, so therefore the requisitioning of civilian means of transport was very considerable. That served us fairly well until late 1942.

You well remember, of course, 7th December, 1941, with Japan kicking off with the attack on Pearl Harbour, followed almost immediately by the bitter loss of "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse". Their loss was particularly well brought home to us because they had been in the harbour in Colombo only two weeks previously. After the initial success of Japan, Ceylon became a very, very, important outpost of the Far East. Black-out regulations were instituted immediately, and very great pre-

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cautions were taken that the blackout would be effective. Speaking of blackout conditions, I would like you to consider that in Ceylon we have two monsoons each year — periods of drenching, driving rains, with no moon—no light at all—you can imagine the difficulties for the services, dashing around the country under these conditions.

Evacuees Pour in from Conquered Areas

And so things went on. Japan moved towards Malaya. In short order Penang, then Singapore fell. I am not going to give you a long story about Japanese invasion of the East. I am dealing only with Ceylon. Following that, Japan moved into Burma and then down in, taking Rangoon and severing the Burma Road. Next it was the Adaman Islands, and then they continued on into and through the jungle and appeared in India proper. It was only a matter of a very few weeks when the evacuees from Singapore started to pour into Ceylon, and that made it a bad proposition. Also, with the evacuees coming in to us, the immediate problem of dealing with the European women and children, particularly those women not identified with any of the services, became very urgent. As quickly as possible, they were evacuated to South Africa and Australia.

At this time, the position became extremely grave, but fortunately, Sir Geoffrey Layton, an able man, came in as Commander-in-Chief of the Island. Shortly afterwards came the first Indian troops from India, a few items of ack-ack equipment and, most fortunately, a few squadrons of Hurricanes and Catalinas, which were based at Ratmalana and took up their positions there.

From that time on, preparations for defence were intense, as it was well realized from the early days of the Jap movement through Malaya and from Burma into India that their attack would not be long delayed.

Attack Comes on Easter Sunday

The attack came on Easter Sunday, 5th April, 1942. The following is a quotation from the official report of the R.A.F., as I would rather it came from them:

"At five minutes past four on the afternoon of the 4th April, a Catalina Flying boat, under command of S/L Burchell, reported a large enemy force 360 miles from Ceylon. This force was steaming towards the Island from the Southeast. Before full particulars could be obtained the message from the Catalina ceased abruptly, the flying boat did not return and is presumed to have been shot down. S/L Burchell,

R.C.A.F., had a mixed crew of Canadian and English personnel. Additional Catalinas were immediately dispatched on receipt of this information, and of these one ship failed to return. This force, with strong opposition from enemy fighters, managed to locate the Jap force, and at 0648 it was known that this force was of considerable strength. Due to the strength of enemy fighter opposition, it was not possible to determine the composition of this force."

This was the first indication that Japan was going to use Ceylon in the same manner as Pearl Harbour. At 0940 hours, Easter Sunday, 5th April, enemy bombers in "V" formations, escorted by Zero fighters, attacked Colombo harbour and shipping. One old destroyer was hit and sunk. The harbour was full of shipping at the time of this attack, although some other ships had been taken outside. There was still a great deal of congestion, but not what there would have been had it not been for the timely warning furnished by S/L Burchell that the attack was on.

There were two large formations of these enemy planes, and when they came over on Easter Sunday morning, with the people going to church, there was a hurried scramble for safety. For some strange reason, the attacking force which attacked the railroad made one complete circle before going into the attack. At the time they circled over the airdrome, the Hurricanes had been on the ground, but they got off quickly. Had the raiders attacked at once, they might have inflicted much more damage. They dropped their bombs as quickly as possible but did very little damage indeed.

The other half of the attack force was going in to attack shipping in the harbour and harbour installations and they had some success in the fact that they hit and sunk a very old destroyer; took pieces out of a jetty, and they did hit one of the harbour installations and two English ships

Over Half of Jap Force Destroyed

It is interesting to recall the damage caused to the Japs by that meagre force of R.C.A.F. personnel—the same good lads that took their part in those famous attacks in the defence of Britain. On that raid, there were 26 Jap planes destroyed, also nine damaged, out of a total of a little over 40 in the formation, so over half the force was put out of action

Trincomalee, the big naval base, was attacked on 9th April, as even after the other planes had been destroyed, the Japs still had considerable forces available. I quote from the official report of R.A.F.:

"On 8th April, 1942, at 3 p.m., a Catalina Flying boat reported an enemy task force about 400 miles East of the Island, steering North and West. Another Catalina on patrol in the early hours of the following morning had reported the same force and as this machine never returned to base, it was probably shot down "

On the 9th April attack the damage caused was considerable, but the enemy paid for it—32 aircraft were destroyed or probably destroyed and five damaged. On that attempted invasion of Ceylon, I would say that 30 per cent of their attacking force of planes was destroyed. Proof of the destruction was that that was the only air or seaborne attack we had, with the exception of the occasional big bomber attacks from the Andaman Islands.

The sea force, as far as we know, included four battleships; four aircraft carriers and a very large number of destroyers. Indication of the defence put up against the Japs came from their own acknowledgements. I would also refer to Admiral Sommerville's official statement. On 29th September, Admiral Sommerville was in charge of the Far Eastern Fleet, and at that time he quoted what ships he had to compete against the enemy's very superior force—four battleships of the "Ark" class; two heavy cruisers; two light cruisers; two aircraft carriers which were not at all modern in any way. He had a mixed lot of destroyers, a few new, but the majority of them all very crusted.

Keeping Shipping Lanes Open

The great problem to be faced at that time was to keep open the shipping lanes, not only to India and the Far East but also to Russia. Japan hoped to control the Arabian Sea; the Persian Gulf as well as Iraq, and thus to link with the Axis forces which were then very, very close to Alexandria; and things were going so smoothly and were so well planned that it must have looked like a certainty to them. Had they reached anything close to this peak, their opportunity of interfering seriously with supplies going to Bombay and by rail to Calcutta would have made the position very grave, indeed. Fortunately, that invasion attempt on Ceylon did not materialize, and it is no credit to us that had the attack been made two months previously, the situation would have been a damn sight more serious, because in that interval we had the opportunity of receiving supplies and of training our Ceylon forces, from our friends in the North.

"Throw Out the Whites" Campaign

I give you another picture. With the move of the Japanese through Burma and into India, came the signal for a strong

campaign by the Japs of "throw out the whites". Following the fall of Singapore and the greatly increased activity of the Japs, including the sinking of a great many of our ships in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, supplies became very short for the troops and British prestige had fallen terribly. Whether the Japs took a lesson from the Germans or not I do not know, but they quickly spread amongst the people of Burma and India a pleasant picture, saying that they would make India the dividing line between the Far East and the West, drive out all the whites, and then according to their story, everything would be very happy. You can well imagine that with the British being forced back everywhere and rapidly losing any foothold in so many places, one after another, it began to look very much to thinking people in that section of the world that the whole world was coming into the maw of the Axis forces. I can tell you it was a pretty difficult proposition to face.

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The Burmese, with their many political agitators, accepted the Japs' programme and they were very enthusiastic, saying "By all means — out with the British". They fell hard for the Japs' statements and placards of "British slave drivers" and so on. It was the same story in India. But after a few months, fortunately not two years later, after they had had all these "privileges" those who came under Japanese rule began to think that the old British rule was not too bad, after all. So finally, what prestige we lost originally, we have, in the long run regained entirely. That, in a few words, was the position out there.

Civilian Reaction Proves Excellent

At the time of the big air raid, the civilian reaction was very good, indeed. The harbour was badly strafed and for that reason many of the Malay labourers responsible for unloading the ships disappeared. They not only went away, many of them up in the hills, but they stayed away for a very considerable time. As the harbour continued very badly congested, a call went out to the civilian population and the reaction was marvellous. The European population responded beyond all hopes—clerks—bank managers—store proprietors—everyone in fact, gave their services unselfishly towards clearing the harbour, often working until two or three o'clock in the morning, and it can be truly said that the population of Ceylon went all out on that job. The authorities got busy and organized them into a battalion, under military law, with the result that arrangements were properly made for them to be fed and looked after. They did a grand job of work.

The present day situation as to equipment and so forth is no more serious in Ceylon than elsewhere. It was lack of equipment and lack of air power that put us in the situation we are in today. Who is to blame, nobody knows. With Ceylon, all supplies made available were put to use. In Singapore and Rangoon they were left on the docks in great quantities—could not be used and could not be taken—it was no particular fault of anybody.

Today, the situation is entirely different, and it is most gratifying. Up until one and a half years ago no great amount of equipment had come out; we got things where we could and made the best of it. Today there are huge reserve stocks of all possible kinds of equipment that could possibly be used. Believe me, when I say, too, that it is there. With that confidence and knowledge we can go forward when the right time comes to go forward, for we will have the material with which to finish the job.

In conclusion, I would like to refer to those words of inspiration of Winston Churchill. Now in 1945 and particularly right at present, we see a great deal of optimism as to the conclusion of the war. We see Berlin surrounded. Things are moving swiftly to their conclusion. I find, at this time, it is good to look back of present events to the famous words of Winston Churchill which I referred to:

"Then let us to the task, to the bitter and the toil, each to our part, each to our station, filling the Armies; raising the air power; rolling out the munitions; strangling the U boats; tilling the fields; guarding the ports and carrying out all things necessary to be done. Let us go forward, then, we have not a week, nor a day, nor an hour, to be lost."

I think, gentlemen, that these were words of prophecy and inspiration in those early grim days of the war. I hope we can remember them in the coming days, remembering them in order that we may follow them through.



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Argentina from Within

(Address delivered by F/O REV V S LORD at a Meeting of The Alberta Military Institute held in The Garrison Officers' Mess on September 12th, 1945)

WHEN I left Calgary in December, 1933, I went home to England for a few months and then went to Rosario, second city of the Argentine Republic, as chaplain at St. Bartholemew's Church, with a congregation of two thousand, including English and Argentinians. I was there for five years before the war.

When the war broke out, I was on reserve of R.A.F. I wrote to Major Davis, who sent me a nice long list of recruiting stations, but I could not get them to accept me — they insisted I was too old, so I just stayed there and carried on, and I think I did the right thing.

British Community Does Well

The British community in Argentina did very well as regards volunteers — two thousand young chaps went to England or were sent here for training on R.C.A.F. stations. There was a call made for all British citizens to assess themselves on the same basis as for taxes, and they responded wonderfully. Another idea which became very popular was an organization in which every member should pay one cent for every plane shot down by R.A.F. This thing grew and grew and many, many thousands of dollars were collected. It got up to twenty thousand odd planes and the organization bought an entire squadron of "Spitfires" for the R.A.F.

There were numerous tributes paid to the members. Fancy names were used to signify contributions, grades such as "Puff," "Whiff," "Bellows". All the work was volunteered and it spread fairly well all over South America. After the war the balance of funds was paid over to R.A.F. Benevolent Association. Great credit was due to these people. As I came down the coast, all the way I saw "Bellows" badges. They were to be seen in Chile, Uruguay, Peru and Ecuador. In fact, I believe the idea even spread to Australia. About a year ago there was an article in "The Reader's Digest" concerning this plan. The open contribution of the British community was allowed by Argentinian authorities. The people at large are quite friendly to us, but are not allowed to say very much.

There were five Presidents there in rapid succession. Justo, Ortiz, Castillo, Ramirez and Farrell, who is now in office. I will not talk of politics. Being of the Church, I will not meddle in politics. I will answer some questions, afterwards.

I went down from London on a coastal boat, and I was not long in making friends with the officers and we had a very enjoyable trip. We called in at Montevideo on the way and arrived at Buenos Aires in twenty-eight days. We then went to Rosario on the Santa Fe, about 180 kilometres further on (in miles, probably 120).

Large Grain Exporting Port

Buenos Aires, a city of half a million people, is one of the largest grain exporting ports of the world. In the harbour there are always three or four ships berthed alongside each other, loading grain for Europe. Most of the grain was wheat or maize, and alongside of the British ships there were German and Swedish vessels, in fact, boats of all kinds. During the war, only British and American vessels were there, chiefly American, for obvious reasons. Shipping was limited to the United Nations. I had quite a lot of work amongst the sailormen from the ships. I made a trip to Montevideo and had a week there, at the English club. During that time there was a ship there, full of troops. Another time we entertained R A F. officers from the Middle East Command.

Uruguay is very friendly to the Empire and a much kinder spirit prevails towards the Allied nations. While we were there the "Highland Monarch" crew came to church and next Sunday we had service on board. During the week we had various entertainments and dances, and I can assure you that a good time was had by all.

I might tell you about the country. From the West Coast to the Andes, it is like this country—flat and rolling country—the railways run along beside the small towns, called "pueblos". The houses are made of brick, unpainted — everything looks rather half done. Certain fertile parts of the 'estancias' are very fertile indeed, while some are better for cattle. I used to visit there and came across some very fine estancias, which would grow everything that was planted very easily. In other parts you could see corn growing along by the railways, also wheat and linseed.

Trips to Mindoza

I had one or two trips to Mindoza and saw the grain being loaded in the mills. A lot of exporting is done from this locality. Another time on the road to Mindoza, which is the road going on through to Chile, the railway grade was washed out. Whole festoons of track lines, held together by the ties, hung on the mountainside. I was the guest of the mayor of one community. I saw the point, from the Trans-Andean Railway, where the national hero went across the Andes—there is a great big cairn there, built of rocks.

While at Mindoja I visited the fruit canning plants. They grow a lot of fruit and a great amount of canned peaches and tomatoes are turned out by the Argentina Canning Company. They also grow grapes there, and there is a "bodega" or wine factory, and there I saw some lovely big French wine casks, as high as this room. This large wine factory is most interesting. These big casks have wine in them in all the various stages of fermentation, and to pass from one to the other, the wine just runs along a large gutter between them.

Picturesque Irrigation Scheme

When we visited Rio Negro, we found a very picturesque irrigation scheme working. A lot of British ships call at Rio Negro and in this district I refer to, South and West of Buenos Aires, there is a lot of water held at a falls on which considerable work has been done. The water is just allowed to trickle through. The valley is very fertile between the two high cliffs and at the top of the cliffs there is just desert—"pueblo" country, for miles and miles around. In the valley of the Rio Negro there are many fertile farms, surrounded by poplar trees which serve to keep the strong winds from the pampas from knocking the fruit off the trees.

It is a very interesting sight to see these fruit farms, a large portion of the products of which is sent by ships to Buenos Aires, and the market is growing fast. They have also tried to educate the people to the kind of fruit we like, and it is going over very well.

I was there for ten years in all, and I saw some of the young people answer the call. We were left behind to serve as best we might. I stayed on for another five years. Many of these boys who went into training did a very fine job and some who went, of course, will never come back, and so we carried on on the home front until 1945. With the co-operation of the British Consul, I was able to get in some large public services on such occasions as the Jubilee of King George V; coronation of King George VI and always on Armistice Day. These services were held under the auspices of the British Legion. We used to meet once a month, for various things, especially keeping up the old spirit and our British people used to turn out in really big numbers. On Armistice Day, especially, the church was crowded and there was a large crowd outside.

We carried on in this way and then, after ten years, I thought, "Well, that is long enough". I wrote to my old Diocesan Bishop—Bishop Bragg, and he said "Come on back". We left Buenos Aires on June 6th. It was very hard to get a ship, unless

we wanted to wait, so we went on an Argentine state fruit boat. These were either bought up or leased, were manned by naval officers and the crew was very co-operative and we had a nice trip.

Through to the West Coast

We left on 6th June, and then I found that this ship was going South and up the West Coast. We went on out the River Plata and down to the sea. We did not see anything until we got to the Straits of Magellan, a day and a half later. It was quite rough in this neighbourhood, but that is quite normal. We saw Valpariso from the sea and it is a much better sight than from the land. Valpariso is rather an untidy, depressed looking place, to judge from Argentinian standards. Everything looked very bedraggled. We stayed there for a day and then went along to a seaside resort. Leaving there we came to Carro—port of Lima. Lima is a fine city, from all appearances. We saw Lima from a car and we saw the remains of the great Pizarro. His actual bones are still there in a cathedral.

In Lima there are many fine old cathedrals, also nearby many most interesting remains of the Incas.

We entered the West end of the Panama Canal on a Sunday morning, with high hills around and all about us. We saw two American destroyers pull out and lots of signs of warlike activity. We went through the Canal that Sunday, going through three locks and Gatun Lake. While going through we passed a British ship, just filled with Australian and New Zealand troops. They were a happy bunch—going home. This was a very pleasant sight. After we got through Gatun Lake and the three locks we were on the level of the Atlantic. While waiting at the Atlantic end we happened to see three Canadian destroyers and we went on board; and there was Senator Buchanan's son from Lethbridge. I told his father about this meeting.

We went to San Francisco and then East; from there up to Tampico, which is an oil city, chiefly Mexican labour is used. There is nothing there but oil and that is all one is reminded of—oil everywhere—everything smells of oil.

We were glad to get to New Orleans, where we left the ship. From there we came straight on to Calgary. I had written to the Canadian Pacific Railway agent at New Orleans and found that reservations had been made two days later. All my household effects were shipped from there right through to Calgary and they arrived in good condition. We landed here on 17th July. We are very glad indeed to be back in Canada and to see the old Union Jack flying with the Maple Leaf forever.

With an Advanced Surgical Unit

(From the Calgary Herald, October 13th, 1945)

MAJOR L. G. ALEXANDER, M.B.E., M.C., recently returned from four and a half years of overseas service, told members of Alberta Military Institute Friday night of some of the difficulties and tasks which confronted an advanced surgical unit. He described his unit as one "especially" designed in this war, to speed evacuation of wounded from the front lines."

Major Alexander, veteran of the First Great War, was awarded the Military Cross in the Second Great War for gallantry during the Dieppe raid. He went overseas early in 1941 with the Calgary Tanks as medical officer and later was given command of the 6th Field Dressing Station, a Montreal unit, with which he served until the capitulation of the Nazis.

Improvised Hospital

Speaking of the difficulties of his unit, the Calgary medical officer told of one instance when his unit, billeted in tents, received a capacity of casualties. Heat was necessary to keep the men alive while they waited treatment and operations.

A heating system was improvised by running pipes from a nearby house through the tents. Sand was spread on the floor of the tents to reflect the heat and enough warmth was provided, even for major operations.

During the period from July 13th, 1944, until June 6th, 1945, Major Alexander stated, his unit alone dealt with 27,738 casualties. Of these 433 were major surgical operations. Nearly 5,000 were treated and then evacuated to base hospitals in England by air. Some 3,600 were treated for sickness other than wounds. Besides treating more than 4,500 Canadian wounded the hospital provided care for 500 enemy wounded.



MAJOR L. G. ALEXANDER,
M.B.E., M.C.

Of the 400 odd major operation cases, plus many minor operations, only 58 patients died. For the whole period the post operation mortality was 13.39 per cent. The total hospital mortality was .79 per cent, Major Alexander said.

Had the evacuation of wounded across the Seine been necessary during the war in Europe, Major Alexander was fully prepared for it.


Invented "Jeep Boat"

Credited with the design of the "Jeep ambulance" which proved invaluable with the 8th Army in Sicily and Italy, Major Alexander also invented what was known as the "Jeep boat". It was a small craft, powered with an outboard motor, specially converted to carry four stretchers. The boat was an outcrop of the jeep ambulance and utilized the same system, whereby the stretchers slid in and out of their positions to facilitate the handling of the injured.

Brigadier G. R. Bradbrooke, M.C., officer commanding the 41st Brigade Group (D) in Calgary, paid tribute to Major Alexander when he thanked him, on behalf of the members of the Institute, for his address.

Brig. Bradbrooke, as a lieutenant-colonel in February, 1941, was in command of the Calgary Regiment (Tanks) when it went overseas. At that time, Major Alexander, then a captain, was medical officer for the unit.

Brig. Bradbrooke stated that no commanding officer ever had, or could ask for a finer medical officer than Major Alexander. He compared him to a country doctor who not only aided the men with their physical ailments, but also as one who helped them mentally and morally by advice and example.



The War-time Internment Camp at Seebe

(Address delivered by LIEUT.-COL. de N. WATSON, O.B.E., E.D., at a Meeting of The Alberta Military Institute, held in The Garrison Officers' Mess, on October 25th, 1945.)

I HAVE been in the internment camp at Seebe more than six years except for the odd trip. I will try to take you quickly through internment work in a Prisoner-of-War camp, up to the present moment.

On the outbreak of war, the enemy aliens who were at all dangerous and known to the R.C.M.P. were rounded up. There was an hour set, in the early hours of the morning, when the Police, all through the country, raided the various German organizations and arrested the officials, usually the President and the Secretary. These men were all known to be working in the interests of Germany, being Nazis, and some of them were very dangerous to this country, indeed, a great many of them, in fact.

The enemy aliens from all four Western Provinces were taken to Kananaskis. Kananaskis had been a relief camp, and there were four old wooden huts, and these prisoners started living in them, with police escorts, and stayed there for many days after that.

Some of these men were very well known in their own districts and some of them would have been of great value to Germany, had they got back. There were others, of course, who would not be so useful. For instance, we had Pat Lenihan, one of the aldermen in Calgary, and I must say that he took it like a man and that his behaviour was always of the best and that he always had a bad word to say for the Germans. Then we had another man from Winnipeg who was an alderman, also a famous doctor from Winnipeg, who was released and re-interned, which was rather unfortunate, because he was really a very decent chap.



LT.-COL. de N. WATSON, O.B.E., E.D.

The two most important persons in those days were two men who were definitely spies—Count von Hoensbrouk and Dr. Schaurte, who were on a "hunting" trip through Alberta. They were undoubtedly in close touch with Germany and also were members of the Bund in this country. They were quite a problem when the police brought them to us. We held them for a long time. Count Hoensbrouk was very co-operative. Dr. Schaurte was a millionaire. He was one of the biggest industrialists in Germany and was concerned with a great many of the factories turning out various types of iron and steel supplies. He also happened to be the owner of a large factory on the outskirts of London. Eventually, the British Government claimed these two and they were sent from here and expected to be released, but they remained on the Isle of Man for a considerable time. Finally they were released and sent back to Germany.

When the camp was first started, the guards were all members of the Calgary Regiment (Tank), called up under G.O. 139, and some of them are still there. C.S.M. Brierley, one of the original guards, is still there as C.S.M. My own batman has been there all the time. A number of others went Overseas. Young officers came back from Overseas who were Orderly Room clerks with us in 1939.

Spork




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The Geneva Convention, as you know, contains the laws governing treatment of prisoners of war. They all worked, but we leaned over backwards in every way to carry out the terms of the Geneva Convention in an endeavour to better the treatment of our men in their hands. One of the earliest officials at that time was Captain Nolan, now a Brigadier and Judge Advocate General in Ottawa. He came there as legal representative for the prisoners interned there, and advised us, later on.

First in Almost Everything

Amongst other interesting things, this camp was first in almost everything. It was the first internment camp in Canada; the first people were interned there; the first central towers were built there; the first working parties were sent out from there; in the first year over \$50,000 was realized from the work done—we had quite a little done, you see. It was the first camp in which newspapers were allowed—ever since 1940 P.O.W.'s have been allowed newspapers there. All the material they got was censored, of course, and received only on orders of the Commandant. They read everything. Amongst the first internees we had Germans, Austrians, Italians, Japs, Spaniards, Czechs, English, Irish, Scotch and Canadians, and they began to fight amongst themselves. The Communists (about forty-eight of them) fought considerably with the Germans and there were quite a few broken heads. It was occasionally reported that someone had fallen out of bed.

Amongst the internees there were a considerable number who were not really so dangerous, and they were released. Some were placed on parole, to report to the police, and some unconditionally. Some of those placed on parole were later interned. One old German from near Wetaskiwin was released and went home and came back with three sons, saying he had a better living inside. (Laughter)

As regards the work of the internees, they were not fully protected as were the fighting forces of Germany. They did benefit to a certain extent, being paid 20 cents per day, which they could use in the canteens and so forth. They always had quite good conditions, being able to buy anything they wanted. They can even buy beer now.

One of the more interesting things was the arrest of the wife of one of our prisoners as a woman spy. The way she got caught was through sending in parcels with a false bottom, in which she placed well done local maps and other maps; also extracts from letters which showed she had returned from the States. This woman was arrested, confined and remained in custody for two years. She served that two years in the women's prison at Kingston.

Another thing not generally known was that there were eight or ten other women interned. They were kept in internment for a considerable time but were eventually repatriated to Germany.

Now amongst the other internees that we had was a man who came from North Saskatchewan, about Christmas, 1939. Later, he made a very strong plea for release to visit his relatives, as his son was ill, and he produced documents in evidence, recommending to the Commanding Officer that he be released, on parole. However, he did not come back and the police rearrested him and reinterned him. Usually there is no question of leave, but there was one internee who did get leave. His wife was very ill, in Vancouver, and he asked to have leave to go and see her and he went.

The Spies — Germans Would Have Shot Them

Now the prisoners in this camp have been changed four times. The original prisoners were spies. In Germany they would have been shot. We treated them better than that. We had the whole of the crew of the "Weser," which was captured by the "Prince Robert" and brought to Vancouver; it was the biggest Diesel powered boat at the time. Some of them were strong Nazis. They had been lying in South American ports for quite a long time, and fifty per cent of them were badly in need of medical attention for V.D. Another crew was that of the "Hermonthes," captured by an American vessel. We had considerable trouble with them. The captain of the "Hermonthes" was a nasty piece of work. All these internees were shipped to Fredericton and the internees from Eastern Canada were moved down there. It was my misfortune to look after them. It was a poor camp, badly situated and we had a near mutiny there for three days. They refused to be counted and we refused food and we won out.

Another interesting man was a Professor from the University of Manitoba. He was very unfortunate. I do not think he should have been interned; but feeling ran very high and there were a lot of these chaps being arrested and interned, yet hundreds got away with it.

Another very interesting item was a clever chap who got away with a working party and when he went to pick up a ride on the road, who should come along but two guards who promptly brought him back. Another incident was when one of these bright lads had stolen a radio and we had a full job getting it back. He was advised that he would be set free of the charge if the radio was produced. So he went out and about an hour afterwards I went in and he asked me, "If this radio is produced, will that certainly be the end of

it " I informed him that that was so. He then said that he could not guarantee it would be produced. I was not quite sure whether this had been decided upon or not. About half an hour afterwards, ten prisoners came along with the radio. (Laughter). They said, in effect, "Here, take your blamed old radio, if it is not a twelve tube set we do not want it at all."

As I said, I went down with these prisoners to Fredericton, and I did not like it at all and they sent me back to Seebe, but in the meantime, I had four months on internment work at the Officers' camp, setting up new camps and so forth. I was on hand when the first officer prisoners of war came in. They included such people as outstanding submarine commanders. They were worse than a bunch of rabbits to watch. Two of them went out under the guard room and used material from the guard room to cut through fences, They made plenty of trouble

Merchant Seamen from All Over the Earth

Another time I was sent on a trip through all the different camps in Canada. I travelled over 10,000 miles in less than four months before I returned to my station here. When I got back here, the merchant seamen had been sent in. They were a very interesting lot, indeed. They had come from all over the earth. Among them was Captain Scharfe, commander of the "Europa" for eight years, and Commodore of the North German Lloyd. Captain Scharfe was a very fine man, indeed. He, of course, was certainly a German, but with exceedingly high principles. He was the camp spokesman, always most courteous and got himself into many bad jams with his own people, because he would always do what was right.

Captain Bresel was another prisoner, with as many decorations as Goering. He was a very well known Officer in Naval Reserve training. He ran the blockade into Narvik, but his ship was captured shortly after that and the war was over for him. He was assistant spokesman of the camp, and if any of the men did not do as they were told he simply knocked them down

Captain Scharfe was later repatriated and he joined his family in Bremen. They moved 3,000 people on board the "Europa" and it was used as a hotel until the finish of the war. The Americans captured the "Europa", but I did not see where they used it. He was a man most highly respected in pre-war days. I heard that Scharfe was going to sail with the "Europa," but things must have turned out quite differently, because there were twelve separate attempts to sabotage the boat by fire

I heard that he was brought before the Commanding Officer on the sabotage charges and I also heard that he died on the boat. I do not know whether or not that was true.

Dr. Klein, who ran the P.O.W. hospital, was eventually released and repatriated. He wrote me a very short letter after the "Gripsholm" arrived in Europe. It was dated from Germany on 18th January, 1945. He said that he wished to drop me a few lines to say that he had had a pleasant trip across the Atlantic and that he expected to be home in a few days. He also said that he wished me to know that he appreciated my "correct attitude." I have never since found out what became of him. Eventually, the merchant seamen were moved out and shipped to Monteith, and that gave rise to a cartoon to the effect: "Join the Nazis and see Canada from camp to camp."

Officer Prisoners From Normandy

Our next arrivals were officer prisoners of war, direct from Normandy—and then the fun began. They were picked up just as on the beaches and they were a miscellaneous lot. Some of them arrived in shorts and shirts, and others had enough kit to sink a ship. Some were of very high rank. One was a Major-General. Some of them were men who were not really soldiers, but were attached to the German Army and Navy and when the pressure became great, were forced into uniform.

After a while I got another bunch from Bowmanville, Ontario, and started in to separate them. We had to grade them according to what grade they were considered to be—black, grey or white. I have seen a lot of black ones and a few grey but I never saw any white ones yet (Laughter). Ours was a "black" camp and they took the greys away and replaced them from other camps.

We got quite a curious collection of thugs. Among them was another general. When we found it necessary to put him on the mat, he started to raise the devil, and if I had not got a bit annoyed, he might have given me quite a time. He was always making a kick about something. One of his complaints was that I had referred to some of his officers as bloody madmen. When I was asked, for an official report, I advised that I did not have any recollection, but I did not think that I would use such an inadequate description.

Things went along that way and finally, this general got to be a darn nuisance. He pretty nearly wanted to take over command of the camp and between everything, I had to take some action. We manoeuvred that and he outsmarted himself and he got twenty-eight days detention in Currie Barracks,

which was quite out of the ordinary—and he served it properly. With him went another senior naval officer who also served twenty-eight days.

The General Who Was "Not Captured But Stolen"

There was a Major-General Kreipe. He had been an interpreter in Crete. I don't know whether many of you have heard the story or not. In any case, our people picked him right out of his car and finally got away. An article in "The Empire Digest" for September had it nearly correct. It appears that they went ashore and got him and later drove him through twenty-two of his own posts, and keeping out of the way with him for some weeks, finally got him off the island. An interesting thing is that one of the other prisoners from there who was being interrogated was asked how did he view General Kreipe, and what did he think of him in general? He said he thought the general was a fine soldier. "What do you think of him getting captured?" we asked him. "He was not captured, he was stolen," he said (Laughter). They thought it was most unfair that he should have been picked out of his own car and stolen. He was another general who had to be tamed.

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We had another chap there who was one of the most senior submarine commanders and was a patriot all the way. The "Ark Royal" was supposed to have been sunk a dozen times, but he was the first man to sink the "Ark Royal", which he did on 14th September, 1939, in the Firth of Forth. He was later moved to one of the other camps.

With regard to rates of pay, I may say that officers were entitled to their service pay. We stood by such agreements through the Swiss Government. There was an exact amount agreed upon, and officers steadily got their pay according to rank. For instance, a lieutenant got \$21.26 per month and a lieutenant-general got \$62.02. They also got any back pay they had coming.

Other Ranks' Pay Cut—Ask for Work

O.R.'s were not paid by us as soldiers, but were paid \$6.00 per month as workpay. They were also paid \$11.00 a month by Germany, through the Swiss Government. The last while before the end the Germans could not carry on any longer. After the war we wondered why this rate of pay was kept up, but it carried on for some time, chiefly at the request of the British Government. Later the pay was reduced to one-third of normal. The prisoners then asked for work and were given work at fifty cents per day—three hundred of them in two shifts. They are also doing a lot of art work for sale and they are allowed to sell it through official channels. They have done a good job on this, and have worked up quite a business. Their prices are reasonable and the work is good. There was one very well known artist there, who, before the war, was commissioned by the Italian royal family to paint the picture of the King of Italy.

One of the things we did realize was that the Germans had to have a decent and honourable burial, and we carried this out very strictly. The caskets are identical and the same burial ceremony is used throughout. Photographs were taken in all cases, and were sent back to Germany through the protecting power.

We had in the camp one of the most successful U-boat commanders of the war, and according to the fan mail from Germany, he must have been one of the most successful escapees in Canada, but he has not got out of our camp yet. This knife (holding up knife) was taken from a prisoner and brought back next morning. It was made from a car spring and is as sharp as a razor—it was taken from one of the seamen.

Prisoner Attempts to Escape

The question of escapes may be interesting. The first two men got away in December, 1939. They actually got into Calgary, but they were spotted very shortly and following their return to camp were tried and got two years. Two men got away from a working party, but they got caught. Two men went underneath a sentry tower—the sentry was asleep. Three men tried to get out by tunnelling and they cut thirty-two strands of wire. They must have made some noise, because the sentry waked up, but he did not catch them. He was placed in the cells. Although they stayed in a toilet for hours they were later caught and they were tried and given twenty-eight days, all three of them. One of them served out his detention in the barracks in Calgary here. There have been other attempts to escape by tunnelling—at least twelve tunnels were started in the camp and some were nearly successful.

One of the largest buildings we had was a mess hall which would accommodate five hundred prisoners. While one set would be in sight, there was always another gang operating on the tunnel. One of the things that raised our suspicions was that one man there seemed to be always playing the same tune on a violin. We finally got onto it, chiefly through this happening, and we ripped up the floor and found that they had dug quite a large passage. They put the dirt into chests and all the dirt went back into the passage. They had done a very fine job for themselves and had actually dug six hundred yards of tunnel.

Another time the prisoners had more than fifty-eight feet dug before we discovered their activities. They were working at the east end of one of the huts. There was a man who would be sitting regularly in a certain place and always just there—he never moved from that one spot. Somebody wondered why, and had a look. It was found that this chap was sitting on a trap door and we really had luck finding it when we did. A number of other cases were discovered. In one case they worked chiefly at night and on this job they made a very fine bellows from a kit bag and pumped fresh air down into the passage. They stopped each morning.

Coming down to more recent times, after the fighting finished they started a form of re-education of the Germans, trying to teach them the meaning of democracy. They did not have any success. There were some interesting things shown on the films that were made available, and we made sure that they saw them. There are things supplied such as illustrated booklets of what went on in Germany. Some of them are pretty gruesome. These are chiefly based on what the Americans

and British found in 1945. Another called "The Third Reich" is pretty much the same sort of thing. There was a lot of other stuff brought out—books, shows and so on, which has been used in an attempt to assist in their re-education.

There is no question but that a lot of these prisoners are very clever. Many of them have done some excellent painting and they turned out an excellent marionette show—made all their own figures and a miniature stage and put on their own concerts. They do not react at such times as our people do, but sit with rather a dour, glum expression for probably an hour and a half; and they never applaud, but sit perfectly still and then, at the end, they applaud long and hard.

During the war Hitler issued his own stamps. Here is the official stamp showing the Czech protectorate. They have painted several well done portraits of Hitler. At the end of hostilities the proclamation was issued and read to the Germans. It was made compulsory that every German hear this proclamation. When this was read, the entire camp was called on parade and I had photographs taken and sent them to Ottawa. I asked for approval of the photographs and they are the only official photographs, as far as I know, showing an official reading of the proclamation. Ottawa approved them, and they sent me a lot of prints and I had them and they made an excellent historical record, as the two German generals are shown in it listening to the reading. I have a copy of that proclamation and a set of these photographs here, which I would like to present to the Institute tonight. In our camp there was one of the few newspapers ever published in an internment camp, called "The Latrine." However, we did not approve of the material published

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
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—Norman Proverb


The maps which are printed on the opposite and in the following pages will be found of interest and value in the study of the campaign in Normandy described herein. The official "Canada's Battle in Normandy", published by authority of the Minister of National Defence, states in the chapter "A Wall is Breached":

The immediate object of Operation "Neptune" (defined as the assault phase of Operation "Overlord") was "to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed". This lodgement area was to include airfield sites and the port of Cherbourg.

The plan was boldly conceived. It was hoped to occupy by the night of D-Day five important towns, all some distance inland: Ste. Mere-Eglise, Carentan, Isigny, Bayeux, and Caen. The next task of the Second Army was to develop the bridgehead South and South-East of Caen to secure airfield sites and to protect the flank of the First United States Army while that Army captured Cherbourg. Thereafter, the Americans were to press on to capture the Brittany ports, which would complete the "lodgement area". Until this was done, the British forces on the Allied left would not attempt a major advance, but when the required ports were in our hands a general offensive would follow with the object of destroying his (the enemy's) Western armies . . .




"The Allies . . . were to land on a five-division front, with the Americans on the right. . . . The Anglo-Canadian front would be between Asnelles, North-East of Bayeux, and Ouistreham, at the mouth of the Orne North-East of Caen. . . . The Second British Army assaulted with three infantry divisions: the 50th (Northumbrian) Division, under the 30th Corps, was to attack on the right on a two-brigade front; while the rest of the British front would be the responsibility of the 1st Corps, with the 3rd Canadian Division attacking on its right, also on a two-brigade front, and the 3rd British Division on its left with only one brigade forward. The Canadians, that is to say, were to be in the centre of the British sector.

THE CAEN AREA




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THE EXPANSION OF THE NORMANDY BRIDGEHEAD



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
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PURSUIT TO DIEPPE



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D-Day—Before and After

(Address delivered by MAJOR HENRY S. PATTERSON before The Alberta Military Institute in the Garrison Officers' Mess, at The Calgary Armouries, on November 9th, 1945.)

BEFORE beginning, I should like it to be understood that this is not a matter of coming home to tell what I did in the Great War. A large number who have been over here have performed very brave deeds in one way or another and they are the ones who are doing the least talking. The only justification for my remarks is that I will attempt to draw some conclusions about the German nation, based upon evidence which has impressed me, and which I think should be passed on to those who have not had the opportunity of meeting the Germans in their army and in their country.

The title "D-Day—Before and After" was chosen because I wished to give you a little idea of some of the training and planning that went into the D-Day operation before it took place. At the time I was officer i/c artillery communications of the 3rd Division. Some considerable time before D-Day the 3rd was selected as the Canadian assault division. We, therefore, began concentrated training around the coasts of England and Scotland. Each person in the whole Division went at least once, and in some cases twice, up to the Clyde, where we trained in assaulting the various islands, particularly the Isle of Bute.



MAJOR HENRY S. PATTERSON

After that we went to the south coast and stayed in areas which were to become our marshalling areas, and the exercises continued from day to day. Many of these were conducted with the artillery and infantry firing live ammunition in very close co-operation.

I would like to give you some idea of one of our greatest trials of that time — the waterproofing and de-waterproofing of our vehicles. Perhaps you have seen moving pictures of military vehicles driving along completely under water. As a

matter of fact, all you could see would be the heads of the drivers and a little pipe sticking up for the air intake and exhaust for the motor. The electrical parts are covered with a sticky "goo" which caused the motor to sweat. If this "goo" were left on for any length of time, short circuits occurred and the vehicle became unserviceable. Before we left on water exercises it would have to be applied very thoroughly, but immediately on landing it would have to be removed equally thoroughly but in a day or so it would be put on again for the next exercise.

In the meantime the planning staff was working overtime and the Division itself was cut down to assault scales, made up of strong, active, young fighting men. General Keller has said that the Division was the best trained that ever went into war without previous experience, and I have no doubt this is correct. For months before the assault we were able to say, "This fellow is just not pulling his weight," and that would be the end of him. He would be posted to a reinforcement unit.

Briefing of Officers

Shortly before Christmas, '43, our Colonel and a few of the Staff Officers disappeared and went to a Headquarters in London where they were briefed on the assault. They learned the approximate date and the exact place. They took with them their clerks and draftsmen, who then began to work on the operation orders. That small body, the nucleus of which was formed before Christmas, was to grow and grow until, six months later, just before D-Day, a great number of people in the Division, largely officers but not all officers by any means, were in full possession of a tremendous amount of information which would have helped the Germans greatly. It speaks very well for the security measures that we did achieve tactical surprise.

I have here my two prize souvenirs—my Artillery and Signals Operation Orders on "Overlord," which was the name of the operation on the beach. Just to give you an idea of the completeness of the briefing, I am going to read a short paragraph dealing with beach obstacles:

"From map reference 970858 to map reference 973856 there is a sea-wall of masonry ten feet high, 400 yards long with a seaward slope of approximately 65°. Directly behind the sea-wall is a concrete promenade, 24 feet wide with a 1½ foot parapet along its off-shore edge."

This was the description for 400 yards, and there was an equally accurate description for every inch of the beach we were to assault.

My own place was on the "stand-in" Head Quarters ship "Royal Ulsterman" which had been on twelve previous landing operations. She was fitted with a duplicate Head Quarters of both staff and communications so we could take over if the Head Quarters ship "Hilary" should become a casualty. However, "Hilary" functioned throughout and "Ulsterman" was used virtually as a troop carrying ship.

D-Day was supposed to be on the 5th of June. That meant that the landing craft and many of the ships would have to sail from England early on the 4th. On the morning of the 4th nothing moved, so we knew that it wasn't on for the next day. On the morning of the 5th, however, the landing craft marshalled themselves in hundreds and started to sail. It was certainly an inspiring sight.

Choice of Sixth Fortunate

Because of tide conditions, moon, weather, and underwater obstacles, if D-Day had not taken place on the 5th, 6th, 7th or 8th it would have been postponed for fourteen days, that is to around the 19th. It did not take place on the 5th because of weather conditions, but it did take place on the 6th and was a success. On the 7th and 8th the sea was very much heavier than on the 6th. On D-Day plus 13, that is the 19th, the worst June gale in 40 years sprang up suddenly and demolished the American Mulberry port. If we had not started on the 6th, we would probably have started on the 19th, and the gale which did so much damage at that time would certainly have defeated the invasion.

The other alternative was to wait 28 days, and under those circumstances everybody was to be unloaded again in England. The total number of chaps who had been briefed ashore was small compared to the number briefed on board the boats before the 5th. Every soldier would have been in possession of the facts and if we had had to return to dry land in England for 28 days the security problem would have been very serious.

Morning of D-Day

On the morning of D-Day we rose early and went on deck. We were sailing along nicely with a destroyer beside us. The destroyer struck a mine. There was a burst of smoke and steam and it dropped behind but we continued as if nothing had happened. We dropped anchor where we could see the land marks. Daylight had broken and wireless silence was off, and the guns began to fire. There was a considerable thrill in hearing the breaking of wireless silence, and in hearing the stations answer even better than on practise exercises. But I don't think that thrill compared with the one we got when we

saw the guns ranged on the coast and heard the first rounds sail off toward the enemy.

We lay off until the landing was going well. One of the earliest events was the returning of a number of divers to our ship, which was equipped to carry casualties back to England. These divers, who were clad in skin-tight rubber suits, had been released from submarines some hours before "H-Hour." They had been taken there to lay demolitions on the underwater obstacles, and were to return before the firing started. A half dozen came back to the "Royal Ulsterman" and I am absolutely certain that I will never again see anybody as exhausted as these men.

In the opening moments of the landing, right with the leading troops, were all varieties of tanks — Churchills and Shermans, waterproofed and so constructed that they would swim. They had been known secretly as "DD" tanks, standing for D-Day. In the water they looked like landing craft and I have no doubt that is what the Germans thought they were until they touched bottom and lumbered out on to the beach in close support of our troops. My own landing was almost uninteresting, it was so quiet. It was along about noon and the firing had moved South on that particular section, Courseulles-sur-Mer. As we marched into Courseulles, heading for Divisional Headquarters at Bernieres, we saw a Frenchman who had a horse and two-wheel dump cart of the kind I had not seen since they were used to collect garbage in the lanes in Calgary. The Frenchman was engaged in dumping dead Germans into the cart and seemed to be enjoying his task. He was not pretending a respect for the dead and was piling them in one on top of the other every which way. My little French-Canadian batman tapped me on the shoulder, and grinning from ear to ear remarked, "Ha Ha. Dose bastard dere—I guess we **reeform** dem."

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CALGARY, ALBERTA

We went along to Divisional Head Quarters. Things had actually gone better than on most of the exercises. People had actually arrived where they were supposed to go at about the time they were expected. The wireless was working properly, and in fact our only failures were from casualties of personnel. On a check-up it was found that the only people who had not arrived had been casualties on the run-in. General Keller called us around him that evening and gave us the best fighting speech I have ever heard. He said the night was going to be bad. There would probably be attacks by paratroops, the shelling and sniping would continue and we could expect the bombing to be very heavy. All in all, it would be a bad night, but everything would be fine in the morning. The 3rd had won its first battle. "You're here, aren't you? That's all." We lost General Keller shortly afterward, but, he will always be remembered by the soldiers of the 3rd Division.

A Navy Day and an Airforce Day

A description of the D-Day operation "Overlord" is incomplete if the Army only is mentioned. It was a Navy Day. The navy landed in the first 24 hours, according to Mr Churchill, one-quarter of a million men with full equipment and a substantial reserve. To do this they used a total of 5143 ships.

One of the interesting things that happened was the capture of the radar station just back from the beach. When that surrendered, the Jerries came out and were marched over a rise of ground to look over the vast expanse of sea, where they saw thousands and thousands of ships unloading and taking off wounded, among them a good many old roughnecks like the "Warspite" and the "Rodney." The Germans themselves realized what had happened and were heard to say, "Hitler kaput." Until then they had not known how serious for them the situation had become.

D-Day was also an Airforce Day. I know very little about the airforce, but I do know that our fighters were above us all day long. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. I didn't see an enemy aircraft until after dark. They made it noisy and it was dangerous on the beach, but until evening, except for a very occasional bomber or recce plane, they didn't get over the beach. My young brother was a Squadron Leader at a heavy bomber station in England and their planes were being used as tactical bombers to help the army. His station was doing three raids in that 24 hours. It takes about three hours or more to bomb up and refuel a heavy machine, and there was a great shortage of tractors and the low slung trailers for moving large bombs. He looked across the field and about 100 yards away saw a chap who was driving a tractor

without any trailer behind it. The driver would go a short distance, stop, get off and go behind the tractor, get in again, drive a short distance, and repeat the performance. My brother went over to see what was going on and give the chap a blast for not using the tractor to better purpose. It seems he had got hold of the tractor but all the trailers were in use, so he had tied a thousand-pound bomb behind and was dragging it along the runway to an aircraft. When the bomb became too warm on the bottom side from being dragged across the ground, he would roll it over to a cool spot and proceed, repeating the operation every few moments.

Murder of Canadian Troops

The initial landing was a success and everybody was well pleased. Once the first big day was over we started inland, not as an assault division but as an ordinary infantry division. Later the battles of Carpiquet, Buron, Gruchy, Authie, and Caen were fought and won. It was at Caen, you should be reminded, that the Hitler Jugend murdered a number of boys of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. They took them prisoner, marched them inland some distance, and shot them through the forehead. The French civilians told the story, and the bodies were exhumed. A Court of Inquiry was convened. No officer served on it of less rank than brigadier, no officer was a Canadian. The finding was absolutely unanimous and damning. The whole business was nothing but cold blooded murder.

All through this operation we were wondering when the bulk of the German armies would be committed. The fact that the armour arrived so late was likely a result of our cover plan. This cover plan was part of our original plan and, I suppose, although I knew nothing of the details, it was permitted to fall into German hands.

Expected Main Thrust Farther North

This plan called for a thrust against the Pas-de-Calais area from the sea. Intelligence reports, and at a later date reports of interrogation of German staff officers and clerks, proved that the Germans had thought the Normandy operation was only an auxiliary landing, and that the main force would strike later farther up the coast on the Channel proper and north of the mouth of the Seine. He therefore kept his armour concentrated in the more northerly points where he thought it would be of more use. Had it been available in Normandy, we might have been defeated on the beach-head. But it was not until Caen had been taken and we were on the road to Falaise that the armour was brought across the Seine and committed to the battle. By then it was too late, and due to the effective work of our

airforce while it was in transit, the force which did arrive was considerably reduced.

After we had taken Caen, the Division came out to re-equip—55 days after D-Day. We came out of the line, the gunners were refitted with tractor drawn 25-pounders instead of the self-propelled guns used in the assault, and the infantry rested and were reinforced.

Black Day for 3rd Division

We stayed out for a week and came back for the Falaise Road. August 8th, the day we moved into the line again, was one of the darkest days for the 3rd Division. Tactical Head Quarters was at Cormelles. An American bomber squadron arrived overhead. The Squadron Leader was in trouble and his bomb-bays were aflame. He wirelessly to his squadron that he was dropping his bombs safe so they could land among our own troops and not explode. He instructed his second in command to carry on to the target. In the American airforce the squadron bombs on the Squadron Leader's mark. His wireless was bad and the other planes didn't receive his instructions, so when he let go his bombs, they did the same, but theirs were not released in the safe position. Both General Keller and Brigadier Wyman were wounded, and of the Signals personnel totalling 34 at the Head Quarters, 28 were casualties. Other arms suffered in proportion. We went on down the Falaise Road and a week later we were standing around watching squadrons of Lancasters and Halifaxes going over. Everybody was saying, "It is all right today, these boys can find their targets in the dark." Something went wrong, however, and they began to bomb us. We were not in a particularly bad position as we were along a high railroad embankment. As the bombers came in we kept on the top of the railroad and when we were sure which side of the embankment the bombs would fall, we hurried down the other. As a matter of fact, the airforce had told us that this sort of thing might happen and the army had accepted the support on that basis. On that particular day only about 10 per cent of the airforce were wrong, and the 90 per cent remaining were right. As the 90 per cent succeeded in preventing a counter-attack there is little doubt that the casualties were a good deal less than the counter-attack would have caused. There are many stories of how it all happened, but we do know that it happened only that once.

Net Closed on Much of German Army

That attack about finished the Falaise show. The net was closed containing a great deal of German armour and a good deal of the rest of his army. Towards the end of Falaise, an

assortment of 250 P.O.W.'s taken by one of our battalions in a short engagement, would contain men from probably 20 or 25 different German units. I went forward to an artillery Observation Post, where a friend of mine was observing for the division. He overlooked a stretch of road about a quarter of a mile long near the town of Trun. When he thought he saw enough Germans on the road that it was worth while expending 72 rounds of ammunition, he would call for "Scale One" from the whole division. The shells would sail over and land together with the attendant noise and destruction, and there would be few living Jerries on the road when the smoke and dust cleared. When a further sufficient number arrived, he would repeat his call for "Scale One" and the performance went on all afternoon. I went away from the post tremendously elated that things were going so well but was sick at the sight of the slaughter.

After the Falaise Gap was closed and the German army in France was destroyed, we headed North through country which had not been fought over, and travelled 15 to 20 miles a day through the beautiful towns and countryside of France. Lining the roads on both sides were crowds of cheering women and children. We passed through Rouen on a sparkling, sunny Sunday afternoon. Every civilian was dressed for the thanksgiving celebration and it was a welcome sight after the weeks of fighting between Caen and Falaise, where the civilians had been evacuated and where everything was burnt and destroyed.

We ground to a halt to fight the battles for the Channel ports. An interesting thing from the artillery standpoint was that we actually fired the Dover guns across the Channel in our own support. A young English officer in an Auster aircraft, flew out over the Channel and by wireless directed the fire from the heavy naval and marine guns on the British shore. At that time there were many German guns of heavy calibre along the coast. One in particular received a direct hit from a 14-inch marine gun. The shell passed directly under the barrel of the German gun and into the pillbox itself. I saw the wreckage later, and the German piece had been blasted completely off its trunnions and was cocked up at a crazy angle into the top of the pillbox.

Calais Surrenders—On to Scheldt Estuary

There was part of one day when the Germans rested from our fire while civilians were evacuated from Calais. When the truce was over at 2 o'clock, we opened up with everything we had, and by 3 or 4 o'clock white flags were flying from almost every building. The German commandant's own flag had been replaced by about the biggest and whitest tablecloth in the town.

We turned our backs on Calais and went to clear the South bank of the Scheldt Estuary. You will remember that Antwerp had been captured practically intact, but that the entrance to the harbour was still in German hands. We fought for it several weeks before the South bank of the Estuary was cleared. At the same time 2nd Division was clearing the North bank and Walcheren Island. This was one of the bitterest battles of the war and one in which the Germans fought until they were killed.

After that we spent a lovely week in Ghent as guests of the city. The details were worked out by the local constabulary. Every soldier was given the name and address of the family with whom he would stay for the week. One or two soldiers were in every house. Hot baths and clean sheets were something we had not seen for months and we had a wonderful time just living and relaxing. While there we saw more evidence of the German occupation. I saw 12-year-old children who had had a gum infection caused by malnutrition and who had lost their second teeth. It doesn't take much thinking to realize that it would be some years before these children could be fitted with false teeth.

PATRONIZE OUR ADVERTISERS



Story of the Ardennes "Bulge"

From Ghent we went to the Nijmegen area where we were to spend the dreary wet winter. It was during our stay here that the battle of the Ardennes sector took place, and you people spent a pretty bad Christmas fearing that the Canadian army might be cut off. This was, no doubt, von Rundstedt's objective, but he wasn't to get his way because of the quick action of Field Marshal Montgomery in deploying his reserves and reorganizing the front. While you people were watching the "bulge" grow with feelings of grave concern, we sat quietly watching it approach a line which Monty had drawn on the map as soon as the offensive was underway. We were told by our commanders that when the line was drawn Montgomery had said, "So far, and no farther," and had explained that because of the large force which the Germans were employing, a large box would be required to hold them, and that after they had committed all they had the box would be closed. We watched our maps throughout those exciting weeks and at no time did the Germans quite reach the line that had been drawn. When the "bulge" reached its maximum size, we had a spell of fairly decent flying weather, with the result that you all know so well. Only remnants of what was left of the German armour escaped from the "bulge," and within three weeks some of those remnants were identified on the Russian front. So we knew that danger was over.

I have since been able to verify a good deal of this story from other British units along the line. The 79th Medium Regiment (Scottish Horse), a fine outfit that was with us in Normandy, went down into the area, dug gun pits and dumped 500 rounds of ammunition per gun in a position along the border of Montgomery's box. They remained there without firing a round because the Germans never came within range. The same thing happened with the famous 51st Highland Division, who formed up along the border ready to fight if necessary, but were not called upon.

From Nijmegen we fought another amphibious operation. The waters of the Rhine were used against us along the German border at Cleve and the approaches to the Reichwald Forest. Jerry had blasted the dykes and the whole area was flooded. We laid our cables from amphibious jeeps and the infantry went forward in "Buffalos", and other amphibious tanks. It was here that the Corps Commander gave the Division the name "Water Rats." With considerable difficulty we reached the higher ground around Cleve and prepared to pierce the Northern end of the Siegfried Line. I should like to tell you a little about the town of Cleve. The evening before the operation began, the airforce

bombed this German town through thick cloud using only radar and no visual aids whatever. By this time our boys were experts at this sort of thing, and when we reached Cleve we found that not a bomb had missed the town, but that every building was destroyed and that from the airforce standpoint the mission was 100 per cent successful.

The Crossing of the Rhine

After the battles of Calcar, Goch, and the Hochwald Forest there were no fighting Germans left on the West bank of the Rhine River. Jerry had made another major mistake by not withdrawing to the East bank and defending that area heavily. He had chosen to commit the best troops he had left in what was left of the Seigfried Line, and as you know, he had failed. We had only to get our forces across the river and it would be impossible for him to hold us from the road to Berlin. The Rhine crossing started late at night and by morning we had fairly secure bridgeheads on the far side, and at 10 o'clock in the morning the air-borne operation flew overhead at an altitude of less than 2000 feet. Dakotas, Halifaxes, Sterlings, Lancasters, towing gliders of every make and loaded to capacity with para-troops and supplies, roared over our heads on that sunny morning, to drop their loads a few miles beyond the line where our men were already fighting on the East bank. It was a remarkable sight, equalled only in my experience by the sight of the ships and craft sailing from Southampton on D-1. The effect on the morale of the Canadians was tremendous, and I have no doubt that the effect on the morale of the Germans was also tremendous, but in the opposite direction.

After the Rhine crossing we went back into Northern Holland and here we saw again the evidences of German occupation. We had been tipped off by the underground that we were approaching a small concentration camp which still held a few Dutch political prisoners. Troops from a Western Canadian regiment captured the place to find the Germans burying about a dozen Dutchmen whom they had despatched with hammers for fear that rifle fire would draw our attention and bring us to the spot too quickly. Our chaps exhumed the bodies of the Dutchmen immediately and found that two, although they died later, were still living.

That was the only German concentration camp I saw, and compared with Belsen and Buchenwald, it was very small and insignificant. It was, however, complete with most of the trimmings. There was, for instance, a small trailer quite airtight, which was fitted up as a gas chamber, to which the exhaust of a car could be fitted.

Not Propaganda but Stark Reality

Since I have come back I have heard a number of very foolish people say that the published pictures of German concentration camps are nothing more than good British and American propaganda. I can only say that if the smell of these camps could have been brought back with the pictures, no person would ever doubt their reality. To me, the worst thing in war is the smell. You can close your ears to the noise and shut your eyes to the sights, but while you breathe the air you cannot evade the stench and scorch of death. In these German camps the smell of rotting bodies would make anything in my experience seem pretty trivial.

The Cease Fire Order

We moved back into Germany, and I was warned for a month's leave in Canada. On the morning of the 7th of May, I was saying good-bye to a friend in the Signal Office and my driver was waiting outside the door. A sergeant looked up and said, "If you are going back to Canada now you had better take a copy of this with you." It was the "Cease Fire" order from Supreme Head Quarters and was just coming in on the wire. I copied it down exactly as given, and I will pass it on to you.

"From SHAEF,
To 3 Cdn. Div.

Para. 1. A representative of the German High Command signed the unconditional surrender of all German land, sea, and air forces in Europe to the Allied Expeditionary Forces and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command at Zero one four one hours Central European time, seven May under which all forces will cease active operations at Zero Zero one Baker hours nine May.

Para. 2. Effective immediately all offensive operations by Allied Expeditionary Forces will cease and troops will remain in present positions. Moves involved in occupational duties will continue. Due to the difficulties of communications there may be some delay in similar orders reaching enemy troops so full defensive precautions will be taken.

Para. 3. All informed down to and including Divisions, Tactical Air Commands and groups, base sections, and equivalent. No repeat no release will be made to the Press pending an announcement by the three Governments.

"EISENHOWER."

We Have Been Warned

Referring to the Germans, and to my justification for coming to you tonight—after Falaise was occupied we began to capture a German order to be read by officers only. We continued to capture this order until the end of the war. It was an order for officers from the German High Command, which stated that while it must not be considered that Germany was losing the war, it was apparent to anyone that such a possibility existed and that it was imperative that officer personnel make every effort to save themselves. When the situation was hopeless, the men were to be abandoned to be killed or become prisoners, but the officers must get away because in the next war (and if Germany lost there would be another), the Fatherland would need every available man of officer calibre.

This frame of mind has been apparent since the end of the war in the utterances of Frau Goering and of Admiral Doenitz. Doenitz was permitted to say that it was the strength and quality of the Allied bombing that sterilized the German war machine and made our victory possible. Shortly afterwards Frau Goering is reported to have said that Hermann had a very fine little aircraft which he was prepared to produce but that he was vetoed by Hitler and that if he had produced it, our airforces would have been beaten. I understand that both these utterances were made public to the German nation and in the two of them we have the hope of every German for victory in another war. Next time Hermann can make his aircraft, next time the V-1 and V-2 and atomic bombs will start off the war, and next time we will be beaten before we get off our knees.

It is my opinion that the Germans have learned nothing from this war that they didn't already know. They have not learned that it does not pay to fight a war. They have only been shown again that it does not pay to lose. With this in mind, my submission to you tonight is that if the Germans have not learned, it would be a good thing if we did.

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The Campaign in North-West Europe

(Address delivered by BRIGADIER CHURCHILL MANN, C.B.E., D.S.O., at a Meeting of the Alberta Military Institute held in The Garrison Officers' Mess in Calgary Armouries, on November 26th, 1945.)

THE object of this review is to consolidate the information you already possess, through the radio, newspapers and movies, so that you may have a clear picture of the various plans and how they worked, in our stern, but victorious progress from the Beaches to the Baltic.

PART I

Units That Carried Calgary's Name High

Before starting I should like to mention among local Units the 14th Army (Tank) Regiment, as I had occasion to admire their enterprise and gallantry as shown in the Dieppe operation. In connection with the activities of the Calgary Highlanders, I must remark that while their deeds as a Unit are well known, particular attention should be drawn to the activities, in connection with Infantry training, of the former Officer Commanding, Col. Fred Scott, whose support of the Battle Drill training of Infantry was such a valuable move. The idea was picked up by the British at Whitehall. The British started it, Col. Scott got it going and it became the accepted pattern of training.

The 23rd A/T Battery and the 91st Field Battery also carried the name of the Calgary area very high; also, of course, The Strathcona Horse. It would be wrong, also, not to keep in mind the activities of and the support given to us by the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F., as well as Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy because in all honesty it is quite obvious that the campaign could not have succeeded without their skill and gallantry.

I speak first of all, about the Royal Navy, but not at length at this time, because I am not going to give you a great amount of particulars as



BRIG. CHURCHILL MANN,
C.B.E., D.S.O.

to the landings. I will give you some detail about the R.A.F. We had 84 Group of Airforce supporting the Canadians, who were chiefly Canadians, with a few British, and also 83 Group supporting 2nd Army, in which there were no Canadians

Vast Scale of Airforce Operations

I will give you some figures applicable to the whole campaign. There were 90,000 sorties flown to our requirements and of those 5,900 were "interdiction" flights; 24,000 armed recce., looking for ground targets; 20,000 on pre-arranged support, which was very important; 2,000 on "cabrank" calls, these being where a single forward Unit wanted some particular object achieved and therefore called through asking that action be taken; 11,000 photographic flights and 25,000 fighter operations.

During the period referred to, 42,000 tons of bombs were dropped and 79,000 rockets were fired. These were No. 5 or No. 6 head, weighing 60 pounds and containing 75 pounds of explosive. Also five million 20 mm. cannon shells were fired. We also had the benefit of medium bombers which worked chiefly at night and they flew 3,000 sorties to our requirements. Bomber Command consisted of 60 squadrons, 1,250 aircraft, mostly Lancasters and Halifaxes.

From D-Day on there were 12,000 sorties flown to our requirements—15% of the total sorties flown by Bomber Command—using 49,000 tons of bombs. These were flown for us from Caen until the West bank of the Rhine was cleared. So much for that.

This review will deal mainly with the activities of the First Canadian Army, but covers the Second British Army, and the five American Armies in sufficient detail to ensure a balanced appreciation of the campaign as a whole.

At the time of the Normandy landings, 1st Canadian Corps was serving in Italy in the famous Eighth Army, and 2nd Canadian Corps was concentrated near Dover. First Canadian Army's role was that of the Follow-Up Force—to land after the assault and the establishment of the original bridgehead.

I draw your attention to the flexibility in modern war, in which divisions are switched from one Corps to another, and Corps from one Army to another whenever this is required by the operational situation.

In keeping with this, and to ensure Canadian representation in the assault, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division with 2nd Canadian Armed Brigade under it, had been placed under command of 1st British Corps in Second British Army for the landing phase.

The basic plan for the Normandy campaign was to land an American Army on the right, and a British Army on the left, capture local bridgeheads and secure a firm lodgment with room to assemble the large forces and administrative installations required, and then to capture the Cherbourg peninsula. Having captured Cherbourg, to strike south-west, secure Brittany, then swing East in a large turning movement toward the River Seine, the outer flank being the River Loire

The Enemy's Plan to Meet Invasion

Against these plans, the enemy had provided a basically unsound defence. He had built and manned the Atlantic wall along the western shores of Europe and disposed a reserve of armoured divisions at intervals close behind his forward troops. He had no central reserve, but depended on his communications to collect one if necessary. He relied on winning the battle of the beaches; then on the one or two Panzer divisions within reach; finally on collecting a sufficient force to restore any situation which his first two plans had failed to control.

In the area of the assault the enemy had made a number of last minute changes which caused us anxiety. There were the usual type of coastal divisions manning strong defences on the good beaches. Immediately behind, South of Caen, was the 21st Panzer Division, and not far away, South of the Seine was a strong, untried fanatical division of Hitler Youths—the 12th S.S. Panzer Division—whose first battle activity was to shoot Canadian prisoners.

A Word on Secret Weapons

As everyone appreciates now, the Germans had two so-called secret weapons up their sleeve. They served them well, but not decisively. Had they been used against our ports at the time of the final assembly of the invasion fleet, or against the beach-head, they would certainly have caused great destruction.

What is not so well appreciated, is that the Allies produced not just two, but many surprises in new weapons and equipments which guaranteed that close fire support which is essential to success in landing operations. Some of these had been developed experimentally before Dieppe, but had not been adopted for operations, nor produced in quantity until that experience pointed the necessity.

These surprises included the production of large numbers of amphibious tanks, armoured vehicles which could place charges against obstacles with comparative immunity, the development of the methods of firing field artillery from landing craft, and

craft which fired several hundred rockets in a few seconds. The personnel to man all these had been specially trained, and the essential integration of these weapons and equipments had been successfully and secretly carried out whilst the controversy over Dieppe went on, which in fact assisted in the essential business of concealing from the Germans the way in which we had profited by our experiences. Thus, it is true to say, that it was the Allies who produced the most effective surprises, and those in time to be decisive

The Early Developments

The Allied assault comprised 9 divisions (3 airborne) plus 5 independent armoured brigades.

Third Canadian Infantry Division with 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade went ashore near Courselles-Sur-Mer. The Canadian Parachute Battalion, in 6th Airborne Division, landed on the Eastern end of the lodgement area. They all attained their immediate objectives after stiff fighting.

With a small Tactical Headquarters, Gen. Crerar landed on D plus 12 (18th June). By then the A.E.F. had gained a lodgement, the American and British bridgeheads were linked up, and the road from Bayeux to Carentan was open, though under shell-fire. The bridgehead was still very shallow and H.Q. First Canadian Army was located $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the nearest Germans.

Just after our arrival a terrific storm blew up. After a few days the beach was a shambles! Nothing could be landed during the gale, and there was a considerable set-back in the build-up. Thus, the enemy was able to gather a reserve of three divisions and we had to tread carefully.

The enemy intended to rope us off, and by bringing up infantry from elsewhere, to release Panzer divisions for counter attack.

Our problem was—

- (a) To snap his roping off policy.
- (b) To capture Cherbourg so all could face in the same direction.
- (c) To capture Caen and release forces locked up in keeping the left flank secure.

The Allies had a total of 23 divisions and 6 Armoured Brigades with 2400 tanks. The enemy faced us with 19 Divisions and 650 tanks. He had two Panzer divisions and one Infantry in reserve. He was known to be forming up opposite Second British Army.

Until Caen was captured, there was no room for another full Army, but there was need for further troops. So H.Q. 2nd Canadian

Corps and 2nd Canadian Infantry Division were brought in, to operate initially under Second British Army.

Second British Army was to capture Caen and provide a strong Eastern flank by a two-pronged thrust with its weight on the right.

Objective, the bridges over the River Orne from Thury Harcourt to Evrecy and, on the left, a thrust to Bourgebus.

First U.S. Army was to isolate the peninsula by a drive on Barneville, hold the roping off line securely, and thrust on Cherbourg.

Both Caen and Cherbourg were to be captured by 27 June.

By 30th June, Cherbourg had fallen, St Lo was in our hands, we held the dominating ground about Caumont, but Caen had still not been captured. However, the intention to hold the main weight of the German Army on the Eastern flank had been accomplished, and between Caumont and Caen there were 8 Panzer Divisions in addition to the Infantry

The Next Plan

The next plan was for the British to hold the main German force between Villers Bocage and Caen,—and capture Caen as soon as possible! The Americans were to develop an offensive South on the right flank beginning on the 3rd July, to pivot on their left to the Caumont area and move South and East to the general line Fougèresvire. When the base of the Cherbourg peninsula at Avranches was reached the right hand corps was to thrust into Brittany on Rennes and St Malo

On the 10th July, that part of Caen lying North of the Orne was captured at last! But the enemy held very strong positions on the dominating ground to the South of Caen and owing to the

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flooded valley of the Dives, it was not practicable to outflank them with a left hook.

The major intentions of the Commander-in-Chief remained unaltered—namely, to draw the main enemy forces into the Eastern flank and to fight them there.

Second British Army was now to secure Tauborg de Vaucelles, which is the part of Caen South of the Orne. It was also to operate in a Southerly direction with its left flank on the Orne and with Le Beny Bocage, Mont Picom to Thury Harcourt as objectives.

First U.S. Army was to operate Southwards and gain touch with the British at Le Beny Bocage, while continuing on its previous instructions. But it received deeper objectives also, namely Laval-Mayenne and Le Mans-Alencon

Assumes Operational Responsibility for Left

On the 23rd July, General Crerar assumed responsibility for the Allied left flank.

First British Corps came under his command. Second Canadian Corps was to remain under, and operate on the Eastern flank of Second British Army until the next operations were concluded. It would then re-join us.

The Situation on the 31st July

Second Canadian Corps came under our command on 31st July, with the River Orne as the inter-army boundary. First Canadian Army was to retain the strong enemy forces on this flank by minor prodding attacks and the threat of a thrust on either the axis Caen-Mezidon or Caen-Falaise

General Crerar anticipated being ordered to penetrate the strong enemy defences on the road to Falaise and, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, instructed General Simonds, commanding 2nd Canadian Corps, then still under 2nd British Army, to prepare plans for an actual attack with the objective Falaise

There was no possibility of concealing our broad intentions, so General Crerar laid down, as the basic tactical plan, that the attack should secure the maximum of surprise as to means and method. The technique was to be such as would largely neutralize the long range and great strength of the enemy's anti-tank defences and ensure that our infantry got through and beyond the enemy's zone of dense defensive fire, developed mainly by mortars and machine guns, without heavy casualties.

This meant the closest integration of fire and movement, and the denial to the enemy of the time to anticipate, as well as the ability to see

The Enemy Situation

The enemy had appreciated all along that a greater invasion was still to come between Le Havre and Boulogne and held his forces North of the Seine intact, until he had to bring them down piecemeal into a battle he had already lost

The greatest adverse factor in the enemy's position was his air inferiority. Most of the bridges over the Seine and Loire had been cut before D-Day, and he was forced to move reserves and supplies by road. According to the captured telephone log of the Seventh German Army, Field Marshal von Kluge, speaking to the German War Office on the 31st July, described this with impressive eloquence. He said, "The enemy's air superiority is terrific, and smothers almost every one of our movements. Every movement of the Allies, however, is prepared and protected by their Air Forces. Our losses in men and equipment are extraordinary. The morale of the troops has suffered very heavily under constant murderous enemy fire . . ."

At this point I would like to read to you an extract from an account written by a Staff Officer of 17 S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division in the presence of one of our Interrogators, which describes the effect upon the Germans of our incessant air attacks. He writes "On the 7th of June, 17 S.S. Panzer Division received orders to leave the marshalling area in Thouars and to move to the invasion front of Normandy. Everyone was in a good mood and eager to see action again — happy that the pre-invasion spell of uncertainty and waiting had snapped at last.

"In some minds there was a gnawing doubt that perhaps this was only a repetition of Dieppe in which the Allies would withdraw after a German show of force. Perhaps the Goertz von Berlichingen would even be too late to get into the scrap

"Our motorized columns were coiling along the roads towards the invasion beaches. Amidst this rumbling of motors and grinding of vehicle tracks, the Panzer Grenadier was in his element again. Then something happened that left us in a daze. Spouts of fire flicked along the column and splashes of dust staccatoed the road. Everyone was piling out of the vehicles and scuttling for the neighbouring fields. Several vehicles were already in flames. This attack ceased as suddenly as it had crashed upon us 15 minutes before. The men started drifting back into the column again, pale and shaky and wondering that they had survived this fiery rain of bullets.

"Had that been a sign of the things to come? This had been our first experience with the Jabo's (f-bombers) The march column was now completely disrupted and every man was on his own, to pull out of this blazing column the best he could. And it was none too soon, because an hour later the whole thing started all over again, only much worse this time. When this attack was over, the length of the road was strewn with splintered anti-tank guns (the pride of our division), flaming motors and charred implements of war.

"It dawned upon us that this opponent that had come to the beaches of Normandy was of somewhat different format. The march was called off, and all vehicles that were left were hidden in the dense bushes or in barns. No one dared show himself out in the open any more. Now the men started looking at each other. The first words passed. This was different from what we thought it would be like. If things like this happened here, what would it be like up there at the front? No — this did not look like a feint attack upon our continent! . . ."

That is the end of my quotation from this German staff officer's statement.

The Germans lost the battle of Normandy when we won the battle of the beaches and secured our lodgement. But the German's aim merely changed from trying to drive us into the sea, to trying to hold us in the bridgehead. We know Hitler's views. They were—that "there shall neither be a withdrawal, fighting to the rear nor a disengagement to a new line of resistance, but every man will fight and fall where he stands." It left nothing to be decided by the Generals, but placed everything on the spirit of the men. And—it was only the S.S., Paratroops and some of the Panzer troops who had the will to "fight and fall" where they stood.

Throughout the campaign the enemy was throwing in formations to block gaps. As General Montgomery put it—he was dancing to our tune. Within formations, he would commit recce. elements and armour first. Not for tactical advantage, but merely because they were first there. Almost always he was fully committed and his tanks were used not for attack but literally to hold his infantry in position. On the other hand, his skill and determination in defence were of the highest order.

Hitler's Intuition at Work

At this time, the intuitive genius of Hitler re-acted to the American break-through at Avranches by conceiving a plan to collect almost all his Panzer formations and to strike at the American flank. His position, though unsound before this decision, had always been firmly based on a strong right hinge,

secured by his dispositions on the flooded valley of the Dives and extended Westward by the wall of Panzer Divisions opposed to First Canadian and Second British Armies.

Now, he proceeded to take these out of the line and move them West to the Mortain area. In their place came infantry from the North, a host of 88's in a ground role, and some assault gun units.

Situation on the Night 7th-8th August

The Allied line extended from the general line from Laval-Vire-Mont Pincon—Evrecy-Burgebus-Troarn to Franceville Plage.

The First Canadian Army front extended from near St. Andre S. Orne through Bourgebus and the Western edge of Troarn to the sea.

The Commander-in-Chief still intended to pivot on his left, swing his right or Southern flank on Paris, and drive the enemy up against the River Seine from Paris to the sea, keeping the bridges cut by incessant air attacks.

First Canadian Army's Task

Task of the 1st Canadian Army was to capture Falaise quickly, and smash the vital pivot of the German armies in Normandy before they could escape from the right hook being developed towards Argentan by the Third U S Army.

Several deliberate attacks had already been carried out with the object of creating an opportunity for an advance on the Axis Falaise-Argentan, but they had failed.

The enemy had the advantage of dominating ground, good fields of fire, and strongly prepared defences. They had, from these defences, succeeded for two months in preventing a break-out.

Both the enemy and ourselves were completely aware of the significance of the Caen hinge. As long as the Germans were able to hold this corner stone, they were able to prevent the disaster which was being planned for their benefit.

The Objects

The objects of this vital operation were:—

- (a) To break through the enemy positions to the South and South East of Caen.
- (b) To gain such ground in the direction Falaise as would cut off the enemy facing the British Army and render their withdrawal difficult, if not impossible.

Generally, to destroy equipment and personnel as a preliminary to a possible wide exploitation of success.

The Plan

Second Canadian Corps held the right, and 1st British Corps the left sector. Thus it was that the responsibility for this operation fell primarily on the Canadian formations, reinforced by 51(H) Division and 1st Polish Armoured Division, all under General Simonds. The attack was to start at 2300 hours. There was to be no preliminary bombardment. The enemy had learned to expect this, and had developed his defence accordingly. The advance was to start simultaneously with the heavy bomber and artillery programme. The infantry were to be protected and moved in self-propelled armoured artillery equipments with their guns removed. These equipments were American—called M7's or Priests, but were dubbed "Defrocked Priests" by our troops after they lost their guns. They were the forerunners of the Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiments which were established as a result of this idea, and equipped with the Canadian Ram Tanks minus guns, which were then given the name of Kangaroos. A thousand bombers were to attack successively three targets on each flank of, and in very close proximity to the advancing troops. Their aiming points were to be marked by special flare shells fired by artillery. Such tactics had never been employed before.

If a break-out was achieved, it was intended to secure Falaise with armoured divisions. Falaise would then be held as a new pivot to assist the swing of the British Army, and further to the South, the Americans.

The Results

The 8th of August is a dismal day in German military history, and a famous one for Canada.

In 1918, the Battle of Amiens was referred to afterwards by General Ludendorff as "The Black Day for the German Army." 26 years later, according to an entry in the captured telephone log of the 7th German Army, von Kluge gave us an unsolicited testimonial, when he exclaimed to one of his Corps commanders: "A break-through has occurred near Caen, the like of which we have never seen!"

The break-in attack was a complete success. The enemy was surprised and overwhelmed by the very heavy and concentrated fire, bombing, and our troops' swift advance through the very strongly prepared forward positions.

By 0100 hours on 8th August the assault formations were generally in possession of their initial objectives beyond the enemy's first line of organized defences

The Second Phase, the "Break-through" operations, intended to breach the enemy's second line of defences, strongly developed along the general line Hautmesnil-St. Sylvain just East of the main road to Falaise, followed immediately. Heavy bombers were again part of the close fire support plan. By evening 4th Canadian Armoured Division had broken through the enemy defences and made considerable progress, but 1st Polish Armoured Division had become heavily engaged with enemy armour and was unable to come up into line until 9th August, as a result of this delay.

Although by the 10th August the "Break-through" had been successfully accomplished, the enemy had had time to improvise another strong position on the high ground about 7 miles North of Falaise, which he armed with numerous 88mm guns formerly employed for AA defence in Belgium and France, as well as with many other weapons.

It was apparent that a new attack with heavy support would be necessary in order to take Falaise

The Second Attack Towards Falaise

At this time General Patton, with his 3rd U.S. Army, which, like ourselves, was in reserve at the time of the landings, was approaching Le Mans virtually unopposed.

A great opportunity was at hand. If Montgomery could drive North to Alençon with U.S. Forces, and South through Falaise to Argentan with British and Canadian Forces, the enemy would be in a most awkward predicament. We held the prospect of trapping and destroying a great part of the German Field Army in France. The atmosphere was electric.

Our part was planned on the same lines as the attack of the 7th-8th August, and was launched on the 13th August, again with full air support. In order to vary the tactics, it was started in daylight.

During this time, of course, the British and the Americans were also actively engaged in their part of the great scheme. There were many tense and critical situations in keeping the pocket closed, and much hard and gallant fighting took place. At times, the situation was very precarious. Indeed, at one stage, in almost impossible flying weather, in pouring rain, it became necessary to drop ammunition to the Poles to enable them to deal with the desperate efforts of the Germans attempting to break through the steel ring in which they were trapped.

The result of these operations was the destruction of the Seventh German Army. It is doubtful if, in all history, there was ever such carnage wreaked upon a battlefield.

We will now have a three minute break and will then deal with the pursuit across the Seine, The Battle for the Channel Ports, and the advance to the Siegfried Line

PART II

The Pursuit Phase

Note: The distance from Paris to Hamburg is approximately 520 miles.

With the Falaise pocket eliminated, the pursuit began. General Eisenhower now assumed personal direction of operations. By the 26th August, the situation was that: (a) The enemy had mainly been driven North of the Seine. (b) We had entered Paris. (c) The Germans were reeling under the pressure and speed of our advance.

General Bradley, commanding 12th U.S. Army Group, was ordered to thrust forward in support of 21st Army Group. In particular, 1st U.S. Army was to establish itself in the Brussels area.

General Montgomery's tasks were (a) To destroy the enemy in North-East France and Belgium. (b) To secure the Pas de Calais area and the Belgian airfields. (c) To secure Antwerp before advancing on the Ruhr.

Second British Army was to establish itself in the Arras area, and then to be prepared to drive through the industrial area of North East France into Belgium.

First Canadian Army was to capture Le Havre, while keeping the bulk of its weight on the right, so that it could drive East and North with its axis Rouen-Ypres.

Amiens had been captured on 31st August. Dieppe had been entered on 1st September without the need of having to fight for it. It was appropriate that 2nd Canadian Infantry Division should have had this privilege after their "savage clash" on that famous, and bloody day, the 19th of August, 1942.

On 3rd September, the Army Group intentions as given to Army Commanders were (a) To advance Eastwards and destroy all enemy forces encountered. (b) To occupy the Ruhr, and get astride the communications leading from it into Germany and to the sea ports. (c) The boundaries between 12 and 21 Army Groups were from Havre to Brunswick.

To mark the change in tempo of the 1944 campaign compared with 1914-1918, one need only appreciate the depth of these objectives. Three weeks after the smashing of the hinge of the German positions at Caen, we were making maps across three European countries!

First Canadian Army was to clear the coastal belt and then remain in the area Bruges-Calais until the maintenance position improved. Our commitments included all the fortresses on the channel coast! A tough assignment!

It is of interest to remark that in First Canadian Army, at that time, we had almost all the Allied Nations represented. It was an interesting and broadening experience for all concerned, which worked with remarkable success.

Second British Army was to advance Eastwards on 6th September from the general line Brussels-Antwerp. While threatening the Western face of the Ruhr between Dusseldorf and Duisberg, its main weight was to be directed on the Rhine between Wesel and Arnheim. The intention was to by-pass the Ruhr to the North and cut it off by a Southern thrust through Hamm. A diversionary thrust was also planned towards Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

On the British right the Americans were to thrust for Aachen, Cologne and Bonn.

Emphasis on Smaller Channel Ports

By 6th September, it was recognized that the port of Antwerp would be unusable for some time, owing to the difficulties in dislodging the Germans from the Dutch islands. This gave emphasis to the smaller channel ports—particularly Boulogne—the intended terminal for the cross channel petrol pipe line.

By 13th September, Le Havre had been captured by 1st British Corps at small cost to ourselves. The attack was supported by the full resources available to us. These included armoured assault vehicles, armoured personnel carriers (Kangaroos), tanks and a very heavy attack by Bomber Command, and the Second Tactical Airforce. The artillery numbered 500 guns.

Le Havre was intended for U.S. use. With the British base still on the beaches it became necessary to ground a number of formations and to use their transport in the long haul from Normandy.

At this time the Allied intention was to isolate the Ruhr and on the way secure the use of the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, so we could be properly based for the advance into Germany.

The First U.S. Army had entered Germany, and was facing the Siegfried Line. Far to the South the Third U.S. Army had bridgeheads over the Moselle

General Montgomery's task was to destroy all enemy West of the general line Zwolle-Maastrich before advancing into the Ruhr

It was now concluded that the early use of Antwerp would pay a better dividend than the opening of all the channel ports, and Gen. Montgomery informed Gen. Crerar that he would be content with Boulogne only, if this would result in opening Antwerp sooner. After opening Antwerp it was intended that our axis would be Breda-Utrecht-Amsterdam, with the task of destroying all enemy within the Army boundaries and opening up another great port—Rotterdam. Later on, we were to be brought up on the Northern flank of the Second British Army and directed on Hamburg.

The British were to secure the crossing over the Maas and the Rhine in the area Grave-Nijmegen-Arnheim, with airborne forces, on 17th September, and were to establish themselves on the general line Zwolle-Deventer-Arnheim with deep bridgeheads to the East of the IJssel, preparatory to an advance to the area Rheine-Osnabruck-Hamm-Munster.

Twelfth U.S. Army Group, directed on Bonn and Cologne, had the task of establishing a bridgehead to the East of the Rhine, preparatory to an advance around the South flank of the Ruhr

The First Canadian Army Problem.

General Crerar faced a difficult situation. Naval considerations required that Calais and the batteries at Gris Nez and Sangatte be captured, as well as Boulogne, as their larger guns would prevent the free movement of shipping. As far as Dunkirk was concerned, the situation was quite different, and we were merely to contain Dunkirk, but not to capture it.

By the end of September, as a result of the violent reactions of the enemy to our offensive thrusts, and in particular to our failure to hold the crossings at Arnheim, the general situation was not to our liking. We had advanced some 400 miles without a seaport of administrative importance, though maximum use had been made of the smaller ports as we acquired them. But our administration was badly stretched.

True, the battle for the Channel Ports was nearly finished. Calais had surrendered on the 30th September, and the campaign since the 6th of June had cost the Germans about one million men, but we had not yet opened Antwerp, and we were being held away from the Ruhr. In Monty's stark phrase, we were now in for another "killing match."

The Pleasant Evenings

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We entered October with two objects. **First**, the opening of the port of Antwerp. **Second**, the destruction of all enemy forces preventing us from capturing the Ruhr

First U.S. Army was to clean up the area South of the line Maastricht-Deurne and West of the Meuse, and then was to develop a strong offensive Eastwards, directed on Cologne and Dusseldorf, to secure bridgeheads over the Rhine

Second British Army was to hold the bridgehead over the Waal at Nijmegen and to continue the threat of a Northern advance over the Neder Rijn. They were also to operate against the N. W. corner of the Ruhr from the general area Nijmegen-Gennep, with the right flank directed on Krefeld. It was desirable that these operations should secure a bridgehead across the Rhine at Wesel

First Canadian Army, while developing operations to free the Schelde, was to thrust on the axis Tibburg-Sherthogen-Bosch, an operation which, when executed, would enable the British to contact their front and thereby have greater offensive power

Operations to Clear the Schelde

October, 1944, saw some of the toughest fighting. The operations to clear the Schelde were bitterly contested. It was essential that the port of Antwerp be opened quickly. The Germans knew this, and resisted desperately.

However, the spirit and determination of our troops was indomitable, as the following incident, which occurred during the fighting for the Leopold Canal will show. A patrol from one of the Canadian Battalions was cut off and in dire straits. They had suffered severe casualties and were short of ammunition. They were pinned down by enemy machine gun fire, and the situation was pretty grim.

The Germans, realizing this state of affairs, called across in English "You English gentlemen are surrounded. You had better surrender." Back went the reply "We ain't English, we ain't gentlemen, and we ain't gonna surrender."

The plan to clear the Schelde estuary divides into three parts. Sealing off the isthmus leading to South Beveland, and clearing the "Breskens" island.

Clearing South Beveland by an advance along the isthmus, in conjunction with an assault across the Estuary from the south.

Clearing Walcheren by concentric assaults from the East, South and West. This involved a second crossing of the estuary, and a sea-borne expedition from Ostend. The fixed, and heavy

defences of Walcheren were to be neutralized by bombing the dykes and flooding the island.

The assault on Walcheren took place on 1st November, but as a result of the counter-thrust on the Second British Army front which diverted a proportion of the air effort, much less preliminary bombing of the heavy batteries had actually been carried out than was intended.

Although there was no question that it was essential to proceed with the operation, the result was that the losses in landing craft and their crews was very heavy indeed. Approximately 80%. Fortunately, at a critical moment in the landing operation, the weather which had not permitted close air support, lifted sufficiently to allow Typhoon attacks to be pressed home, enabling the landings, in the end, to succeed.

It was in 1809 that British forces had last been concerned with operations in Walcheren, and again with Antwerp as the objective. On that occasion the expedition was a colossal failure. The element of surprise was completely lacking. The composition and destination of the force had been discussed in the press beforehand, and the dynamic merits of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Richard Strachan, could not effectively combine with the static virtues of his military colleague, Lt General the Earl of Chatham.

The affair is chiefly remembered in the well-worn rhyme

Lord Chatham, with his sword undrawn
Kept waiting for Sir Richard Strachan.
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Kept waiting too, for whom? Lord Chatham "

Inter-Service Co-operation Well Nigh Perfect

It is gratifying to be able to record that inter-service co-operation in 1944 it was well nigh perfect. It is also reasonable to assume that our tactics were not devoid of surprise. At least, there was something novel in sinking an island by bombing it, and in putting in a Mountain Division below sea-level.

The Americans were now to make the main effort, and 21st Army Group was to assist by: (a) Releasing U.S. Divisions temporarily under command (b) Extending our responsibilities Southwards. (c) Developing an offensive on our right in close co-operation with the U.S. left.

Early in November, we took over the Nijmegen bridgehead from the Second British Army, which was ordered to clear the enemy from all territory West of the Meuse as far South as Venlo.

At this time, General Crerar received instructions to study the mounting of an operation Southwards from the Nijmegen

bridgehead between the Meuse and the Rhine, which would link up with the projected Northward thrust of the Americans directed on Cologne. This operation had, as its objective, the line Venlo-Orsoy. The target date was to be 7th January.

By the middle of December, all enemy on the 21st Army Group front had been pushed back across the Meuse.

In the centre, 12th U.S. Army Group was securing the territory required as a spring-board to cross the Rhine.

Far to the South, the advance by 6th U.S. Army Group proceeded unostentatiously into the Saar. This Army Group had landed at Marseilles

This state of affairs was rudely arrested with the savage, bold and initially successful offensive launched by von Rundstedt into the Ardennes.

All Available Forces Needed to Stabilize Situation

The Allied Command had been aware, generally, of the position of the main German reserves, but had not correctly assessed the area of the enemy's intentions. A critical situation developed, and required the concerted efforts of all available Allied forces to stabilize it.

For a long time, it had been the Allied desire to bring the main German forces to battle West of the Rhine but NOT so far West.

First Canadian Army's plans, like the rest of the Allied plans, were temporarily and necessarily shelved. The forces which were assembling for this operation, with target date 7th January, had to be diverted to form a defensive barrier against the very likely eventuality of a German break-through, which we had discovered was directed on Liege and Antwerp.

General Crerar issued instructions, however, to continue the heavy engineer programme of route development, and the administrative build-up, so as to be ready for a change in our prospects which he was confident would occur providing no serious break-through actually took place.

As part of the German plan, we appreciated that the enemy intended to strike South with perhaps four divisions on the axis Breda-Antwerp across the difficult and waterlogged islands between the Waal and the Maas, from Shertogenbosch to the sea.

Christmas found the 1st Canadian Army re-grouping to meet this threat. The year 1944 ended with an interesting situation: von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive was not yet sealed off, though it was checked. A subsidiary thrust to draw off reserves from the Ardennes had just been launched by the

Germans against the 6th U.S. Army Group. The 9th U.S. Army Group, under General Montgomery, was disposed defensively to meet a possible further thrust by von Rundstedt. Aachen was still firmly in our possession.

First U.S. Army, also under General Montgomery, was driving East in order to take advantage of the favourable situation created by the very gallant stand of the 101st U.S. Airborne Division at Bastogne.

The splendid spirit of this division is shown by the reply of its commanding general to the formal German demand to surrender—simply, "Aw, Nuts". He reported this situation to his Corps Command, by wireless, in clear, in an epic, and brief message: "Surrounded—Situation normal."

It may be of interest to note that in seven months the Germans lost over 800,000 prisoners of war, of whom 1st Canadian Army had captured 118,000. It is estimated that, in all, his losses on the Western front amounted to over two million men during the fateful period from 6th June to 31st December, 1944.

At this time we had unmistakable evidence of an alteration in the enemy's plans to strike from the North across the River Maas in co-ordination with the thrusts from the Ardennes. So, with a great sense of relief, we resumed our preparations for a return to the offensive.

Situation in West by 17th January.

By 17th January, von Rundstedt had shot his bolt, and although, if opportunity offered, he could be expected to attempt further offensive operations against the U.S. armies, it was appreciated that he would probably firm up to the West of the important Diekerch-St. Vith road, basing himself on the Siegfried Line from Switzerland to opposite Nijmegen.

Now we had an opportunity to regain the initiative.

It was decided that we would force an entry into the North German plain. To do this.

(a) U.S. Army, with some 12 divisions, placed under 21st Army Group, was to be responsible for the sector along the River Roer from Duren to Roermond.

(b) Second British Army was to have placed under it a U.S. Corps of three divisions which would take over the line of the River Meuse from Roermond to Wansum. Later, at a time to suit the strategic needs of the 1st Canadian Army operations, this U.S. Corps would force a crossing of the Meuse.

(c) First Canadian Army was to resume its interrupted arrangement to clear the Northern portion of the area. The target date was the 10th February, later advanced to 8th February. Our operation was given the code name Veritable

Meanwhile, 2nd British Army was carrying out the very detailed planning for the crossing of the Rhine which would follow after our task was accomplished.

PART III

The Plan for Operations Veritable—8th February

Our Intelligence disclosed that the Reichswald defences were strongly developed and in depth. It was apparent that the full resources of 21st Army Group in armament and material would be required if we were to smash through this Northern bastion of the Siegfried Line. These resources were placed at General Crerar's disposal, as Field Marshal Montgomery was taking no chances in his part of the larger plan

Nor were our Russian Allies, who commenced an offensive on the 12th January, as agreed at Yalta, and it was soon apparent that its repercussions would be felt on the enemy situation in the West—which was greatly to our advantage

The operation was expected to develop in three phases

PHASE 1. The clearing of the Reichswald and the securing of the line Gennep-Asperden-Cleve

PHASE 2 The breaching of the enemy's second defensive system East and South-East of the Reichswald. The capture of the localities and the securing of the communications Weeze-Udem-Calcar and the crossing places opposite Emmerich

PHASE 3. The "Break-Through" of the Hochwald lay-back defence lines and the advance to secure the general line Xgeldern-Xanten.

The three weeks preceding Veritable were busy ones. From a staff officer's point of view, D-Day minus 6 was the critical date, for it was then imperative to get a specified date for the launching of the operation, as six days were required to complete the forward movement and assembly under conditions which would make it possible to achieve surprise as to the actual place and weight of our attack. This meant that we had just two weeks in which to complete and put into effect a plan which involved the concentrating of a very large force in a difficult and constricted area

Our Task Again "Smashing a Hinge"

Once more, as at Caen in August, we had the task of smashing a hinge, and it was apparent to all concerned that if this task were successfully accomplished, the results would be of equal importance

Extreme care was taken to develop a Deception Plan, and a certain amount of "Leakage" of information regarding it was carefully organized

The following facts will illustrate the size of the staff and service problems involved in mounting the actual operation

Eighteen hundred tons of bridge equipment were used in the construction of five floating bridges across the River Maas, leading into the forward assembly area.

The Mook hi-level pontoon bridge—known as the Quebec bridge, was the longest Bailey bridge built up to that time—1280 feet long.

British and Canadian sappers, in the space of a few weeks, constructed, widened and improved approximately 100 miles of road, using about 20,000 tons of stone, 20,000 logs and 30,000 pickets.

To move troops and their fighting equipment and supplies into position prior to D-Day for Veritable involved 35,000 vehicles travelling an average of 130 miles each and using approximately 1,300,000 gallons of gasoline

To ensure that convoys reached their destinations 10,000 route signs were erected. One thousand troops were employed in traffic control. Five hundred thousand air photographs and 15,000 enlargements were produced. Over 800,000 special maps, requiring 30 tons of paper, were produced

If the ammunition, consisting of 390 types, had been stacked side by side, and 5 feet high, it would have lined a road for 30 miles. The total ammunition provided for the first three days of the battle was the equivalent in weight to the bomb-drop of 25,000 medium bombers

Probably Longest Smoke Screen in History

Eleven hundred tons of smoke materials were used in the ground plan, which produced what is believed to be the longest smoke screen in the history of this War—perhaps all wars. At the conclusion of Phase One, a 30-mile smoke screen was in operation.

The planned air support for the "Break-in" involved over 1000 heavy bombers, some 220 mediums and over 1000 fighter-bombers; but although it was highly desirable that maximum air support should be used, it had been decided that the attack could not be postponed once the D-Day had been decided, as it was necessary not to prejudice surprise. Fortunately, the weather worked out all right, and the results of this tremendous air effort can only be fully appreciated by those who saw them.

The composition of 1st Canadian Army as this tremendous battle opened is interesting. With the exception of the minimum numbers of divisions required to hold the West Bank of the Meuse from Mook to near Roermond, all the fighting strength of the British Empire in N.W. Europe was under General Crerar's command, plus the Poles and other Allied contingents. Our ration strength exceeded 470,000.

The order of battle for operation Veritable contained 7 Infantry Divisions, 3 Armoured Divisions and 3 independent Armoured Brigades, supported by 1 super-heavy regiment, 51 heavy regiments, 17 medium regiments and the Canadian Rocket Battery in addition to the divisional field artillery, totalling some 1200 guns. Other equipments included Crocodiles, Buffaloes, Weasels, Kangaroos, Flails and Wasps.

Despite the vast and prolonged preparations, including a postponement of nearly a month as a result of von Rundstedt's Ardennes offensive, a measure of surprise was actually achieved. An enemy air recce, the day before the battle commenced spotted the final movement of columns of transport, which had unfortunately been delayed in completing their movement in darkness. However, the Germans had been expecting a general attack further South, and failed to appreciate the full significance of the movement seen.

Phase 1 began on schedule under appalling conditions, the combination of mud, flood, narrow approaches and incredibly congested assembly areas making this an extremely difficult undertaking.

When our attack commenced the enemy realized his very hazardous predicament. Reserves from West and North-East Holland, and from the South, were moved rapidly and skillfully. We were only able to interfere to a limited extent, as weather conditions "clamped down" on all fighter-bomber operations about half the time.

The Germans succeeded in establishing a strong defence with determined troops, including a large proportion of paratroopers, and although our attack went in initially against one division,

before Phase 3 commenced, the enemy opposed us with elements of ten divisions. By then, however, we had smashed his strongest prepared defences.

In the planning, it had been intended that the 9th U.S. Army would commence their operation within a few days of ours. However, they were unable to meet the original schedule owing to flooded conditions.

Our battle commenced with 30 British Corps only, and involved 5 divisions—2nd and 3rd Canadian, 51st Highland, 53rd Welsh and 43rd British, each with strong armoured support. There simply wasn't room to deploy any more, even if this had been desirable, but the others had their full share of fighting later.

Hardest Fought Battle of Campaign

This battle, which all ranks recognized as being of the greatest importance, was the hardest fought and most bitterly contested of any battle in the campaign. Our troops were determined to see it through and fought like wild-cats.

Having forced our way through the bottleneck of the Reichswald by heavy, bloody and bitter fighting, subsequent developments were carried out with 30th British Corps on the right, and 2nd Canadian Corps on the left. The Hochwald lay-back position was bitterly contested. By the beginning of March our Intelligence estimated that the enemy deployed over 700 mortars and more than 1000 guns which were able to concentrate on our points of penetration in the defiles along our line of advance—especially in the Hochwald.

When the battle is joined, the forces are dependent upon the equipment provided, and although it was apparent to all that we would have benefited by tanks with less pressure per square inch of track surface, such thoughts were wishful thinking and obviously we had to drive through to our objectives with the equipment provided. As an example, one armoured regiment, starting at full strength, had only 17 out of 54 tanks still able to move at the conclusion of the approach march; but it must be remembered that though many were bogged, the anti-tank guns and mines took a large toll also.

In all, some 300 of our tanks were knocked out, and 1,049 officers and 14,585 other ranks were killed, wounded or missing as the price of this vital operation.

A "Break-through" was not achieved. The enemy resisted with skill and determination, falling back when he was compelled to, but always in a well-organized manner. The final

phase of Veritable was accomplished as the others had been—by dint of hard and bloody fighting

The enemy, realizing the significance of our attack, hurled in every division he could lay his hands on. This had the advantage of creating an opportunity for a rapid advance by the 9th U.S. Army. They enjoyed a comparatively weakly opposed advance and soon made contact with the formations of 2nd Canadian and 30th British Corps driving South.

By the 9th March and as a result of a month's continuous heavy fighting, the enemy had been driven back over the Rhine on the whole front of 21st Army Group. Farther to the South 12th U.S. Army Group had also been making great progress, and had secured a bridgehead over the Rhine South of Bonn. The Germans were in a bad way. The Allies held the West Bank of the Rhine and stood ready to cross it.

The date was advanced a week, from the 1st of April—at the time of the commencement of our Operation Veritable, to the 24th of March. This is a tribute to the doggedness of the troops who, for four solid weeks had fought so hard to achieve this success. For his part, the enemy had put up stern resistance to the bitter end, with his best troops.

One incident, reported by our intelligence staff, which gave us a useful identification of a newly-arrived German division from Holland, is amusing. A German Major in the Pay Services, captured by a Scottish division, upon reaching the Corps Cage, complained bitterly, stating that he wanted some money returned to him, for which he held a receipt. The receipt, signed J. Smith, Sergeant, read as follows:

"This blighter had 40,000 guilders—he hasn't got 'em now."

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The Crossing of the Rhine

Montgomery's intention was to cross the Rhine North of the Ruhr and secure a firm bridgehead. Then, to isolate the Ruhr, and penetrate into Germany. To the South 12th U.S. Army Group was to expand its bridgehead and penetrate into Germany South of the Ruhr.

At this time 21st Army Group comprised the First Canadian, Second British, and Ninth U.S. Armies. The 21st Army Group outline plan was:

- (a) With D-Day the 24th March, to cross on a front of 2 Armies between Rheinberg and Rees, with 9th U.S. Army on the right, and 2nd British Army on the left.
- (b) To capture Wesel.
- (c) To expand the initial lodgement area on the East bank of the Rhine sufficiently to secure the road centre of Wesel from enemy ground action, and to enable the river to be bridged at Emmerich, and
- (d) Then to position the three armies of 21st Army Group East of the Rhine and North of the Ruhr ready for the rapid development of the strategic plan.

The boundaries for the Rhine—crossings between 9th U.S. and 2nd British Army, Buderich—between 2nd British and 1st Canadian Army, Emmerich.

The bridgehead for the first phase was: Duisburg-Dorsten-Aalten-Pannerden. This was to be secured by the 9th U.S. and 2nd British Armies. The inter-army boundary being the River Pipe.

It is well to remember that this operation was the third occasion during the campaign where airborne forces were used in the airborne role. D-Day in Normandy. The attempt to capture and hold the crossings at Arnheim and now, the Rhine crossings. The seizure and successful holding of the Nijmegen bridgehead created the eventual opportunity for our drive through the Reichswald.

For the first phase of the crossing of the Rhine, 2nd Canadian Corps was under the operational command of 2nd British Army, as only one Army H.Q. could exercise control until the development of bridges enabled separate communications to be arranged. 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was placed under 30th British Corps for the initial phase. Later, as the build-up proceeded, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division reverted to 2nd

Canadian Corps. And after the Emmerich crossings had been established, 2nd Canadian Corps returned to 1st Canadian Army.

First Canadian Army's tasks were to hold securely from Emmerich to the sea, ensure the security of the Nijmegen bridgehead, and to ensure security for our use of Antwerp. We were also to be prepared to develop operation to the North and N. E., to cover the left of 2nd British Army, and finally, we had to make plans and preparations to secure the route Arnhem-Zutphen.

Intentions of Second Phase

The Field Marshal intended that the second phase of the Rhine crossings would result in the extension of the bridgehead to the general line Hamm-Munster-Rheine-Almelo-Appeldoorn-Renkum, and that the boundaries between armies should be:

- (a) Right boundary 9th U.S. Army — The bridgehead line from the Rhine North of Duisbemburg, to Dorsten—thence the River Lippe to Hamm.
- (b) Between 9th U.S. and 2nd British from Wesel-Munster.
- (c) Between 2nd British and 1st Canadian Armies — from Emmerich to Borne.

First Canadian Army, having taken over 2nd Canadian Corps and the Emmerich bridgehead, was then to:

- (a) Attack the Ijssel defence from the East.
- (b) Capture Deventer and Zutphen.
- (c) Cross the Ijssel and capture Appeldoorn and the high ground between there and Arnhem.
- (d) Bridge the river at Arnhem and open up the route from Nijmegen, Northwards through Arnhem to the North East.
- (e) We were then to secure a flank facing West and guarantee the route through Arnhem, but we were not to operate further into West Holland.

This extensive program was possible as a result of the arrival in N.W. Europe of H.Q. 1st Canadian Corps, and Corps Troops, 1st Canadian Infantry Division, 5th Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. Thus the whole of the 1st Canadian Army as originally planned was under General Crerar's command for the final phases of the war against Germany.

Three days after the Rhine crossings commenced, Field Marshal Montgomery ordered the Ninth U.S. and 2nd British Armies to thrust for the Elbe, the Ninth on the Magdeburg and

the Second on Hamburg. In his directive, he correctly appreciated the future, when he said, "If we reach the Elbe quickly, we win the war."

On the first of April, H.Q. 1st British Corps reverted to command of 21st Army Corps and took over Corps District responsibilities including Military Government West of the Rhine. We said farewell to General Sir John Crocker and his staff with regret after our long association since the 23rd of July, when 1st British Corps first came under our command.

By the 5th of April, 21st Army Group had joined up with the 12th U.S. Army Group in the Paderborn area. 150,000 Germans were surrounded in the Ruhr.

12th U.S. Army Group had the task of cleaning up the Ruhr and then operating S.E. towards Leipzig and Dresden.

The 2nd British Army was ordered to secure the line of the Weser, and, having captured Bremen, was then to advance its right to the line of the rivers Aller and Leine and to secure bridgeheads over all three rivers. After that, it was to be prepared to advance to secure bridgeheads over the Elbe.

The 9th U.S. Army, back under 12th U.S.A. Army Group, was ordered to protect the right of the Second British Army as far as Hanover, and establish its left firmly on the Der Deister Hills.

Canadian Army Given Two Further Tasks

The immediate task for First Canadian Army to open the route Arnhem-Zutphen remained unchanged. But we were given two further tasks. The first was to clear N.E. Holland, then advance Eastwards to clear the coastal belt as far as the Weser. The second was a definite instruction to commence operations with at least two divisions to clear up Western Holland.

The advance into the West Netherlands began on the 11th April, with an assault crossing over the River IJssel, by 1st Canadian Infantry Division under command of 2nd Canadian Corps. The object was to secure the high ground beyond Appeldoorn and to link up with a co-ordinated thrust from the South by 1st Canadian Corps, across the Neder Rijn.

At this time General Simonds was faced with an interesting task. On the right 4th Canadian Armoured Division was thrusting on the axis Meppen-Oldenburg. In the centre, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division and Armoured Corps were driving North and establishing contact with several thousand Special Air Service troops who had been dropped on the night 7/8 April in the general area Assen-Emmen-Meppel. Their instructions were to range widely over the area, avoid capture, disrupt the enemy columns, and carry out guerrilla tactics.

They were dropped in sticks of ten. A number of armoured jeeps were also dropped in crates. Their efforts were successful and were a valuable contribution to the operations.

To the West, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was striking for the North Sea, and carrying out mopping-up operations. All these operations were directed by General Simonds until 0600 hours on the 13th, when 1st Canadian Infantry Division was placed under command of 1st Canadian Corps.

The Capture of Arnhem

Many plans had been evolved since September, 1944, to secure Arnhem, but the situation had not put them to the test. The eventual plan aimed at securing the high ground beyond Arnhem by crossing the Neder Rijn near its confluence with the River IJssel. The enemy was to be led to believe that the crossing was to be made to the West of Arnhem and thus it was hoped to achieve surprise in this very important operation. 49th (W.R.) Infantry Division, which was to do the assault crossing, was relieved opposite Arnhem by infantry of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade. These formations carried out measures to mislead the enemy.

The 49th (W.R.) Division and armour from 5th Canadian Armoured Division was then transferred to the East bank of the Neder Rijn. The assault was launched at 2240 hours 12th April, using military assault boats, rafts, and landing craft of Naval Force "T". Complete surprise was achieved. A class 40 bridge, assembled upstream in raft sections, was floated down as soon as the far bank had been secured. The plan called for the seizure of Arnhem and exploitation to the North and N.E. to clear the left bank of the IJssel. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division was to strike hard for the high ground to the West of Appeldoorn, to cut the enemy's line of retreat to Amersfoort.

The enemy had been putting up stiff resistance to 1st Canadian Infantry Division in its advance on Appeldoorn. He had transferred a number of his best troops to support the 6th Parachute Division defending Appeldoorn. So when 5th Canadian Armoured Division started its determined thrust, with ideal going beneath its tracks, the enemy was in a most unsatisfactory position.

Communications in the German forces at this stage were poor, and the Parachute Troop Division was unaware of the direction of this new threat to its rear, which compelled a rapid retreat in some confusion.

By nightfall of the 17th, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division had driven through to Barneveld, and had established its Div-

isional H.Q. at Otterloo; 1st Canadian Infantry Division was engaged in the capture of Appeldoorn; 49th (W.R.) Division was still clearing the left bank of the IJssel.

Germans Run Foul of Divisional H.Q.

The night of the 17th April won't be forgotten by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, in particular the Divisional H.Q. and the 17th Canadian Field Regiment. As a result of the German decision to withdraw from Appeldoorn, a large column was retreating on the axis Appeldoorn-Otterloo. The Germans thus ran foul of 5th Canadian Armoured Divisional H.Q. For several hours stern fighting took place. The 17th Canadian Field Regiment engaged the enemy over open sights at point blank range, and in this unusual and hazardous situation lived up to the finest traditions of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. At the Divisional H.Q., an exciting hand to hand engagement took place and the H.Q. personnel at last had an opportunity to demonstrate their skill with rifle, grenade and Sten gun. At the conclusion of this entertainment, large numbers of German dead plus some 500 prisoners testified to the results which can be obtained by steadfast devotion to duty in an emergency when those concerned keep their heads and courage.

By the 19th of April it was intended that First Canadian Army would continue on past the River Weser as far as Hamburg and then clear the Cuxhaven peninsula as well as the Wilhelmshaven-Emden peninsula and, in addition, all the Frisian Islands, but not Heligoland.

However, as operations proceeded, we received instructions to give first priority to clearing N.W. Germany up to the Weser.

At this date the right wing of First Canadian Army was making steady but not rapid progress and its active front stretched from Cloppenburg to the Ems estuary at Delfzijl. It was appreciated that, as the enemy forces were compelled to withdraw, they would be able to develop a strong defensive position in the waterlogged country between Oldenburg and Emden.

Meanwhile, the left wing, in West Holland, was completing the clearing of the Appeldoorn-Nijkerk-Zwolle area and pressing Westward to feel out the Grebbe line running South from Amersfoort which, as we knew, the Germans were prepared to hold with all the means at their disposal. This defensive position was potentially very strong, being supported by the possibilities for flooding which were controlled by the Germans. At some places this flooding had already been started.

The situation map on the 19th of April showed the Second British Army's right flank thrust well forward to Lauenburg. Another thrust had reached Hunstedt. However, on the left of Second British Army, 30th Corps were having difficulty in dealing with the enemy South and West of Bremen, and had as yet been unable to secure Delmenhorst.

The First French Army was in the vicinity of Stuttgart. The 7th U.S. Army was nearing Lorch and advancing South and East with all organized resistance in Nuremburg at an end. The 3rd U.S. Army had advanced beyond Bayreuth and was about to turn S.E. to Salzburg. The 1st U.S. Army had cleared Leipzig and Malie, its armour was on the line of the River Melde, the Hartz pocket was being reduced and it was to firm up on the line of the River Elbe.

The 9th U.S. Army having just disposed of a counter-attack in the Wittenburg area had been instructed to close up to the Elbe

The 15th U.S. Army was holding rear areas.

Operations Develop With Great Rapidity

By the 22nd April, operations were developing with great rapidity on all fronts, and it was exciting to receive our first instructions as to the action to be taken within the 21st Army Group upon making contact with Soviet forces. In brief, these were to halt in the positions then reached, and arrange mutually with the local Russian commanders for the steps necessary to deal with any remaining enemy opposition. These instructions were, I believe, complied with enthusiastically by all concerned, but the objectives for the 1st Canadian Army did not bring us into contact with our Russian Allies.

The Red Army was at this time about to join hands with the Americans south of Berlin and was closing in on Berlin from the South and East. 12th U.S. Army Group had cleaned up the Ruhr pocket and, having reached its Easterly objectives was halting on the Elbe whilst its right wing was about to thrust into the Danube basin, there to meet the Russians and seize Salzburg.

Second British Army had reached the Elbe astride Hamburg and was closing in on Bremen, whilst First Canadian Army had liberated N.E. Holland and isolated the large German forces in Western Holland.

On 22nd April, Field Marshal Montgomery's intentions were to capture Emden, Bremen, Hamburg and Lubeck, and to clean up all German territory North of this general line.

Second British Army was instructed:

- (a) To capture Bremen and clear all the enemy from the Cuxhaven peninsula, between the Elbe and the Weser.
- (b) To cross the Elbe South of Hamburg and at the earliest possible moment.
- (c) And then, to thrust with all speed and capture Lubeck and seal off the Schleswig peninsula, forming a secure East flank on the general line Wisma-Schwerin-Darchow, and finally, to capture Hamburg and Kiel and to clear all German territory up to the Danish frontier.

First Canadian Army's instructions remained as before, but General Crerar was instructed not to operate further Westwards than the line then held East of Amersfoort, since it was then necessary to employ the bulk of the amphibious resources in the operations being conducted by Second British Army.

Certain other gratifying events were taking place. Through the Netherlands Forces of the Interior we had had, as far back as the 16th of April, exploratory representations made to us by Seyss-Inquart, the Reichkommissar in Holland, with the object of reaching an agreement which would enable food supplies to be delivered by us to the Dutch people. These approaches by the Germans were welcome. The difficulties of conducting operations into West Holland were great. For Holland, the results would be calamitous, as great devastation would be inevitable if the Germans put their demolition and inundation schemes into effect. The German force in Holland numbered 120,000.

To cut a long story short, a meeting was held in a little village called Achterveld, where an agreement was reached and arrangements made. The joint staff meetings with the Germans were most interesting, and seemed quite fantastic. The food supply began on schedule and proceeded without incident. Fighting on this front was suspended by unwritten arrangements, as it was essential to pass the food convoys through without interruption.

This dramatic and significant event in the history of Europe, and in particular Holland, was soon overshadowed by the arrival at Field Marshal Montgomery's H.Q., near the Elbe, of representatives of the German High Command, seeking to surrender.

"Cease Fire" was ordered on the front of 21 Army Group with effect from 0800 hours 5th May. For us, the War in Europe was over.

The Scientist and the Services.

(Address delivered by E. LLEWELLYN DAVIES, Esq., O.B.E., at a Meeting of The Alberta Military Institute, held in The Garrison Officers' Mess, on Friday, December 7th, 1945.)

IT WAS an honor indeed to be asked to address this Institute. Your President suggested that I talk about Chemical Warfare but, somewhat regretfully, I had to reply asking to be excused from such a subject and I suggested the topic "The Scientist and the Services".

My reasons for this change were that, while I have spent all my earning life in Chemical Warfare and thus should be able to give a better talk on that subject than on any other, I felt that to give an interesting talk to an audience who know or should know Chemical Warfare as well as you do would mean going into scientific details, and often I might slip into revealing items which were still on the secret list. My other reason for the change was that I felt that the Services knew too little of Scientists just as the Scientists knew too little of the Services, and I felt that anything I could do to help bridge this gap would be very useful and, I hope, of interest to you.

We Think We Helped

According to some articles in the press, it appears that science won this war. To the scientists who have worked for years or perhaps only during the war years, this statement has never been accepted and has never been claimed; but we do proudly claim, and we think with every right, that we helped. Without the sailor, soldier and airman, the efforts of the scientists would have been of very little account; but we feel that any army, however brave and efficient, would have little chance of success in modern warfare unless it makes fullest use of the country's scientific brains.

War is becoming more and more scientific. We are apt to think that this phase commenced in 1915, but it started many centuries ago. The introduction of bows and arrows was relatively quite as big a scientific discovery as the atomic bomb, and I feel



E. LLEWELLYN DAVIES, O.B.E.

certain raised quite as much controversy by the side that did not have it as Chemical Warfare did in the last war or the atomic bomb in this. The losing side thought it very unsporting, unethical and contrary to the then accepted laws of warfare.

Up until the latter part of the last century there had been no properly organized scientific establishments concerned with defence problems. This does not mean that no work was done. In the British Army it was the accepted responsibility of the Royal Engineers to investigate how new scientific discoveries could be applied to war, and in this application of science they were very successful. But something more than application was necessary, so late in the last century organizations were set up in the United Kingdom to carry out research into the problem of new weapons, explosives, etc. The biggest of these in England was, as most of you may know, centred at Woolwich. Here were collected three or four scientific departments concerned mainly with the design and development of new guns, fuses, and all such equipment, also with new explosives and propellants.

Why War Stimulates Research

Every modern war gives scientific research a chance to justify itself, and considerably faster progress is made during war than in peace time. The reasons for this are first—money. No scientist is prepared to work for nothing. He is just another normal human being like yourselves and has to be fed and clothed; but chiefly money is important when it comes to equipment. Rightly or wrongly, scientific equipment is expensive and in peace time, with peace-time economies, these are difficult to obtain. Another reason for the more rapid progress is of course that results are available for assessment. In his cold-blooded way, every defence scientist looks on every action as an experiment and finds out the weaknesses of the equipment he designed when it is subjected to actual battle. In designing weapons, one very important factor which cannot be determined at an experimental station or in a laboratory, however realistic we may try to make the experiments, is the ability of the weapons to kill the enemy or protect our own troops. A new anti-personnel bomb or shell cannot receive its final testing until used in battle, despite the fact that we try every method to make our experimental shoots as complete as possible. Many a weapon which has been assumed excellent after tests, has failed in war. We scientists regret this both from professional pride and from the fact that a failure costs our own sailors, soldiers or airmen many casualties before a modified weapon can be made available.

Dieppe From A Scientist's Standpoint

A battle like that at Dieppe in 1942 is to the scientist an experiment. After working hours we can read the reports and

feel proud of the bravery and skill of the Canadians who took part. During working hours the reports mean something different. When I read the official reports and discussed details officially with officers who had been in the raid, my first task was to determine how our smoke screens and smoke bombs worked. Had they failed? If so, why? What would have been the effect had the Germans used gas? Would it have helped us or hindered us had we used gas? How would flame throwers have affected the raid? At the same time many other organizations were studying their own problems. It was to us just another experiment, a glorious bloody one, and one from which we learned many lessons.

If progress can be so much more rapid in war than in peace, then why cannot we pep up peace-time progress? The answers are given above—lack of real full-scale "experiments", if I may be permitted to call a battle that, and of course money. I hope you won't object to the next statement coming from me, a "foreigner", but the statement is true. Of all the countries in the world, Canada spent less money per capita on research than any other decently organized country. Let me give you the 1935 figures:

	Per capita	% of Nat. Inc'me.
U.S.S.R	\$2.50	1.0
U.S.A.	2.40	0.5
U.K.	.70	0.15
Canada	.25	0.07

Worse than this, on war or defensive research, Canada spent practically nothing in the period 1919-1939. Since then Canada has done an excellent job, and I am proud to have had the opportunity and pleasure of leading one of its best—I feel like saying its best—experimental team, at Suffield.

World War I—"The Chemists' War"

The first World War has often been called by the press the Chemists' War. This is due to the fact that the most devastating new weapon developed then was Chemical Warfare. However, all the other sciences contributed their share, as I shall try to demonstrate later.

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Chemical Warfare should not have come to us as a surprise in April, 1915. In the first place burning oil, sulphur smokes, etc., had been in use many centuries ago. In the second place the attack at Ypres in April, 1915, was the third use of chlorine in a few months, not the first as so many people assume. In reading the intelligence reports of those days, information was available to the staffs of the use of chlorine against the Russians, then against the French before the attack on the Imperials and Canadians. Again, for many weeks previous to this attack, prisoners had given ample information regarding the possible use of gas. With our present knowledge, all the necessary warning was there, but perhaps it is unfair to judge the then staff too harshly, as the significance may not have been as obvious then as it is now.

Had the Germans made full use of their success on that occasion, the result of World War I might have been quite different. The Allied Nations at that time raised the usual cry against any new weapon—that it was callous, and contrary to the rules of war—as if there could be any rules of war! In actual fact, Chemical Warfare is probably the most humane form of warfare. This is demonstrated by the use of H.C.N. (prussic acid gas) by many of the states in the U.S.A. as the most humane form of carrying out a death sentence. This propaganda we raised in 1915, which has continued up to the present time, has been very dangerous, because had gas been used against, say, London during this last war, we would have suffered many more casualties than necessary. I reassured my wife with her young daughter during the Blitz with the statement that, if a 100 kgm bomb fell in our back garden, if it were charged mustard or phosgene, I would say, "Thank God, it was not H.E.", as with reasonable training we had excellent protection. Without training and faith in our equipment, it would have been terrible.

Experimental Stations In Many Countries

As a result of the introduction of Chemical Warfare by the Germans, experimental stations were started in nearly all countries, and in the United Kingdom these various establishments were collected together after World War I at Porton, near Salisbury. After a period in C.W. overseas in the last war I, like others, returned to a university and rejoined Chemical Warfare in 1923. I have been in this service ever since.

As I mentioned before, the chemists (by the way, I am not a chemist) were not the only contributors to World War I. The engineers gave us the early tanks and started mechanization. The aircraft engineers changed something that looked like a kite into an airplane of real use. The doctors had found in the Boer War that Tetanus and Typhoid could decimate armies much faster than the enemy, so they produced inoculations which combatted these diseases and which were proven in World War I. Again, the

surgeons were given new opportunities to test their skill, and surgery made rapid strides and plastic surgery was introduced. The physicists gave us sound ranging, and radio was improved to the stage that we can all now turn on our radios and listen to the Soap Operas, should we so wish.

Chemical Warfare In World War II

Many of you served with the Canadian Army overseas in that very difficult period from 1939 until the invasion of Sicily, or perhaps until D-Day. You all experienced that feeling of frustration that after months and perhaps years of training you were getting no nearer the enemy. You got satisfaction in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and thence on to Germany. Try, gentlemen, to imagine the feelings of my colleagues and myself who have spent between 20 and 30 years in Chemical Warfare and then to see this last war completed without any use being made of weapons and defensive equipment on which we had expended so much sweat and blood.

Why wasn't Chemical Warfare used?

The answer to that question is difficult, but one of the most widely accepted is a really fine compliment to our work and in part balances our natural disappointment. That answer was that we in the United Kingdom were the best gas protected nation in the world in 1939, and the enemy knew that we were capable of an effective retaliation. All the money spent in the years 1919-1939, if looked upon as an insurance premium, was well justified.

The use of gas in this war would most probably have changed the character of the tactics used, and we might have quite well been reduced again to trench warfare with its high casualty rate and slow progress. Try and imagine D-Day to D-Day plus 10 had the Germans used mustard gas to the full extent of their production! Imagine the crossing of the Rhine with that triangle Arnheim-Nijmegen-Wessel heavily contaminated with mustard and all our troops forced into respirators and perhaps oilskin clothing, and those very uncomfortable hoods!

When I visited Germany last June I had the opportunity of seeing some of their experimental stations and we had to admit that these establishments were better equipped than our own, and it was obvious that in the between war period they had spent more money than ourselves—that is if money can be compared from country to country. It is definite, though, that their effort represented many more "man-hours" than that in the U.K., France or U.S., all of whose stations I have had a chance to visit. During the actual war years the U.S.A.'s expenditure easily represented more "man-hours" than Germany or than any of the Allied nations.

Germans Had Much To Learn From Us

It was only natural to find that in some problems the Germans were more advanced than we were; but trying to assess the whole effort in an unbiased way, all of us on this side agreed that they, the Germans, had lots to learn from us. I would like to go into more detail on this, but I am afraid that if I did so I should be breaking security regulations

We, that is the Chemical Warfare scientists, can, however, feel proud of the success of our smoke and flame thrower equipment. One German corps commander, after capture by the Canadian troops, stated that, after the fine fighting spirit of the Canadians, the biggest contributions to the defeat of his corps was the excellent use of smoke and flame throwers

The use of smoke in this war undoubtedly saved many lives and assisted in many successes in battle—as was shown in the crossing of the Rhine. In that important battle, a considerable portion of the 60-mile smoke screen was organized by Major Hugill, who was on our staff at Suffield before becoming G.S.O.2 at Canadian Army Headquarters. Such battles showed the more spectacular use of smoke, but most probably, when considered in the overall war effort, the use of smoke to protect the factories in the U.K. during the difficult period when Canada and the U.S. were "tooling up" was much more important. Again, the large smoke screens put up over dock areas such as Oran in North Africa, and in the bitter and long drawn out battle of Malta, played very important parts in the ultimate victory.

In one arm the U.K. and Canada were well to the front when compared with any of the other allied nations or the Germans. That arm was flame throwers. To the Canadian Army must go the credit of being the most flame thrower conscious, and their early enthusiasm gave the necessary incentive to the development of flame throwers, most of which was carried out in the U.K., but most of the early testing was done at Suffield. The Canadian Army carried out more flame thrower operations than any other army, and we at Suffield are, indeed, very proud of the part, however small, we played in the development and testing of this weapon.

World War II—"War of the Physicists"

As World War I has often been called the Chemists War, this last war has been referred to as the War of Physicists. The physicist gave us R.D.F., afterwards called Radar, and this equipment was one of the vital weapons which enabled the "so few" of Winston Churchill's speech to win the Battle of Britain in 1940 and early 1941.

Other scientific contributions in this war were the Bailey Bridge by the engineers; Pluto and Fido by a combined team of

engineers, chemical engineers and meteorologists; rockets by the chemists and engineers; Penicillin and DDT by the chemists, medical people and entomologists, and of course the very large field of synthetics to which nearly every science has contributed.

The biggest and most talked of scientific development of this war is the Atomic Bomb. The money, enough to keep all of us here and many more in luxurious comfort for the rest of our lives, was supplied by the U.S.A. The basic material was supplied by Canada, and the brains came as a combined effort from the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. I do not intend attempting to go into any details, for the simple reason I don't know them and, again, the American press has published enough on this subject to satisfy the average person. One word of warning—don't think that the atomic bomb does away with the need of the navy, army and air force, and please don't get the impression that all experimental stations other than those dealing with atomic power are now obsolete. Again a warning—don't expect too much in the immediate future from atomic power for civilian use. In the past two years we put so much effort and money (we had to beat the Germans to it) into atomic research that we most probably did about 50 years of peace-time work in two years. Don't expect similar progress when the national pursestrings are drawn tighter.

Co-operation Between the Services and the Scientists

As I have mentioned before, I have spent all my earning life working as a scientist for the services. In that time I have made many very good friendships with the Regular or Permanent sailor, soldier and airman, but always I get the impression that they think me as a "long-haired bastard" trying to devise gadgets and trying to ruin the sportsmanship of war. Two bad examples of this sportsmanship were the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava and the Battle of Passchendaele. All these two actions proved was that the men of the British Commonwealth of Nations were the bravest in the world—period. Men should never be asked to charge massed guns with lances and sabres, neither should infantry be asked to fight mud. This attitude of the, I hope, old-fashioned soldier, must be changed. The scientist is as important in modern war as the personnel who man the aircraft, ships, tanks, guns, etc., developed by the scientist.

On the other hand, the Scientist must not think of the Services as a brainless collection of brass hats on wooden heads. Some scientists unfortunately think that way. We must get together. The criticism thrown by the Services at some scientists is sometimes justified—too many scientists have no conception of war, and don't or won't realize the difficulties involved in the introduction of a new weapon—the change in training, tactics and supply. In mod-

ern war, no country can afford to keep a sufficiently large standing army to fight a future war to a conclusion. Civilians-in-uniform have to be trained, and naturally this training must be short, so simplicity of weapons is important. It is our task as scientists to realize this. Only when we think we have a war-winning weapon, like Chemical Warfare in World War I and the Atomic Bomb of this last war, can we afford to go right out and design weapons judged only on their technical efficiency and then bring pressure to bear on the Services to make superhuman efforts to include them in their tactical or strategical plannings

Question of the Soldier Scientist

Often there has been raised the question of the Soldier-Scientist. One idea is to take a young, highly qualified scientist, send him to R.M.C. or a similar institution for his military training, then post him as a subaltern to, say, an infantry unit; then in about four years' time transfer the officer to a scientific establishment as a scientist; then back to his infantry unit. Gentlemen, I personally am against this scheme, as I think this poor officer would end up as acceptable neither to the scientists nor to the army. What officer in peace time would ever hope to be given the command of a company by his C.O. if he only spent half his time with the unit? Is this officer expected to let his hair grow long for four years, then cut it short for the next four years?

An alternative suggestion has been made, that is, to take a young scientist from the university and send him to R.M.C. for one or two years, then post him for full duty with a normal service unit for about four years. This technical officer would spend the rest of his service life in experimental stations or in technical staff appointments. The purpose of this scheme is to give as many technical officers as possible a good service background. In the immediate post-war years this arrangement is automatic, by taking scientists with overseas experience and making them the nucleus for the technical group of officers. My only objection to this course is that I fear these officers would have a much slower

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rate of promotion than their colleagues in the normal combatant arms of the Services, or their civilian colleagues in definite scientific posts.

I prefer the present arrangement in the United Kingdom—it has its faults but these could be eradicated fairly easily. Our system is that in all experimental stations the research and development work is carried out by scientists, all of them civilians. However, to every station there are attached for two or three year appointments, naval, army and air force officers whose task is to test under practical conditions any equipment developed, to advise the scientists on what they, the Services, can accept, and to keep their Chiefs of Staffs informed regarding progress and how the new equipment is likely to affect strategy and tactics. With very close co-operation along these lines we can, I think, be assured of success.

Too Little Pay—Too Little Authority

Another important factor lies in the conditions of service of the Scientist in the defence organization. In the past he has been given too little pay and too little authority. Again, owing to security regulations, all very necessary, he has not been able to publish his results or discuss his work with his fellow scientists outside government organizations. This has meant that government organizations have not attracted first rate scientists, or when they did, the scientists were unable, owing to the restrictions on publication, to attain the prominence in the scientific world that their ability and work justifies. Similar restrictions on publication apply in industry, and during the past twenty-five years industry has realized the difficulties and has compensated the scientists for loss of prestige in their own world by larger remunerations. All this sounds like propaganda. If it does, I am sorry, but I feel that something must be done. It is only after a war has started that we can recruit the best scientific brains into war research, results cannot be expected for a year or two. In the next war this may be too late. You are the tax payers, you have to pay for all the Canadian experimental stations. Don't put us in the position of having to close down and so be badly behind our enemies in the next war. Or—put more optimistically—help us to put the English speaking nations in such a strong position that all war-like nations will think twice before starting another war.

Long-Range Objective Defined

To support these statements, I would like to quote three famous scientists: First, D. T. Compton, President of M.I.T., who has defined the long-range personnel objective of defence research as follows:

"The membership of the Research Board for National Security must not be static. It must not be allowed to develop into a group of old men who look back on their experience in World

War II. Of necessity it must start out with men, involved in World War II, but as rapidly as possible new and younger scientists should be continually fed into the picture. The criterion should be: **who are the men who would most effectively lead the scientists of this country if war should break out next year?"**

Again, Dr. Vannevar Bush, the leading defense authority in the U.S.A., says:

"The position of the technical man in uniform must be improved. It is not enough merely that technical and scientific planning be done at the level of high command. The position of the technical man should be improved throughout the length and breadth of both Services "

Again, to demonstrate the steps that are normally followed in technical development, I intend quoting from a report of Dr. Donald Rose, who was until recently Scientific Advisor to the Chief of Staff and is now Chief Superintendent of the Canadian Armament Research Development Establishment. This illustration is in the form of a table which I have here and which I will try to explain.

TECHNICAL PROGRESS CHART

Phase	Part
1 Scientific principle, invention or discovery.	A Pure research, no industrial motive
2 Measurement of the phenomenon discovered	
3 Suggestion of application	
4. Construction of first workable equipment	B Applied research where scientists trained in "A" are essential.
5. Development of prototype for first demonstration trials	
6 Test of prototype and first user trials	C Development by engineers with production in mind.
7. Engineering design of production model.	
8 Tooling and manufacture	D. Pure manufacture and use.
9 Inspection.	
10. Acceptance trials and use	

Let me conclude by thanking you for the opportunity of submitting a case for the scientist. Please remember that my colleagues and myself have never claimed that science can win any war, we only claim we can help, but conversely we do feel that without us you cannot win any modern battle.

The Annual General Meeting, 1945

THE Annual Meeting of the Institute was held in the Armouries in Calgary on Thursday, January 31st, 1946. The meeting was called to order at 8.15 p.m., Captain R. C. Carlile presiding. The following were in attendance:

F/Lt. W. C. Carruthers, Major W. G. Ledingham, Major L. W. H. Randall, Brig. L. W. Miller, Col. E. R. Knight, Capt. W. St. J. Miller, Major A. Maw, Major S. R. Farquharson, Capt. G. G. Pook, Col. D. G. L. Cunningham, F/Lt. J. K. Farley, Major E. C. Cosstick, Major J. S. Peppard, Lt.-Col. W. H. Broadberry, Lieut. W. Norman Smith, F/Lieut. G. Zetterstrand, F/Lieut. H. T. Hetherington, F/O. G. L. Carter, Major J. D. Middlemass, Capt. J. E. Treacy, Major H. M. Hunter, Major P. W. Higgs, Lt.-Col. T. Jenkins, Capt. T. W. Laybourne, Major J. M. Gardiner, Major J. H. R. Thomson, Lt.-Col. H. H. Riley, Sub-Lieut. F. Tempest, Sqd.-Ldr. H. F. Francis, Lieut. A. F. Trickey, 2/Lt. H. Earle, Major L. H. Chapman, Lt.-Col. J. Begg, Lieut. H. Adair, Major H. Chambers, Major J. R. Harkness, Lt.-Col. G. M. Ewens, Capt. D. E. Cashion, Major J. U. Acton, Lt.-Col. H. E. Wright, Lieut. M. H. Robinson, Col. N. D. Dingle, Capt. R. C. Carlile, Lt.-Col. G. E. Leighton, Lt.-Col. J. W. Littleton, Capt. E. L. Harvie, Col. J. Fred Scott, Lt.-Col. D. F. Rogers, Major L. G. McCarthy, Capt. T. W. Beaver, Major A. J. Davis.

The President tendered the regrets of Col. E. T. Snow, D.O.C., (who had advised that he was unable to be present) remarking at the same time that it was a great pleasure to have four of the Past Presidents present. Col. Leighton was present representing District Officer Commanding.

Membership

Twenty-one applications were recommended by the Directors and elected to membership on motion of Col. N. D. Dingle and Major J. V. Acton.

Minutes

Minutes of the last Annual Meeting held on Monday, February 5th, 1945, having been printed in the Annual Journal of 1944, it was moved by Major R. Farquharson, seconded by Col. D. G. L. Cunningham, that the minutes be taken as read—Carried.

Report of President

Capt. R. C. Carlile read the report of the activities of the Institute during 1945.

It was moved by Col. E. R. Knight, seconded by Major W. G. Ledingham, that the report be received and approved,

and a hearty vote of thanks be extended to the President and Directors for successful year.—Carried.

Librarian

Lt. M. H. Robinson read report of the Librarian for the year 1945.

It was moved by Lt. M. H. Robinson, seconded by Capt. W. St. J. Miller, that the report be received and approved and grant of \$25 00 authorized for 1946.—Carried.

Auditor's Report

Report of the Auditor, Lieut. F. J. Butler, was read, certifying that all the books, accounts and securities of the Institute for the year 1945 had been examined and found correct.

It was moved by Sqd./Ldr. H. F. Francis, seconded by Sub/Lieut. J. Tempest, that the report be received and adopted.—Carried

Financial Statement

The Treasurer stated that copies of the Financial Statement for 1945 had been mailed to all members. He read report regarding the accounts for the year.

It was proposed by Major L. G. McCarthy, seconded by Capt J. E. Treacy, that the statement be received and adopted.—Carried

A. M. I. Cadets

Major L. H. Chapman read report of the A. M. I. Cadet Committee

Moved by Major L. H. Chapman, seconded by Brigadier L. W. Miller, that the report be received and approved, the Directors authorized to spend up to \$300.00 during 1946, also that Liability Insurance be carried during 1946 as well as Insurance on Band Instruments —Carried.

Brigadier L. W. Miller, D.S.O., stated: "Nineteen years ago the Cadet Corps was mainly financed by the Institute I think that the progress has been really wonderful. I would not be surprised if it was the leading Cadet Corps in Canada. When I came in here I could not help thinking of the old days, when we organized here. That was in 1919—there was General Bell, Colonel Spry, Pearkes and myself It does, however, give me great pleasure to be here with you tonight and to be with you all once again. I am quite sure that all our friends in Victoria send a message of welcome to you—General Pearkes, Brigadier Connolly and the rest".

Clerical Work

Directors recommend that a sum not exceeding \$150.00 be authorized for clerical assistance to the Treasurer and that a sum not exceeding \$150.00 be authorized for the Secretary in 1946.

It was moved by Col. J. Fred Scott, seconded by Lt.-Col. J. Begg, that the recommendation be approved.—Carried.

Annual Journal - 1946

The Directors recommended that the Annual Journal containing the activities and lectures during 1946 be published.

It was moved by Col. D. G. L. Cunningham, seconded by Major L. G. McCarthy, that the recommendation be approved.—Carried.

Vimy Dinner - 1946

The Directors recommended that the Vimy Dinner be held on or about April 9, 1946

Moved by Major J. H. R. Thomson, seconded by Major R. Farquharson, that the recommendation be approved.—Carried

Ball - 1946

The Directors suggested that the incoming Directors be authorized to consider the holding of a Ball during the fall of 1946.

Moved by Lt.-Col. H. E. Wright, seconded by Col. N. D. Dingle, that the recommendation be approved.—Carried

Garrison Officers Mess

Moved by Major W. G. Ledingham, seconded by Lt.-Col. G. Leighton, that the Directors be empowered to make the necessary arrangements with the Garrison Officers' Mess for meetings and supplying of refreshments in 1946.—Carried

Nomination of Officers - 1946.

In accordance with Section VII of the Constitution and By-laws the following nominations were submitted:

President	Lt.-Col. H. E. Wright, E.D.
Vice-President	Lt.-Col. J. Begg, D.S.O., E.D.
Secretary	Major A. J. Davis, E.D.
Treasurer	Major L. G. McCarthy

Directors

Col. J. Fred Scott, O.B.E., E.D.	S/L H. F. Francis
Major L. H. Chapman, E.D.	Major M. A. Ellissen, M.C.
Major J. H. R. Thomson, O.B.E.	Major A. Maw, M.C.
Sub/Lt. F. Tempest	

Election

There being no further nominations the President declared those elected

President - 1946

Lt-Col H. E Wright in assuming the chair as President said: "It is my first pleasant duty to move a hearty vote of thanks to our Immediate Past President, Captain R. C. Carlile. I appreciate very much indeed the honour you have shown me in electing me as President of the Institute for 1946. I wish to voice my thanks to those who were interested enough in suggesting Directors and the Nominating Committee in presenting me with the slate of Officers that they have. This year, which is the first year of Peace, we are hoping to foster and obtain closer liaison with the Reserve Army."

Calling attention to "the choice of a particularly good slate of officers," Col D. G L Cunnington expressed the hope that in future years there would be a return "to the old system of having more Directors nominated than there are vacancies." This had not been practicable during the war, but "election of Directors has a good deal to do with the interest of the members in the annual meeting," and "it is some satisfaction to the Directors to feel that they have won an election."

Vote of Thanks to Press

Moved by Major A. J. Davis, seconded by Capt R C Carlile, that a vote of thanks be extended to the Albertan and Herald for their co-operation during the year—Carried

The meeting closed at 10 o'clock with the singing of the National Anthem, after which refreshments were served.

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The Alberta Military Institute Membership List

THE utmost effort has been made to bring the membership list up-to-date, in spite of numerous changes of station and private addresses. If any member is aware of a change which has not come to the Directors' notice, he will confer a favor by notifying the Secretary.

PAST PRESIDENTS

Colonel G. E. Sanders, C.M.G., D.S.O.	1920-21
(Late) Colonel George Macdonald, V.D.	1922
(Late) Lt.-Col. J. N. Gunn, D.S.O., V.D.	1923
Deputy Commissioner J. W. Spalding, R.C.M.P.	1923
(Late) Major-General D. W. B. Spry, O.B.E., V.D.	1925
Lt.-Col. G. H. Whyte, M.C.	1926
Colonel D. G. L. Cunningham, M.C., V.D.	1927
Major H. W. McGill, M.C., V.D.	1928
(Late) Major A. N. Martin	1929
(Late) Lt.-Col. D. Ritchie, M.C.	1930
Lieut. Hugh C. Farthing	1931
(Late) Major General L. F. Page, D.S.O.	1932
Colonel E. R. Knight, V.D.	1933
Major-General D. J. McDonald, D.S.O., M.C.	1934
Lt.-Col. D. H. Tomlinson, M.B.E., V.D.	
Lt.-Col. J. W. Littleton, M.C.	1935
Lt.-Col. H. Pryde, E.D.	1936
Colonel N. D. Dingle, V.D.	1937
Colonel H. C. A. Hervey, V.D.	1938
Brigadier H. G. Nolan, M.C.	1939
Lt.-Col. A. C. Cooper-Johnston, M.C., V.D.	1940
Lt.-Col. E. R. Selby, D.S.O., V.D.	1941
Major N. A. Campbell	1942
Capt. D. C. Sinclair	1943
(Late) Lieut. T. W. Collinge	1944
Capt. R. C. Carlile	1945

LIFE MEMBERS

Major-General A. H. Bell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
 Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., D.S.O., M.C.
 Colonel G. E. Sanders, C.M.G., D.S.O.
 Hon. Colonel Viscount Bennett, E.D., P.C., K.C., LL.B., LL.D.

HONORARY MEMBERS

The Most Rev. L. Ralph Sherman, M.A., D.D.
 L. W. Brockington, Esq., K.C.

RESIDENT MEMBERS

A

Acton, J. U., Major, E.D.
Adair, H., Lieut.
Adams, J. M., Major.
Adams, S. A., Major.
Alexander, L. G., O.B.E., M.C., Major.
Allan, C. W. Mr
Anderson, J. C., Capt.
Annand, S. A., Lieut.
Armstrong, W. H., 2/Lieut
Appleton, F. L., Major.

B

Baker, A. H., Capt
Ballachey, F. G., F/O
Ballard, C. P., Lieut.
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
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